Speculative claims about Russian/Chinese involvement in Snowden's Hong Kong movements

The Question of When | 163 just research him,” he replied. As we know now, he pointed out, Rus- sia and China probably had access to the 127-page standard form in his personnel file that he updated in 2011. They also had the capa- bility to track his air travel to Hong Kong. “Could someone have steered him to Hong Kong?” I asked. He answered, with a shrug, “That depends on whether Snowden had a confidante who could have influenced him.” Whenever adversaries became aware of Snowden in this scenario, it was not until after he copied the NSA secrets and took them with him to Hong Kong that Russian intelligence officers offered him a deal. So from the Russian point of view, Snowden had already burned his bridges. Because he had used other people’s passwords and access privileges to get into computers that he was not authorized to use, illegally moved documents, and given a false reason for his medi- cal leave, it was only a matter of time, as he told Greenwald in his interview in Hong Kong, before NSA investigators would identify him as a possible spy. He could be of no further use at the NSA to an adversary. His intelligence value now lay in the documents he had © taken with him or stored in the cloud as well as his ability to help © clarify them in debriefing sessions. He could also inflict damage on the morale and public standing of the NSA by denouncing its spying in the media. Once Snowden was in Hong Kong, the Russians would have no reason to restrain him from holding a press event or releasing a video. In fact, the KGB had organized press conferences for all the previous NSA defectors to Moscow. Hong Kong was a perfect venue for a well-staged media event because all the major newspapers in the world had bureaus there. Snowden’s disclosures about NSA spy- ing could serve to weaken the NSA’s relations with its allies. It is also possible that Russian or Chinese intelligence did not become aware of Snowden until after he went public in June by having The Guardian release his video. The video would have con- vinced the Russians or the Chinese of how dissatisfied Snowden was with the NSA. Because dissatisfaction is one of the classic means of recruitment in the intelligence business, he would certainly become a prime target for recruitment after he went public. The CIA also considered the possibility that Snowden might | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 163 ® 9/29/16 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019651