Skip to main content
Skip to content
Case File
d-17126House OversightOther

NSA’s expanded compliance reporting to FISA court and oversight board creates bureaucratic burden

The passage outlines internal NSA reporting requirements and oversight mechanisms after Snowden, but offers no concrete new allegations, transactions, or misconduct involving high‑level officials. It NSA required to retrieve billing records of foreign‑origin calls and share with FBI Multiple layers of compliance reporting to DoD, ODNI, DOJ, and a presidential Oversight Board DoJ lawyers reviewed

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #019692
Pages
1
Persons
1
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

The passage outlines internal NSA reporting requirements and oversight mechanisms after Snowden, but offers no concrete new allegations, transactions, or misconduct involving high‑level officials. It NSA required to retrieve billing records of foreign‑origin calls and share with FBI Multiple layers of compliance reporting to DoD, ODNI, DOJ, and a presidential Oversight Board DoJ lawyers reviewed

Tags

oversightgovernment-complianceprivacygovernment-oversightfisalegal-exposurehouse-oversightnsasurveillance

Ask AI About This Document

0Share
PostReddit

Extracted Text (OCR)

EFTA Disclosure
Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
204 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS made from phones originating outside the United States by known foreign jihadists. If these calls were made to individuals inside, the NSA was now authorized to retrieve the billing records of the per- son called and those people whom he or she called. These traces were then supplied to the FBI. The new duties also increased the NSA’s need to create new bureaucratic mechanisms to monitor its compli- ance with FISA court orders. Rajesh De, the NSA’s general counsel at the time of the Snowden breach, described the NSA as becoming by 2013 “one of the most regulated enterprises in the world.” Grafted onto its intelligence activities were layers of mandated reporting to oversight officials. Not only did the NSA have its own chief compli- ance officer, chief privacy and civil liberties officer, and independent inspector general, but the NSA also had to report to a different set of compliance officers at the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Justice. Additionally, the Department of Justice dispatched a team of lawyers every sixty days to review the results of “every single tasking deci- sion” approved by the FISA court. © According to De, just assembling these reports involved thousands © of hours of manpower. In addition, the president’s Oversight Board required that the NSA’s Office of the General Counsel and inspec- tor general supply it every ninety days with a list of every single error and deviation from procedure made by every NSA employee anywhere in the world, including even minor typing errors. These requirements, according to De, inundated a large part of the NSA legal and executive staff in a sea of red tape. Yet this regulation could not undo surveillance programs such as the one Snowden revealed of Verizon’s turning over the billing records of its customers to the NSA, because the NSA was in compliance with the FISA court order (even though, as it turned out in 2015, the FISA court might have erred in interpreting the law). The NSA’s focus on surveillance might have led to the neglect of its other mission: protecting the integrity of the channels through which the White House, government agencies, and military units send information. This task had been made vastly more difficult by the proliferation of computer networks, texting, and e-mails. To protect government networks from cyber attacks, the Penta- | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 204 ® 9/30/16 8:13AM | |

Related Documents (6)

DOJ Data Set 8CorrespondenceUnknown

EFTA00036739

0p
DOJ Data Set 9OtherUnknown

Display Name

Display Name Email UUID 6ICE9350-0B4F-0000-AB39-E8Of'2A59A443 Distribution 'I've TO Recipient Type SysternGroupMember Recipient Display Name Email IRA D 9D77B2D0-19C1-0000-A9894Y2C00000S8D0 Distribution Type TO Recipient Tvpc SystemGroupkkmber Recipient Display Name Email _ U LID 4237CDC0-1407-0000-AF20-8402120084D2 Distribution Type TO Recipient Type _Recipient Display Name a Email UUID 66E64C10-1320-0000-8ECI-2F2162868DCC Distribution Type TO Recipient Txpe SystemGroupMember Expire 0 Delay delivers until 0 Delegated fake Archived fake Read fake Deleted fake Opened fake Completed fake Security Normal Box type Inbox Return notification hen opened fake Return notification "hen deleted fake Return notification when completed fake Return notification %%hen declined fake Return notification "hen accepted false Archive S'en ion 5.3 Internal ID 5D4F0066.NYMDOMLNYMADMI.100.16B6F30.1.F EAE. b@II.NYMDOM LNY MADM 1.103.0.1.0.141

1000p
DOJ Data Set 9OtherUnknown

Cc "Ml==

From: To: Cc "Ml== IMIMIS> Subject: Re: (no subject) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 02:47:11 +0000 Importance: Normal Thank you. OR 12, 2019 10:34 pm, ie wrote: A brief account of the BOP staff interviews for 8/12 are as follows: - 4 staff members were interviewed. The Warden, the Capt, one Lt. and one guard. - The 3 executive staff members (Warden, Capt, and Lt) provided similar information regarding procedures and how they each followed those procedures. This generally entailed the notification process following the discovery of Epstein and the timeline of those notifications. This information was consistent with information previously obtained. - The one guard interviewed, was the guard that facilitated the unrecorded phone call with advised that his shift ended at 7pm on 8/9, and that when Epstein returned to his cell following his attorney meeting, he requested the phone call. This was close to the time to due scheduled to be at the end of his shift and he rushed th

1p
DOJ Data Set 9OtherUnknown

90A-NY-3151227 Serial 64

90A-NY-3151227 Serial 64 FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10) •1 of 1. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date of entry 08/28/2019 On August 16, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) III , New York, NY, Special Agent (SA) , SA , TFO , OIG Investigator and MCC Lt. interviewed LEONARDO FERNANDEZ, MCC Inmate #86824-054. After being advised of the identities of the agents and the purpose of the interview, FERNANDEZ provided the following information: On Friday (August 09, 2019), FERNANDEZ was housed in Cell 218 on L-TIER of the Special Housing Unit within MCC. He received a visit from his girlfriend, TYRELYSHANTI CRIAG, that day. He was suspected of receiving contraband at the visit and was placed in the dry room for approximately 25 hours. FERNANDEZ was then moved to K tier Cell 111. FERNANDEZ last day being housed in L Tier was Friday (August 9, 2019) prior to his visit. FERNANDEZ remembers that JEFFREY EPSTEIN would be in legal from approximately 9am to 9pm and he was

476p
Dept. of JusticeAug 22, 2017

11 MAY 25-MAY 27 901_Redacted.pdf

Kristen M. Simkins From: Irons, Janet Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2016 11-29 AM To: Richard C. Smith Cc: Jeffrey T. We Subject: Meeting with Prison Society tomorrow Hello Warden Smith, I'm writing in preparation for our meeting with you and Director Hite tomorrow at 9:30 to talk about the Law Library. We have been in touch with Kim Kelmor, Assistant Director ofthe Law Library at Penn State, who has experience with prison libraries. She has helpfully provided us with some questions and guida

186p
DOJ Data Set 10OtherUnknown

EFTA01655397

4p

Forum Discussions

This document was digitized, indexed, and cross-referenced with 1,400+ persons in the Epstein files. 100% free, ad-free, and independent.

Annotations powered by Hypothesis. Select any text on this page to annotate or highlight it.