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d-17806House OversightOther

Israeli Prime Minister’s Camp David Statement Reflects Disappointment Over Unmet Peace Steps

The passage is a personal recollection without specific names, dates, transactions, or actionable allegations. It mentions President Clinton and Camp David but provides no concrete leads on misconduct Speaker identifies as Israeli Prime Minister and former special‑forces commander. Expresses disappointment that planned peace initiatives over the past 14 days did not materialize. References a prior

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #011472
Pages
1
Persons
0
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

The passage is a personal recollection without specific names, dates, transactions, or actionable allegations. It mentions President Clinton and Camp David but provides no concrete leads on misconduct Speaker identifies as Israeli Prime Minister and former special‑forces commander. Expresses disappointment that planned peace initiatives over the past 14 days did not materialize. References a prior

Tags

israelpolitical-statementmilitary-backgroundcamp-davidhouse-oversightpeace-process

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Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
Night Flight They say that you can read a person’s feelings on his face. But if so, either I’m a very good actor — the opposite of what anyone who has worked closely with me would tell you — or the journalists clustered in front of me weren’t very good face-readers. They said that I looked defeated. Distressed. Depressed. Yet as I delivered my brief final statement outside an olive-green cabin at Camp David, the American presidential retreat in the forested Catoctin hills north of Washington, I felt none of those things. Yes, I was disappointed. I realised that what had happened over the last 14 days, or more crucially what had not happened, was bound to have serious consequences, both for me personally, as Prime Minister of Israel, and for my country. But I had been a politician, at that point, for all of five years. By far most of my life, I had spent in uniform. As a teenager, small and slight and not even shaving yet, I was one of the founding core of a unit called Sayveret Matkal, Israel’s equivalent of America’s Delta Force, or Britain’s SAS. It may be that the way I thought and acted, the way I dealt with danger or with crises, came from someplace inside me. Even as a young kid, I was always quiet, serious, contemplative. But my 13 years as a part of Israel’s main special-forces unit, especially once I became its commander, etched those qualities more deeply. And they added new ones: a sense that you could never plan a mission too carefully or prepare too assiduously; an understanding that what you thought, and certainly what you said, mattered a lot less than what you did. And above all the realisation that, when one of our nighttime commando operations was over, whether it had succeeded or failed, you had to take a step back. Evaluate things accurately, coolly, without illusions. Then, in the light of how the situation had changed, you had to decide how best to move forward. That approach, to the occasional frustration of the politicians and diplomats working alongside me during this critical stage of Israel’s history, had guided me from the moment I became Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the White House and moving on to Camp David — I had mapped out at great length, in great detail, every one of the steps I knew we would have to take to confront the central issue facing Israel: the need for peace. 1

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