Plaintiffs Seek Personal Jurisdiction Over Saudi Prince Sultan Over Alleged Terror‑Financing Links

812 jurisdiction). “If a plaintiff has identified a genuine issue of jurisdictional fact, juris- dictional discovery is appropriate even in the absence of a prima facie showing as to the existence of jurisdiction.” Daventree, 349 F.Supp.2d 7386 at 761, 2004 WL 2997881, at *20 (citing Im re Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 207-08). Courts are not obligated to subject a foreign de- fendant to discovery, however, where the allegations of jurisdictional facts, con- strued in plaintiffs’ favor, fail to state a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction or where discovery would not uncover suffi- cient facts to sustain jurisdiction. Jd. (cit- ing Jazini, 148 F.3d at 183-85 (granting motion to dismiss and denying jurisdiction- al discovery where complaint was de- scribed as “sparse” and “conclusory”)); see also Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Consolidated, Nos. 97 Civ. 2262, 98 Civ. 9186(MBM), 2000 WL 284222, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2000) (granting motion to dismiss and denying request for juris- dictional discovery where the complaint stated, without any supporting facts, that the defendant “participates in a ‘multina- tional insurance arrangement’ present in the State of New York”); Im re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, 230 F.Supp.2d at 410-413 (granting motion to dismiss and denying jurisdictional discovery where complaint only contained conclusory alle- gations). D. Application of Plaintiffs’ Theo- ries to Moving Defendants 1. Prince Sultan The Court outlined the allegations against Prince Sultan in Part I.B.1. With respect to Prince Sultan’s contacts with the United States, Plaintiffs allege that “Saudi Royal family members own sub- stantial assets in the United States of America, and do substantial business in the United States of America, the profits of which in part, are used to fund interna- 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES tional terrorist acts, including those which led to the murderous attacks of September 11, 2001.” See Ashton Complaint 1296. There is no indication of whether these unspecified members of the Royal family include Prince Sultan. Most Plaintiffs also claim Prince Sultan is the ex-officio Chair- man of the Board of Saudi Arabia Airlines, “which does business in the United States and internationally.” Burnett Complaint 1340; Ashton Complaint 1253; Barrera Complaint 1255; Salvo Complaint 1245; Tremsky Complaint 1180. The Federal Plaintiffs do not make a similar allegation. [57] To the extent these allegations are an attempt to establish general jurisdiction over Prince Sultan, they are insufficient. See In ve Baan Co. Sec. Litig, 245 F.Supp.2d 117, 180 (D.D.C.2003) (refusing to hold that control status in foreign corpo- ration with United States office is suffi- cient for personal jurisdiction over individ- ual); Cornell, 2000 WL 284222, at *2 (granting motion to dismiss where com- plaint contained one conclusory statement regarding jurisdiction); Family Internet, Inc. v. Cybernex, Inc, No. 98 Civ. 06377RWS), 1999 WL 796177, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1999) (holding that per- sonal jurisdiction must be individually es- tablished over corporate officers even when the court has personal jurisdiction over the corporation itself). [58] Proceeding under the purposefully directed activities theory of personal juris- diction, Plaintiffs argue that Prince Sultan knew or should have known the organiza- tions to which he donated were funneling money to al Qaeda and that al Qaeda’s primary target was the United States. Consol. Plaintiffs’ Opp. at 23. Prince Sul- tan argues that his alleged actions cannot satisfy the minimum contacts requirement since the Second Circuit’s recent descrip- tion of Calder requires “primary partici- pa[tion] in intentional wrongdoing.” See HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017877