Court dismisses tort claims alleging support for al‑Qaeda via front charities

In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) The district court also dismissed many other non-Federal plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims for assault and battery, trespass, and wrongful death and survival on the ground that plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendants had “supported, aided and abetted, or conspired with the September 11 terrorists” in a manner that warranted liability. SPA101-02 (SAMBA J); SPA87-88 (Terrorist Attacks IT); SPA53-54 (Terrorist Attacks I). The court dismissed corresponding wrongful death and survival claims, as well as the Federal Ins. plaintiffs’ trespass claims, on the same grounds. SPA231-32, 252-53 & n.12 (Terrorist Attacks V); SPA101-02 (SAMBA J); SPA88, 98 (Terrorist Attacks IT); SPA53-54, 61-62 (Terrorist Attacks I). As the court recognized, however, because the ATA incorporates state tort law causes of action, liability under the plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims, wrongful death and survival claims, and trespass claims is necessarily coextensive with liability under the ATA. SPA88 (Terrorist Attacks IT) (“If Plaintiffs state a claim for relief under the ATA, they will have also stated a claim for wrongful death and survival, the Federal Plaintiffs will have stated a claim for trespass, and the Aston and Burnett Plaintiffs will have stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional *149 distress.”). Because the complaints state claims under the ATA for knowingly providing material support to al-Qaeda, see supra Pomt LA & LB, the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims -- like its dismissal of the ATA claims -- should be vacated. 2. Defendants Who Supported al-Qaeda Through Its Network Are Liable. Finally, in its most recent opinion, the district court held that the intentional tort claims against some defendants (precisely which ones, the court does not say) fail because plaintiffs “broaden the scope of liability to include those who allegedly aided, abetted, conspired and/or provided material support to other terrorist organizations that were affiliated with al Qaeda.” SPA231-32 (Terrorist Attacks V). The court appears to have concluded that because plaintiffs alleged that some defendants supported front charities and institutions in the larger al-Qaeda network that funnel money to the organization, rather than, say, wrote a check directly payable to “al Qaeda,” plaintiffs therefore have not alleged that defendants supported al-Qaeda at all. To the extent that this is what the court meant, then Judge Daniels -- who took over the MDL litigation after Judge Casey passed away -- advances a line of reasoning never endorsed by his predecessor. Indeed, *150 this line of reasoning would be contrary to the court’s own prior statements of law, if not its applications thereof. Cf SPA24 (Terrorist Attacks IT) (“The Court is not ruling as a matter of law that a defendant cannot be liable for contributions to organizations that are not themselves designated terrorists. But [the defendant must have] kn[own] the receiving organization to be a solicitor, collector, supporter, front or launderer for such an entity.”). More problematic than inconsistency, however, is the fact that the court’s rationale is incorrect. Support for a terrorist organization can be just as intentional if provided directly to the organization as if provided through an intermediary or agent certain to pass the funds to the terrorists. For this reason, courts have repeatedly recognized that material supporters of terrorism may be found liable “even where support wasn’t provided directly” to the attackers, but rather through “support to an alias or agent.” Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 432; cf Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 373 F.3d at 157-58 (“Just as it is silly to suppose” that State Department designations of terrorist organizations did not survive organizational name changes, “so too it is implausible to think that Congress” did not “authorize the Secretary to prevent” terrorist organizations “from marshaling all the same support via juridically separate agents subject to its *151 control.”). And, such a rule would have provide a ready path for terrorist organizations to shield their financiers from liability -- simply by placing having the financier contribute to a cooperative intermediary. See Companion Brief at Point I.A.3 (describing implications of excluding from liability indirectly provided support for terrorism); see Boim ITI, 549 F.3d at 690-91 (shielding a financier from liability would exclude from the operation of the law precisely those parties most likely be deterred by the prospect of liability). Plaintiffs have consistently alleged in their pleadings that al-Qaeda operates through an integrated network of institutions and individuals. E.g., R.3779-80. The district court, for its part, cited no authority in support of its “al Qaeda-only” principle, which departs from both precedent and common sense. The dismissals of plaintiffs’ tort claims predicated upon it should be vacated. V. The Court Should Reverse The Dismissals Of NCB and the Sovereign Defendants Based Upon Doe v. Bin Laden WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023407