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Morgan Stanley | RESEARCH
For Ares, we believe conversion makes sense, given the company
is largely a play on fee related earnings from draw down funds,
separately managed accounts, and their relationship with ARCC, the
publicly traded business development company. Earnings from per-
formance fees at ARES are a smaller portion of overall profitability,
which is furthered by relatively higher compensation payout on per-
formance fee revenues, which in turn approach 80% in strategies
such as private equity vs. peers typically in the 45-55% range. The
company could benefit as a first mover and if the stock price reacts
favorably, we could see other alternative peers follow suit.
Apollo in our view may stand to benefit the most from conver-
sion with the best risk reward skew in our analysis using a SOTP
framework. Why? Similar to ARES, the company has meaningful
fee-related earnings as a percentage of overall operating income.
This is largely driven by their advisory relationship with Athene,
where APO earns a fee on ~$74b of assets and should benefit from
additional management fees from the company©most recent $24b
flagship private equity fund.
Our deep dive suggests Apollo has relatively longer-duration
stickier assets under management vs. peers, which gives us
greater confidence in APO® fee-related earnings stability,
growth, and potential for a re-rating. ApolloOAUM has a 12-year
duration on average (measured as outflows and realizations as a per-
centage of beginning of period AUM). This is noticeably better than
HLNE@at 9.1 years, which trades at 23.4x P/E, and below Partners
Group of 16.7 years, which trades at 28x P/E.
We see Blackstone as potentially less likely to convert, but see
amore nuanced story at KKR given their token dividend policy;
for both we do not see as much valuation upside from are-rating
of FRE multiples. BX and KKR have larger concentration to perform-
ance fees and as a result we see less of an impact to potential upside
should fee related earnings multiples re-rate. Our estimated tax rates
for KKR and BX are also significantly Lower than the group given the
earnings mix and other offsets. We see a greater downside to current
share prices if there was a conversion that had a higher tax drag and
multiples did not expand. That said, KKR has a history of making
major changes, such as its payout policy change in 2015 that
sharply reduced the dividend with a shift in strategy to grow book
value. At the time we thought such a change by KKR was a prelude
NORTH AMERICA INSIGHT ~~
i. od
to converting to a C-corp, as we wrote here. However, the stock has
lagged and KKR@limited/token dividend means investors do not
receive the full benefit of a flow through partnership structure
with single-layer taxation. So we again raise the question, Why not
convert to a C-corp with a token dividend that is effectively single
layer taxation?
C-corp Conversion Could Be the Catalyst
to Unlock Value and Drive Multiple
Expansion
The alternative asset managers trade at a steep discount to
broader financial peers. We believe this is largely due to 4 factors:
1) volatility of the earnings (particulary performance fees) and ques-
tions as to alpha persistency going forward by public market inves-
tors, 2) complicated business models, 3) corporate governance
concerns, and 4) corporate structure as a partnership. We do not
expect to see the first three factors change, but conversion could
make a meaningful difference by:
1) Expanding the universe of eligible investors in the Alts,
2) Alleviating the tax complexities of current K-1 tax reporting,
3) Unlocking value via multiple re-rating, particularly for manage-
ment fee-related earnings in the widely used sum-of-the-parts valua-
tion for Alts. We could also see incremental upside to current
valuations if multiples on performance fee earnings adjust upward
(more details below).
Exhibit 3:
Alts trade on average FY2 of 10.5x, a 28% discount on average to other
financials subsectors
Alts vs. Financial Subsectors P/E
m2018P/E Alts % Discount/Premium (RHS)
30.0x x ; 10%
25.0x 7% ee , 0%
22.1x
: | tii ‘Oxi an 7 + : | 0%
= I Thr ee -30%
: LULU anes
5.0x -50%
0.0x -60%
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Source: Company Documents, Rowen Stanley Data
Note: P/E multiples for other financials subsectors aside from brokers and asset managers are based on
Morgan Stanley Estimates as of 1/18/2017
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025556