Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012)
why the district court disregarded and failed to credit plaintiffs’ extensive, entirely adequate pleadings, see infra Point I.B.2;
failed to draw reasonable inferences from those pleadings, see infra *76 I.B.3; and declined to accept the truth of the facts
alleged by plaintiffs, see infra Point LB.4.
Application of this heightened standard is especially misguided in light of Congress’s intent that the ATA reach just the
conduct that plaintiffs allege. That is, “Congress[] clearly expressed [an] intent to cut off the flow of money to terrorists at
every point along the causal chain of violence.” Boim J, 291 F.3d at 1021. Congress did this by “attach[ing] liability to all
donations to foreign terrorist organizations regardless of the giver’s intent” because “foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.” Jd. at 1027. Moreover, Congress enacted Section 2339B, a criminal provision incorporated through the ATA, out
of a “concern that terrorist organizations could raise funds ‘under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise.’ ” Weiss,
453 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-393, at 43 (1995)). That statute was designed to “ ‘severely restrict the ability
of terrorist organizations to raise much needed funds for their terrorist acts within the United States.’ ” Jd. Any effort to
impose a heightened pleading standard upon terrorism-related *77 cases, as the district court did, thus “thwart[s] Congress’
clearly expressed intent.” Boim J, 291 F.3d at 1021.
2. The District Court Understated and Ignored Plaintiffs’ Extensive Pleadings Addressing Defendants’ Knowing and
Reckless Support of Terrorism.
Although the district court acknowledged that plaintiffs had in certain respects pled that the defendants knowingly provided
support to al-Qaeda," it radically understated the scope and detail surrounding those direct allegations. Far from presenting
bare conclusions, plaintiffs abundantly provided defendants with notice of the basis for plaintiffs’ claims, including their
assertion that defendants sought to advance al-Qaeda’s activities.
For each defendant, plaintiffs’ detailed allegations focused on the knowing or reckless nature of the provision of support to
al-Qaeda. The particular allegations set forth below are in addition to plaintiffs’ extensive allegations regarding the broader
context of al-Qaeda’s use and development of a financing network, the relation between the key financiers and financing
mechanisms and al-Qaeda’s operations, and the integration of sources of financing into the broader social and ideological *78
network of persons and organizations that facilitated al-Qaeda’s activities. See supra pp. 29-60.
(a) Al Rajhi Bank
Al Rajhi Bank was founded in 1987 and “has a network of nearly 400 branch offices throughout Saudi Arabia and seventeen
worldwide subsidiaries.” SPA55 (Terrorist Attacks 1). Plaintiffs’ complaints contain numerous allegations that Al Rajhi Bank
knowingly provided an extensive amount of material support to al-Qaeda front charities, including the International Islamic
Relief Organization (“IIRO”), the Muslim World League (““MWL”), the World Association of Muslim Youth (““WAMY”),
the Benevolent International Foundation (“BIF”), the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (““SJRC”), and Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation (“Al Haramain’”). See SPA55 (Terrorist Attacks I; JA1062-65, 1069-77, 3827-29. Its provision of material
support included “knowingly and intentionally provid [ing] financial and bank account services” for al-Qaeda front charities
and “September 11th hijacker Abdulaziz al-Omari.” JA1062-77, 1784, 2483, 3827-29.'" “Al Rajhi Bank has long known that
the[se] *79 accounts ... were being used to solicit and transfer funds to terrorist organizations, including al Qaida.” JA3828.
Through these bank accounts, Al Rajhi Bank “knowingly and intentionally ... facilitated [the] purchase of weapons and
military equipment.” JA2483. Al Rajhi Bank also “knowingly and intentionally lent repeated material support to Al Qaeda,”
including the front charities, “through, inter alia, the use of interstate and international faxes, telephones, wire transfers and
transmissions, and mailings.” JA1064, 1784.
The complaints further allege that Al Rajhi Bank knowingly provided material support through its involvement in raising
funds for al-Qaeda’s front charities, including by making direct donations to them, JA1068-73, 2483, guiding the donations
of its customers, JA1069-70, cooperating with the charities to advertise the existence of their bank accounts, XXXXXX, and
managing and accounting for donations, JA1071. Donations were often made as part of the Islamic duties of zakat and
haram, which include an obligation by the donor “to determine” (7.e., know) that “the ultimate *80 recipients of these
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