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in the English-language market, in print, radio, television, and online. At the same
time, the Chinese government has severely limited the ability of US and other Western
media outlets to conduct normal news gathering activities within China, much less
to provide news feeds directly to Chinese listeners, viewers, and readers in China, by
limiting and blocking their Chinese-language websites and forbidding distribution of
their output within China itself.
Among the Chinese American community, China has long sought to influence—
even silence—voices critical of the PRC or supportive of Taiwan by dispatching
personnel to the United States to pressure these individuals and while also pressuring
their relatives in China. Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a
worldwide Chinese diaspora that presumes them to retain not only an interest in the
welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even political, allegiance to
the so-called Motherland. Such activities not only interfere with freedom of speech
within the United States but they also risk generating suspicion of Chinese Americans
even though those who accept Beijing’s directives are a very small minority.
In the technology sector, China is engaged in a multifaceted effort to misappropriate
technologies it deems critical to its economic and military success. Beyond economic
espionage, theft, and the forced technology transfers that are required of many joint
venture partnerships, China also captures much valuable new technology through its
investments in US high-tech companies and through its exploitation of the openness
of American university labs. This goes well beyond influence-seeking to a deeper
and more disabling form of penetration. The economic and strategic losses for the
United States are increasingly unsustainable, threatening not only to help China gain
global dominance of a number of the leading technologies of the future, but also to
undermine America’s commercial and military advantages.
Around the world, China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States are
mirrored in different forms in many other countries. To give readers a sense of
the variation in China’s influence-seeking efforts abroad, this report also includes
summaries of the experiences of eight other countries, including Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK.
Toward Constructive Vigilance
In weighing policy responses to influence seeking in a wide variety of American
institutions, the Working Group has sought to strike a balance between passivity and
overreaction, confidence in our foundations and alarm about their possible subversion,
and the imperative to sustain openness while addressing the unfairness of contending
on a series of uneven playing fields. Achieving this balance requires that we differentiate
constructive from harmful forms of interaction and carefully gauge the challenge, lest we
Introduction
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