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Case File
d-24035House OversightFinancial Record

Chinese talent recruitment programs (Thousand Talents) used to acquire foreign technology via non‑traditional collectors

The passage outlines a systematic Chinese effort (Thousand Talents Program) to recruit foreign scientists and corporate personnel, including non‑ethnic Chinese, to obtain U.S. intellectual property. W Thousand Talents Program (TTP) started in 2008 to recruit overseas experts for China’s modernization Program includes non‑ethnic Chinese collectors targeting IP through open‑source, funding, and cybe

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #020582
Pages
1
Persons
0
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

The passage outlines a systematic Chinese effort (Thousand Talents Program) to recruit foreign scientists and corporate personnel, including non‑ethnic Chinese, to obtain U.S. intellectual property. W Thousand Talents Program (TTP) started in 2008 to recruit overseas experts for China’s modernization Program includes non‑ethnic Chinese collectors targeting IP through open‑source, funding, and cybe

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technology-transferespionagefinancial-flowintellectual-property-theftforeign-influencelegal-exposurehouse-oversighttechnology-acquisitionresearch-funding

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123 Chinese defense universities explicitly tasked with acquiring foreign technology; others are not and targeted for access to research they have pursued by their own passion and intellect. Indeed, some nontraditional collectors may even be unwitting in their support. Collectors do not appear to be chosen by Beijing for their race or nationality; rather they are targeted for their access to the desired intellectual property and their willingness to violate their employee agreements or national laws. Indeed, more recent scholarship has shattered the shibboleth that the Chinese government only recruits ethnic Chinese. While Chinese intelligence does have a historically strong track record of attempting to recruit ethnic Chinese, primarily because of cultural and language affinity, more recent cases of espionage and technology transfer suggest that the Chinese government has broadened its tradecraft to recruit nonethnic Chinese assets and collectors as well, perhaps as a way of complicating US counterintelligence efforts. China’s most systematic channel for identifying foreign-based nontraditional collectors is its Recruitment Program of Global Experts (2S BRATS|HItz), commonly known as the Thousand Talents Plan (FAit&I) or the Thousand Talents Program (TTP).° The TTP is a massive and sustained talent recruitment campaign designed to recruit leading experts from overseas to assist in the country’s modernization drive. Initiated in 2008, the TTP aims to recruit leading overseas scientists and experts who work in areas that are deemed high priority for achieving China’s modernization goals.° The program originally aimed to recruit 1,000 “overseas talents” (#3\A4) over a period of five to ten years. Official Chinese TTP websites list more than three hundred US government researchers and more than six hundred US corporate personnel who have accepted TTP money.’ In many cases, these individuals do not disclose receiving the TTP money to their employer, which for US government employees is illegal and for corporate personnel likely represents a conflict of interest that violates their employee agreement. State Collection Apparatus China’s nontraditional collection relies on a web of activities, including open-source research, exchanges, cooperation and professional organizations, direct funding of research, strategic acquisition, or cyberespionage. Open-source China’s efforts to exploit foreign innovation is further seen in its open-source acquisition infrastructure, which surpasses that of any other country. China employs a cadre of thousands to locate, study, and disseminate foreign journals, patents, proceedings, dissertations, and technical standards without regard to ownership or copyright restrictions. The documents are indexed, archived, and supplied to Chinese commercial and military “customers.” Section 8

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