Court dismisses claims against Saudi princes for alleged 9/11 charity donations

IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 801 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) stam or New York law. Similarly, Plain- tiffs have not pleaded facts to suggest the Princes knew they were making contribu- tions to terrorist fronts and provided sub- stantial assistance or encouragement to the terrorists to satisfy Boum or New York law. The Court has reviewed the com- plaints in their entirety and finds no alle- gations from which it can infer that the Princes knew the charities to which they donated were fronts for al Qaeda. The Court is not ruling as a matter of law that a defendant cannot be liable for contribu- tions to organizations that are not them- selves designated terrorists. But in such a case, there must be some facts presented to support the allegation that the defen- dant knew the receiving organization to be a solicitor, collector, supporter, front or launderer for such an entity. There must be some facts to support an inference that the defendant knowingly provided assis- tance or encouragement to the wrongdoer. Here, there are no such factual bases pre- sented, there are only conclusions. See Robinson, 269 F.3d at 146 “(We note that the conclusory nature of [plaintiffs] alleza- tions alone would give us pause before we would allow them to sustain jurisdiction.”) (citing Zappa Middle Kast Const. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.2000) (finding, in context of FSIA 12(b)(1) motion, conclusory allegations in plaintiffs affidavit insufficient to sustain jurisdiction)). The law does not permit Plaintiffs to circumvent the jurisdictional hurdle of the FSIA by inserting vague and conclu- sory allegations of tortious conduct in their complaints—and then ... rely on the federal courts to conclude that some conceivable non-discretionary tortious act falls within the purview of these generic allegations under the applicable substantive law. This is at odds with the goal of the FSIA to enable a foreign government to obtain an early dismissal when the substance of the claim against it does not support jurisdiction. Robinson, 269 F.3d at 146. ii. Discretionary Function Plaintiffs argue that there is no discre- tion to conduct illegal activities and the so-called discretionary function exception to the tortious act exception should not apply to Prince Sultan or Prince Turki. See, eg, Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1421, 1431 (th Cir.1989) (find- ing no discretion to violate Chinese law prohibiting murder where gunmen acting on direction of China’s Director of De- fense Intelligence Bureau killed plaintiffs husband); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 329-80 (2d Cir.1978) (find- ing in FTCA case that the CIA had no authority and therefore no discretion to open U.S. first class mail departing for and arriving from the Soviet Union); Glickman v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 171, 175 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (finding in FTCA ease that CIA agent’s secret administra- tion of LSD to plaintiff was not discretion- ary function); Letelier v. Republic of Chi- le, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C.1980) (holding no discretion to order or aid as- sassination of former Chilean ambassador and foreign minister). Prince Sultan in- sists that any recommendation of govern- ment grants to Islamic charities was a discretionary function. Prince Turki makes a similar argument regarding his actions as the head of DGI and urges the Court to find that all of his alleged actions should be subsumed by the discretionary function exception. [28] The Court finds the discretionary function exception independently bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Prince Sultan and Prince Turki. Both Princes are accused of donating money or recommending govern- ment grants to charities that allegedly sup- ported al Qaeda. As the head of DGI, HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017866