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(the Security Intelligence Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) identified
improper influence through community associations connected to Chinese intelligence
agencies and efforts to award politically connected Canadians in high-level roles with
Chinese entities.’ Today, the view in Ottawa is that China is definitely trying to influence
Canadian opinion and opinion-makers but is not making much headway at present. At
the federal level, the greatest concern with China has to do with the acquisition, often by
legal means, of strategic Canadian assets such as oil sands or major companies.
As in other countries, Chinese state actors (the CCP International Liaison Department,
commercial entities, media) have targeted political parties and politicians (with a few
ongoing cases at the provincial and municipal levels that are being investigated by the
RCMP), civil society (through Confucius Institutes and consular outreach), and academia
(through the Chinese Students’ Association, China Scholarship Council supervision of
student recipients, and pressure on Canadian China specialists). An informal survey
of Canadian China professionals (political and business actors) and China specialists
(research professionals) confirms some PRC state activity in all these realms. But no cases
have yet reached the intensity or threat documented in Australia and New Zealand.
In large part, this difference in intensity is due to material factors: Canada is less
dependent economically on China than Australia and New Zealand but smaller and
less powerful than the United States. In short, while facing similar influence and
interference efforts from China, Canada—like the United States—appears to have more
effective mechanisms (diplomacy, election funding transparency, foreign investment
regulations) than Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, in May 2018 Canada’s security
service produced a report warning of the extent of interference in New Zealand.”
Politics
The Liberal government elected in October 2015 is inclined to expand relations
with China at the diplomatic and commercial levels, including with some form of
bilateral free trade agreement and deeper cooperation on global issues like climate
change, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Yet, despite Asia’s rising geoeconomic
and geopolitical weight, Canada’s strategic center of gravity remains heavily tied to
the United States and the transatlantic world and to Western perspectives. There are
significant disagreements in the public and within government about the possibilities,
opportunities, limits, and risks of a deeper relationship with China.
Media reports highlighting concerns over improper interference include the following:
e In 2010, the director of CSIS, Canada’s national security agency, said at least
two provincial cabinet members and other government officials were under the
Appendix 2
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