Court Dismisses Saudi Arabia Immunity Claim in Federal Plaintiffs' Case

804 tions would not sustain jurisdiction). Sau- di Arabia’s treatment of and decisions to support Islamic charities are purely plan- ning level “decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy.” Varig Atr- lines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755; see also Kline, 685 F.Supp. at 392. The Fed- eral Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating an exception to the FSIA applies to negate the Kingdom’s immunity. “[Slovereion immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just from liabili- ty.” Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 th Cir.1994). Because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court’s resolution of this motion, no jurisdictional discovery is necessary. See Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 304 F.8d 180, 188 (2d Cir.2002). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s motion to dismiss the Federal complaint for lack of subject mat- ter jurisdiction is granted. II. Personal Jurisdiction [33-36] To avoid dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdic- tion over each Defendant. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir.1999). Because these motions are brought before discov- ery and decided without an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction ex- ists. PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.8d 1105, 1108 @d Cir.1997); AZ. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1993). Plaintiffs may rely en- tirely on factual allegations, Jazini v. Nis- san Motor Co. 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998), and they will prevail even if Defen- dants make contrary arguments, A.J Trade, 989 F.2d at 79. In resolving the motions, the Court will read the com- plaints and affidavits in a light most favor- able to Plaintiffs. PDK Labs, 103 F.3d at 1108. It will not, however, accept legally 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES conclusory assertions or draw “argumenta- tive inferences.” Mende v. Milestone Tech, Inc, 269 F.Supp.2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (citing Robinson v. Over- seas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir.1994)). A. Bases for Personal Jurisdiction 1. New York Long—Arm Statute [37] “In a federal question case where a defendant resides outside the forum state, a federal court applies the forum state’s personal jurisdiction rules if the federal statute does not specifically pro- vide for national service of process.” PDK Labs, 103 F.3d at 1108. Similarly, a feder- al court sitting in diversity exercises per- sonal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant to the same extent as courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which it sits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 4(kK))(A). Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 124 (@d Cir.2002). In such cases, courts must determine if New York law would confer jurisdiction through its long- arm statute, and then decide if the exer- cise of such jurisdiction comports with the requisites of due process under the Four- teenth Amendment. /d. (citing Bank Brussels, 171 F.8d at 784); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir.1997). a. Conspiracy Theory Plaintiffs claim that New York’s long- arm statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction. Rule 302(a)(2) of New York’s Civil Practice Law & Rules states in part: “(a) As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent ... (2) commits a tortious act HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017869