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d-33009House OversightOther

Judge Breyer dissent discusses statutory interpretation doctrines in Jam v. International Finance Corp.

The passage is a routine judicial opinion excerpt focusing on legal theory about dynamic versus static statutory interpretation. It mentions no specific actors, transactions, or allegations of miscond Cites multiple Supreme Court cases on interpreting statutes at the time of enactment vs. dynamically Highlights Judge Breyer's dissenting view on the relevance of statutory language. References the p

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #028560
Pages
1
Persons
0
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

The passage is a routine judicial opinion excerpt focusing on legal theory about dynamic versus static statutory interpretation. It mentions no specific actors, transactions, or allegations of miscond Cites multiple Supreme Court cases on interpreting statutes at the time of enactment vs. dynamically Highlights Judge Breyer's dissenting view on the relevance of statutory language. References the p

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statutory-interpretationsupreme-court-precedentlegal-analysisjudicial-opinionhouse-oversight

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2 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. BREYER, J., dissenting was when the statute was written? Or is their reference to that subject matter “dynamic,” changing in scope as the subject matter changes over time? It is hardly surprising, given the thousands of different statutes containing an untold number of different words, that there is no single, universally applicable answer to this question. Fairly recent cases from this Court make that clear. Compare New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. _, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 7) (adopting the interpretation of “‘con- tracts of employment’” that prevailed at the time of the statute’s adoption in 1925); Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. __, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2) (adopting the meaning of “‘money’” that prevailed at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1937); Carcieri v. Sala- zar, 555 U. 8. 379, 388 (2009) (interpreting the statutory phrase “‘now under Federal jurisdiction’” to cover only those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s adoption in 1934); and Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612-613 (1992) (adopting the meaning of “‘commercial’” that was “at- tached to that term under the restrictive theory” when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted in 1976), with Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. __, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 14) (moting that the words “‘re- straint of trade’” in the Sherman Act have been interpreted dynamically); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218 (1999) (interpreting the term “‘appropriate’” in Title VII’s reme- dies provision dynamically); and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 518 U.S. 265, 275-276 (1995) Gnterpret- ing the term “‘involving commerce’” in the Federal Arbi- tration Act dynamically). The Court, like petitioners, believes that the language of the statute itself helps significantly to answer the stat- ic/dynamic question. See ante, at 7-9. I doubt that the language itself helps in this case. Petitioners point to the words “as is” in the phrase that grants the international

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