Alleged DOJ coercion of state prosecutors in Jeffrey Epstein case via threats of money‑laundering investigation and targeted letters

12. 13. 14, 15. 16. KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP In August 2007, in a clear attempt to coerce a state settlement, Ms. Villafana threatened to broaden the investigation to include a money laundering violation (18 U.S.C. § 1956), though all the funds expended were simply Mr. Epstein’s, and a violation for operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business (18 U.S.C. § 1960), though Mr. Epstein never had such a business. See Tab 22, August 31, 2007 Letter from M. Villafana to Ross (reciting, in a target letter to one of Epstein’s employees, that the investigation concerns “suspected violations of federal law, including but not limited to, possible violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections ... 1591, ... 1956, 1960... .’) (emphasis added). On the very same day that the grand jury issued subpoenas to the records-custodian and employees of Epstein’s businesses for all financial transactions from 2003 forward, Ms. Villafana (who we were told was not authorized to act in this regard without supervisory approval) promised to close the money-laundering investigation “if the sex offense case is resolved.” See Tab 23, August 16, 2007 Letter from M. Villafana to G. Lefcourt (“In other words, if the sex offense case is resolved, the Office would close its investigation into other areas as well. The matter has not been, and it does not appear that it will be, resolved so the money laundering investigation continues, and Request Number 6 [seeking records of every financial transaction conducted by Epstein and his six businesses from “January 1, 2003 to the present”] will not be withdrawn.”). Two weeks later, when Mr. Epstein continued to oppose federal prosecution during negotiations and Mr. Epstein’s counsel sought a meeting with the United States Attorney, AUSA Villafana then classified all of Mr. Epstein’s assistants as targets (sending a target letter to one of them and promising the attorney of the other two that additional target letters would be served on them as well), dispatched FBI agents to the homes of two of his secretaries, and personally telephoned Mr. Epstein’s largest business client to advise him of the nature of the investigation. See Tab 22, August 31, 2007 Letter from M. Villafana to FAUSA Sloman Forces Mr. Epstein’s Lawyers to Convince the State Prosecutors To Impose a More Severe Sentence Than They Believe Is Appropriate Throughout the plea negotiations with the USAO, Mr. Sloman and Ms. Villafana continually insisted that the only way they would agree not to bring a federal indictment was if Epstein’s lawyers, not the state prosecutors as required under the Petite Policy, convinced the state prosecutors to impose a more severe punishment than the state believed was appropriate under the circumstances. FAUSA Sloman’s version of the history with respect to the sentence he required Mr. Epstein’s lawyers to seek from the State contradicts his later assertion, which is patently false—that “the SDFL indicated a willingness to defer to the State the length of incarceration” and “considered a plea to federal charges that limited Epstein’s sentencing exposure...” See Tab 1, May 19, 2008 Letter from J. Sloman. In fact, by a email dated August 3, 2007, Criminal Division Chief Matthew Menchel advised the defense that the federal government required a minimum term of two years of incarceration. See Tab 40, August 3, 2007 Email from M. Menchel. Subsequently, Ms. 4 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_012163