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To give a robust account for the
practice of medicine, one must explain
why sick and debilitated strangers are
worthy of attention and care, and how
the medical arts contribute to human
flourishing. For some Americans, such
accounts begin in secular moral
tradition, but for most they begin in
religion; nine out of ten Americans
endorse a religious affiliation’. Either
way, medicine looks beyond science to
find a vision that animates care of the
sick, a moral framework that guides the
application of medical technology, and
practices that nurture and extend the
human capacity to care for patients as
persons rather than as mere objects. In
this sense, even though religious
concepts are rarely made explicit in
public and professional discourse about
medicine, they are everywhere implicit
and operative, and necessarily so.
Why care for the sick?
Humans in all cultures are moved
to care for the sick. The question is why?
The concept of the social brain provides
the beginning of an answer. The peculiar
human need and capacity for
constructive, complex and meaningful
relationships seems to involve
neurological structures and functions
that also facilitate attending to the sick.
For example, Epley describes the human
capacity to pay attention to our own
mindedness and the mindedness of
others. We are not only conscious of
ourselves, but we are conscious of others
being conscious of themselves and of us.
This capacity allows us to be mindful of
others’ bodily suffering and mindful of
their consciousness of our relation to
them in that suffering. To mindfulness is
added the capacity to empathize. Decety
describes a neurological structure
through which the sight of pain in
another person triggers a response in our
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own brains that mirrors (albeit at a level
attenuated by training and other
contextual factors) the response we
would have if we were suffering the pain
ourselves. These features of the human
brain allow us to pay attention to and to
some extent share in the suffering of
others—capacities that are psychological
building blocks for caring for the sick.
Yet to explain medicine strictly
on the basis of empirical science, one
must solve a particularly thorny version
of the more general problem of
explaining altruistic human behavior.
Decety notes, “The emergence of
altruism, of empathizing with and caring
for those who are not kin, is ... not
easily explained within the framework of
neo-Darwinian theories of natural
selection.” Indeed one can scarcely
imagine a practice less conducive to the
reproductive fitness of a population than
spending enormous resources caring for
the sick, the deformed, the weak, and the
aged. Natural selection and the physician
would seem to be at cross-purposes: one
works to eliminate the sickly, the other
to save them from elimination. On this
account, medicine appears to be the sort
of dead end into which the evolutionary
process sometimes blindly drifts.
Cacioppo, however, argues that
altruistic behaviors can be explained
within evolutionary theory by paying
attention to inclusive fitness and the
multiple levels of selective pressure:
...for species born to a period of
utter dependency [e.g., humans],
the genes that find their way into
the gene pool are not defined
solely or even mostly by
likelihood that an organism will
reproduce but by the likelihood
that the offspring of the parent
will live long enough to
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