Dissenting Opinion Discusses Historical Immunity of International Organizations

Cite as: 586 U.S. (2019) 9 BREYER, J., dissenting In light of this history, how likely is it that Congress, seeking to “satisfy in full the requirements of ... interna- tional organizations conducting activities in the United States,” S. Rep. No. 861, at 2-8 (emphasis added), would have understood the statute to take from many interna- tional organizations with one hand the immunity it had given them with the other? If Congress wished the Act to carry out one of its core purposes—fulfilling the country’s international commitments—Congress would not have wanted the statute to change over time, taking on a mean- ing that would fail to grant not only full, but even partial, immunity to many of those organizations. B Congress also intended to facilitate international organ- izations’ ability to pursue their missions in the United States. To illustrate why that purpose is better served by a static interpretation, consider in greater detail the work of the organizations to which Congress wished to provide broad immunity. Put the IMF to the side, for Congress enacted a separate statute providing it with immunity (absent. waiver) in all cases. See 22 U.S.C. §286h. But UNRRA, the World Bank, the FAO, and the UN itself all originally depended upon the Immunities Act for the immunity they sought. Consider, for example, the mission of UNRRA. The United States and other nations created that organization in 1948, as the end of World War IT seemed in sight. Its objective was, in the words of President Roosevelt, to “assure a fair distribution of available supplies among those liberated in World War II, and “‘to ward off death by starvation or exposure among these peoples.’” 1 G. Wood- bridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 3 (1950). By the time Congress passed the Immunities Act in 1945, UNRRA had obtained and shipped billions of pounds of food, clothing, 299 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028567