Opinion piece on Xi Jinping's term limit abolition and China’s Belt‑and‑Road, plus Hong Kong private club leases

Al2 Saturday, March 10, 2018 INSIGHT Power with purpose Robert Lawrence Kuhn explains why abolishing presidential term limits may well be good for China o interview delegates and officials at the annual National Peo- ple’s Congress in Bei- jing, interspersed with being interviewed in the interna- tional media about China abol- ishing term limits forits president, is to inhabit parallel universes. Delegates and officials focus on clusters of issues from control- ling financial risk and reducing pollution to scientific innovation and business stimulation, plus enhancing and institutionalising China’s anti-corruption cam- paign with a powerful National Supervision Commission. The international media, no surprise, focus on the constitutional amendment ending term limits, assuming President XiJinping will now serve in a for-life dictator- ship, reminiscent of Mao's China, the Soviet Union, the Kim family in North Korea and some African countries. It is no challenge to explain why abolishing term limits is bad for China - dependency on one human being who is not omni- scient but is hostage to fortune, fewer and weaker checks and balances, forced conformity in a complex society with no easy an- swers, etc. The system begins stronger in that hard choices can be made and consistency main- tained, butit could become brittle in that officials are more wary and may say things they do not believe. Itisa challenge to explain why abolishing term limits is good for China, so that's what! will do. First, some background. There are three separate issues being conflated: the significance of end- ing term limits, the intended con- sequences and the unintended consequences. Though terminat- ing the two-term limit for China's presidency captures headlines, it is more the symbolic, final step ratifying Xi’s near-absolute power than the big breakthrough itself. Many expect this experiment to end badly for China. It is indeed an experiment but its end is not set Xi’s prior designation as “core” of the Communist Party in October 2016 and the inscribing of “Xi Jinping Thought...” into the party constitution in October 2017 were more meaningful. Moreover, the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest authoritative body in China, unambiguously supports Xi. China watchers see the front page of People's Daily - published the day after the new Standing Com- mittee marched out on stage — which featured Xi’s photo on top, many times larger than the small- er, subservient photo of all seven members lined up on the bottom. All this reconfirms that, in a system where the party controls the state - especially where the pany ‘is Marxist and ideology is its asis for being — Xi, as core of the party, with his name inscribed in the constitutions of party and state as the contemporary arbiter of Marxism, will be the uncontest- ed, overarching leader of China for the rest of his sentient life. For intended consequences, the official line is that the purpose is national cohesion brought about when the three top leader- ship positions — general secretary ofthe party, chairman of the Cen- tral Military Commission and president of the republic - are aligned temporally and held bya single person. his makes sense, but as a primary, proximal motivation, itis not entirely persuasive. The current structure has existed for decades without outcry or angst (notto mention that the three po- sitions could be unified by install- ing term limits on the other two). The “newera”, marked by eco- nomic, social and global com- plexities, is said to require firm and consistent leadership, mak- ing moot inner party struggles and even mitigating political gos- sip, facilitating focus on the tasks of governance and development. Specifically, because advancing etd) reformhasbecome more difficult, with entrenched interest groups resisting change, the message must now go forth that all must get with the programme, because you can’t outwit or outwait Xi. Because, it is said that only Xi has the vision, experience, com- petence and character to bring about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”, especially from 2020 to 2035 and ultimately to 2050- bringing China to global centre stage — Xi’s unimpeded leadership is deemed essential. China cannot afford “downtime” to accommodate a change of leadership, and after Xi’s success at the 19th National Party Con- gress came the time to make clear that he will call the shots for the foreseeable future. Some argue that doing away with term limits shows the superi- ority of the Chinese system as it allows flexibility in matching leadership to requirements (though what national leader, when extending his reach, hasnot claimed “current requirements” as justification?) The party-run Global Times stated that ending term limits does notmean China has reverted to president-for-life tenure. (But who can deny that however long Xi holds the top positions seems largely up to him?) As for the unintended conse- quences, the almost unanimous, disparaging foreign reaction — other than US President Donald Trump’s-didnotburnish China's international image. More worrisome would be a reluctance by officials to offer constructive opposing views on central policies. By stressing term limits, the international media misses fundamental changes going on in China ~ this ee, innovation, streamlining of government, faci- litation of business (cutting bureaucracy and reducing taxes), rural revitalisation and rural land reform. The 13th National Peo- ple’s Congress shows how the grand vision and mission of the 19th National Party Congress is translated into specific strategies and policies. Ifone sees only term limits, one cannotvisualise thebig picture. AsforXimaintaining the presi- dency perpetually, it doesn’tactu- ally matter much thisis the deep insight of how China’s party-state system works. Xi as core of the party and “Xi Jinping Thought...” as the party's (andnowthestate’s) guiding principle means that Xi can transfer titular party leader- shipand/orthe presidencyto oth- ers and still maintain his overarching power. It may well be that, after serving two or even three more terms, rather than try- ing to find and install another leaderlike himself, he will move to bring about true democracy with- inthe I. Here's he best case. Xi will not be leader-for-life, but leader long enough to bring about China's national rejuvenation and estab- lish a Chinese kind of democratic norms. Could Xi continue until around 2035, when China plans to have “basically” achieved full mo- dernisation, heading towards, by mid-century, 2050, a “great mod- ern socialist country”? Many expect this experiment toend badly for China. Itis indeed an experiment but its end is not set. It may be a race between achieving Xi’s grand vision and some untoward perturbation that could cause fracture. Allfactors considered, Iam not saying abolishing term limits is absolutely good for China. I am saying itmay be good -because of China's special conditions and Xi’s special capabilities—butifitis good, it’s just for this once, andit’s just for so long. That's the best case. I'm rooting forXi. Robert Lawrence Kuhnisa public intellectual, international corporate strategist and investment banker, and China expert/commentator. He is the author of How China’s Leaders Think What the Western belt and road sceptics are missing Wenshan Jia says there are opportunities for the whole world to benefit from China’s initiative hina'’s “Belt and Road Initiative’is an original plan to carry out anew type of “collaborative globalisation” above and beyond US-led type. Itwas proposed five years ago by President Xi Jinping after the tapering off of US-led globalisation in 2008. Xioffered three principles: mutual consultation, joint construction and shared benefits. China has since then fully executed 101 agreements with 86 countries, and total investmentin the 24 countries along the belt and road regions. has amounted to US$50 billion, resulting in 75 industrial and trade zones, an¢ 200,000 jobs. With its focus on infrastructure, the initiative is a model not only for developing countries, but also industrialised ones in Europe and North America, where ageing infrastructure needs replacing. It also adapts to each local, national or regional condition, situation and need. Itis proving very democratic, more so than the lopsided US-led globalisation that spurred a populist, isolationist backlash across the Western world. China has done a proper job of explaining to the West what the initiative is and extended a sincere invitation to each country to join. Many think tank scholars. and major media outlets in the West have found it potentially lucrative and expressed relatively strong support. Yet, instead of appreciating China's efforts to both inherit the liberal agenda of globalisation and forgea new path for global development, many Western political elite, led by the US, have started a campaign to resist the initiative. From Australia to the US, and the UK to Germany, there are calls for the West to cut interactions with China to minimise or resist its so-called “sharp power”. The labels typically applied to China include “authoritarian” and ‘predatory citing Beijing for not upholding “freedom, democracy and individual rights”, the core values of the West. This attitude towards the initiative reveals not only a contradiction in the Western mind, but also the narrowing or even closing of minds. Isn'tit beneficial to meet the goals of forging connectivity and cooperation, as articulated in Xi’s effort to enrich and expand the meaning of the “free world” by liberating humankind from geographical, financial, political and cultural barriers? The worldis no longer the West versus the rest, as wealready live in aworld connected by the internet. The initiative seeks to make the world more interconnected for both the West and the rest, contributing to the construction ofa human community with a shared future. Recently, the initiative has inspired and spawned a push for localisation, particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy led by the so-called “Quad” of the US, India, Japan and Australia. Some Western media viewit asa rival or alternative to China’s beltand road. But] would argue that it can be part of China's initiative as longas the three Chinese principles (mutual consultation, The anti-China smear campaign must be replaced bya discourse involving consultation and communication joint construction and shared benefits) are observed in the Quad strategy. The belt and road was created to be anall-inclusive platform, so Beijing has no need to fear localisation as long as such strategies do not seek to contain China or disruptits plan. Itwould be wise for the Quad and China to look for ways to collaborate. Quad countries need not take an antagonistic stance towards China; the anti-China smear campaign must be replaced bya discourse involving consultation and communication. The world has experienced more than enough damaging talk, not to mention wars. The core principles of Xi’s belt and road strategy must be always applied in China's interactions with local strategies. If China is, as German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel told the Munich Security Conference in February, “the only country in the world with any sort of genuinely global, geostrategic concept”, then Western leaders should cultivate a genuinely global strategy in line with China's vision, for the betterment of all humankind. Wenshan Jia, PhD, is a professor in the School of Communication, at Chapman. University (California) and a research fellow atthe National Academy of Development. and Strategy, Renmin University of China Private clubs deserve ‘cushy’ rental deals Edith Terry says private recreational clubs are part of Hong Kong’s heritage and have contributed to nurturing less popular sports, as well as a unique hybrid culture first job, went in search of a social group. He founda home away from home in Hong Kong's oldest private recreational club, newly relocated froma prime location on Victoria Harbour, where City Hall is today, toa modest flagstone boathouse beneath Island Road on Hong Kong's south side. Fifty-five years later, Frank Pfeiffer, a Zen Buddhist and mountain climber, is still anactive member of the Victoria Recreation Club, established in 1849. He has watched it ring the changes from Hong Kong's colonial society in the 1960s, when it had only two Chinese members and no female members, to the hybrid institution it is today, under its first Hong Kong Chinese chairman, Wu Kam Shing. Its membership is a spectrum of Hong Kong's diverse and athletically minded middle class. There is the Hong Kong Chinese court reporter who visits the club in Deep Water Bay every morning at 6am on her way from home in Ap Lei Chau to her workplace in Sha Tin. There are her fellow swimmers, many elderly, who swim outto the buoys, rain or shine, hot or cold, eve day. Some 100-150 “paddlers” use the club as a base for outrigger canoeing, dragon boating and paddle boarding. Some of the sports were unknown to Hong Kong before the club nurtured them, others, like dragon boating, are deeply traditional. In the current debate over the future of the 67 private recreational clubs that pay minimal rents to the government, history has been swept aside. True, they were designed on a colonial template, in which the diverse ethnic groups were given separate retreats. Membership at the pinnacle clubs was reserved primarily for the British. For other ethnic groups, there was a Chinese Recreation Club, a Club de Recreio, a Hlipiie Club, an Indian Recreation Club, andso on. long Kong's colonial rulers reviewed the lease system for the private clubs in 1968 and 1979, andin the run-up to the handover in 1997 when leases were restricted to 15-year terms. At the handover, anumber of leases were extended to ensure a so-called smooth transition. The sceptic would argue that this was a dodge, and indeed in 2011, during the first post-1997 review of private recreational leases oy the Legislative Council, most of the clubs seemed oblivious to public concerns as well as new requirements for “opening up” The government argued that subsidies were needed because use of land for sports and recreation would never trump commercial utilisation I 1964, ayoung German, fresh off the plane athis to schools and community organisations, Following the last well-publicised review in 2013 and the current investigation seeking new venues for public housing, theyareno longer complacent. Should the private clubs have got their cushy rental deals in the first place? At the time of the reviews 50 years ago, the government argued that subsidies were needed because use ofland for sports and recreation would never trump commercial utilisation. What was true then is even more so today. The high cost ofland in Hong Kongis dragon innovation and creativity. The existence of the private recreational clubs means ithas been less ofa dragon sports. Most of the clubs with governmentleases are framed around core sports golf, tennis, horse racing, swimming sailing and rowing, to namea few. Hong Kong athletes whose development was: supported by these clubs have gone to the Olympics and other international competitions. In the 1940s, the Victoria Recreation Club was the driving force behind Hong, Kong's participation in the International Olympic Committee and the Hong Kong Sports Federation. Public pressure on the clubs to forge community ties and contribute to Hong Kong through “opening up” schemes is appropriate—but not the pressure to convert their land to high-rise estates. The loss is not only to the core sports they represent but also to their unique DNA, which is the foundation of Hong Kong— diverse, cosmopolitan and adventurous. If you want to look for a Hong Kong that is not just about money, one place tolookishere. Edith Terry is the honorary secretary of the Victoria Recreation Club. She writes in a personal capacity Stand-up paddlers participate in an event held at the Victoria Recreation Club. Photo: Jonathan Wong HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023683