Speculative claim that Snowden was recruited via Russian/Chinese intelligence and used journalists as cover

The Question of When | 161 him to gain proximity to the super-secret lists of the telecommuni- cations systems that the NSA had penetrated in Russia and China. This could account for how he managed to acquire the necessary passwords to accrue privileged information. It could also account for why the documents he copied that pertained to NSA operations in Russia were not among those he gave to Poitras, Greenwald, and other journalists. Because Russia has had an active intelligence- sharing treaty with China since 1996, it could further explain why his first stop was Hong Kong, a part of China. It was a safe venue for debriefing Snowden, as well as establishing his credentials among journalists as a whistle-blower, before a decision was made to allow him to proceed to Russia. The nearly fatal problem with this early recruitment scenario is Snowden’s contacts with journalists. Snowden, it will be recalled, had contacted Greenwald in December 2012. Greenwald was a high- profile blogger in Brazil who did not use encryption or any security safeguards. Next, he contacted Poitras in January 2013 in Berlin; she was a magnet for NSA dissidents. Both of these contacts put © Snowden’s clandestine downloading at grave risk. As known oppo- © nents of U.S. intelligence agencies, these journalists might be, as they themselves suspected they were, under surveillance by American, British, Brazilian, or German intelligence services. Greenwald and Poitras might also tell others who were either under surveillance or informers. So no matter what precautions Snowden took, his secret enterprise, or just the fact he was in contact with anti-government activists, might be detected. At minimum, he could lose his access to secrets and be of no further use as a source at the NSA. He could also be interrogated and reveal the way he was brought under control. If Snowden had actually been under the control of the Russian intel- ligence service, the last thing it would allow was for him to take such a risk—or even to contact a single journalist. After all, the purpose of an espionage operation is to steal secrets without alerting anyone to the theft. A former CIA officer told me that while anything could “go hay- wire” in an intelligence operation, it would be “unthinkable” that the Russian intelligence service would permit an undercover source | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 161 ® 9/29/16 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019649