Justice Breyer dissent argues broad immunity for international organizations under the 1945 Act

Cite as: 586 U.S. (2019) 1 BREYER, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17-1011 BUDHA ISMAIL JAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [February 27, 2019] JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting. The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 extends to international organizations “the same immu- nity from suit and every form of judicial process as is en- joyed by foreign governments.” 22 U.S. C. §288a(b). The majority, resting primarily upon the statute’s language and canons of interpretation, holds that the statute’s reference to “immunity” moves with the times. As a con- sequence, the statute no longer allows international or- ganizations immunity from lawsuits arising from their commercial activities. In my view, the statute grants international organizations that immunity—just as for- eign governments possessed that immunity when Con- gress enacted the statute in 1945. In reaching this conclu- sion, I rest more heavily than does the majority upon the statute’s history, its context, its purposes, and its conse- quences. And I write in part to show that, in difficult cases like this one, purpose-based methods of interpreta- tion can often shine a useful light upon opaque statutory language, leading to a result that reflects greater legal coherence and is, as a practical matter, more sound. I The general question before us is familiar: Do the words of a statute refer to their subject matter “statically,” as it HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028559