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12.8 Possible Benefits of Creating Societies of AGIs 233
we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted.
While a moving humanistic vision, this seems to us rather difficult to implement in a computer
algorithm in a compellingly "right" way. It seems that there would be many different ways of
implementing it, and the choice between them would involve multiple, highly subtle and non-
rigorous human judgment calls +. However, if a deep collective process of interactive scenario
analysis and sharing is carried out, in order to arrive at some sort of Coherent Blended Volition,
this process may well involve many of the same kinds of extrapolation that are conceived to
be part of Coherent Extrapolated Volition. The core difference between the two approaches
is that in the CEV vision, the extrapolation and coherentization are to be done by a highly
intelligent, highly specialized software program, whereas in the approach suggested here, these
are to be carried out by collective activity of humans as mediated by Global Brain technologies.
Our perspective is that the definition of collective human values is probably better carried out
via a process of human collaboration, rather than delegated to a machine optimization process;
and also that the creation of deep-sharing-oriented Internet technologies, while a difficult task,
is significantly easier and more likely to be done in the near future than the creation of narrow
AI technology capable of effectively performing CEV style extrapolations.
12.8 Possible Benefits of Creating Societies of AGIs
One potentially interesting quality of the emerging Global Brain is the possible presence within
it of multiple interacting AGI systems. Stephen Omohundro [Omo09] has argued that this is an
important aspect, and that game-theoretic dynamics related to populations of roughly equally
powerful agents, may play a valuable role in mitigating the risks associated with advanced AGI
systems. Roughly speaking, if one has a society of AGIs rather than a single AGI, and all the
members of the society share roughly similar ethics, then if one AGI starts to go "off the rails",
its compatriots will be in a position to correct its behavior.
One may argue that this is actually a hypothesis about which AGI designs are safest, because
a "community of AGIs" may be considered a single AGI with an internally community-like
design. But the matter is a little subtler than that, if once considers AGI systems embedded in
the Global Brain and human society. Then there is some substance to the notion of a population
of AGIs systematically presenting themselves to humans and non-AGI software processes as
separate entities.
Of course, a society of AGIs is no protection against a single member undergoing a "hard
takeoff" and drastically accelerating its intelligence simultaneously with shifting its ethical
principles. In this sort of scenario, one could have a single AGI rapidly become much more
powerful and very differently oriented than the others, who would be left impotent to act so as
to preserve their values. But this merely defers the issue to the point to be considered below,
regarding "takeoff speed."
The operation of an AGI society may depend somewhat sensitively on the architectures of
the AGI systems in question. Things will work better if the AGIs have a relatively easy way
to inspect and comprehend much of the contents of each others’ minds. This introduces a bias
toward AGIs that more heavily rely on more explicit forms of knowledge representation.
| The reader is encouraged to look at the original CEV essay online (http: //singinst.org/upload/CEV.
htm1) and make their own assessment.
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