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efta-01385488DOJ Data Set 10OtherEFTA01385488
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efta-01385488
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3 January 2018
HY Corporate Credit
HY Multi Sector.Media. Cable & Satellite
Trade Ideas
Sprint — BUY: Although bondholders didn't get the outcome they wanted as it
relates to the highly publicized merger discussions between Sprint and T-
Mobile, we believe Sprint's standalone operational plan coupled with its vast
optionality around liquidity make Sprint bonds attractive. We acknowledge the
turnaround in FCF generation will take longer than originally expected, but
that's only because the company has opted to accelerate its CapEx plans
forward into FY18 and FY19, which we believe will result in better subscriber
trends and financial metrics just in time for the arrival of next generation 5G
roll-outs.
The reinvigorated stance towards network investment comes at a time when
Sprint will also return to services growth (FY2H18) for the first time since
CY4Q13. As the network improves, we model in lower churn and better gross
adds as well as improving ARPU in FY19. which will all lead to improved
revenue trajectory as well as profitability. Sprint has considered itself the "price
leader" in the industry for a while, but raised prices last quarter and plan to
again, which should enhance top-line and margins. Once CapEx normalizes
back to $4-5 billion (post-FY19), we expect Sprint to start generating billions of
cash.
Until then, Sprint can use its ample pockets of liquidity to deal with near-term
obligations as well as funding CapEx. The company ended the most recent
quarter with over $6 billion of cash on the balance sheet, has -$10.5 billion of
Spectrum LeaseCo capacity available to them ($3.5 billion under the existing
program and another -$7 billion under a second program), will take advantage
of the ABS market to handle device financing, and could open up a layer of
financing if management decides to take out the Junior Guaranteed notes.
Currently, the indenture governing the Junior Guaranteed trenches restrict how
much pari debt Sprint can raise ($6 billion notional), but removing that
restrictive covenant could provide a source of liquidity at more attractive
financing than existing unsecured bonds. Knowing there is positive liquidity
optionality around removing that sliver of capital from the balance sheet, we
think management may target the 7% Jr Guaranteed Notes due 2020 later in
2018 when the 9% Jr Guaranteed Notes mature, which provides an opportunity
to capture some alpha in a senior part of the capital structure.
Sprint 7% Jr. G'teed Notes due 2020:
$107.00, 3.63%, 163 bps
Sprint 6.875% Sr Notes due 2028:
$101.00, 6.74%, 426 bps
Frontier Swap:
The trajectory for Frontier has changed materially throughout 2017. Entering
the year, many investors were still believers in an annual run-rate EBITDA of $4
billion. The synergies were going to come through, CTF properties were going
to inflect their subscriber figures, and DSL in the rural properties could fight off
the less quality competition in those geographies. Almost nothing has played
out as expected and Frontier has, again, struggled to make sense of an
acquisition that was supposed to act as a catalyzing event that stabilized the
business.
While we are confident that a near-term cost reduction story is credible
(revenue is declining so costs should be able to come down and duplicative
spending utilized in stabilizing CTF can run off), we do not think that cost cuts
can out-run revenue declines over even the intermediate term. Until the story
can credibly shift to a position of discussing revenue stability, then growth, the
Frontier story will be very challenged. We are going back to the same well in
our trade idea in 2018, recommending the compression trade between higher
dollar bonds and lower dollar bonds as we expect further signs of stress in the
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Risks
include
mental
of
subsaiber trend; no inflecdon in
revenues, downward spiral in
ARPU,
and
higher
then
anticipabsti CapEx
*sirs
!,dude
better
then
expected performance in C7F
tflie4
cutting the dividend,
end asset sales
Page 215
CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)
CONFIDENTIAL
DB-SDNY-0086774
SDNY_GM_00232958
EFTA01385488
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