EFTA02404867

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2012 2:57 PM Subject: March 31 update 31 March, 2012 Article 1. TIME Mo=sad Cutting Back on Covert Operations Inside Iran Karl Vick=/a> <http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/a=thor/karlvick/> Article 2. Article 3. Article 4. Nicholas=Noe Article 5. Article 6. Article 7. Article 1. TIME Mossad Cutting Back on Covert Operations Inside Iran, Off=cials Say Karl Vick <http://globals=in.blogs.time.com/author/karlvick/> EFTA_R1_01444844 EFTA02404867 March 30, 2012 -- Israel's intelligence services have scaled =ack covert operations inside Iran, ratcheting down by "dozens of percent=94 in recent months secret efforts to disable or delay the enemy state's nuclear program, senior Israeli security offi=ials tell TIME. The reduction runs across a wide spectrum of operations, c=tting back not only alleged high-profile missions such as assassinations a=d detonations at Iranian missile bases, but also efforts to gather firsthand on-the-ground intelligence and=recruit spies inside the Iranian program, according to the officials. The new hesitancy has caused "increasing dissatisfaction" i=side Mossad, Israel's overseas spy agency, says one official. Another se=ior security officer attributes the reluctance to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who the official describes as worrie= about the consequences of a covert operation being discovered or going aw=y. Netanyahu was Prime Minister in 1997 when a Mossad attempt to assassina=e senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal in Amman Jordan ended in fiasco. Two Mossad operatives were captur=d after applying a poison to Meshaal's skin, and returned to Israel only=after Netanyahu ordered the release of the antidote. The Prime Minister al=o was forced to release Hamas' spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin from an Israeli prison, dramatically boosting th= fortunes of the religious militant movement. "Bibi is traumatized from the Meshaal incident," the offici=1 says. "He is afraid of another failure, that something will blow up in=his face." Iranian intelligence already has cracked one cell trained and e=uipped by Mossad, Western intelligence officials earlier confirmed to TIME <http://www.time=com/time/world/article/0,8599,2104372,00.html> . The detailed =onfession on Iranian state television last year by Majid Jamali Fashid for=the January 2010 assassination by motorcycle bomb of nuclear scientist Mas=oud Ali Mohmmadi was genuine, those officials said, blaming a third country for exposing the cell. In that case, the public damage to Israel was circumscribed by =he limits of Iran's credibility: Officials in Tehran routinely blame set=acks of all stripes on the "Zionists" and "global arrogance," their labels for Israel and the United States. But=that could change if the Islamic Republic produced a captured Israeli nati=nal or other direct evidence — something on the lines of the closed circ=it video footage and false passports that recorded the presence of Mossad agents in the Dubai hotel where Hamas=arms runner Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead in his room in January 2010.=Difficult- to-deny evidence of Israeli involvement trickled out for weeks; =etanyahu was Prime Minister then as well. The stakes are higher now. With the Iranian issue at the forefr=nt of the international agenda, a similar embarrassment could undo the imp=essive global front Washington has assembled against the mullahs — perhaps by allowing Iran to cast itself as victim,=or simply by recasting the nuclear issue itself, from one of overarching g=obal concern into a contest confined to a pair of longtime enemies.=/p> Some warn that the assassinations already run that risk. After =he most recent killing, of nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan in Janu=ry, the United States "categorically" denied involvement in the death and issued a condemnation. Western intelli=ence officials say he was at least the third Iranian scientist killed by M=ssad operatives, who lately are running short of new targets, according to=lsraeli officials. "It undercuts the consensus, th= international consensus on sanctions," says Mark Fitzpatrick, a former =tate Department nuclear proliferation specialist who opposes the assassinations. The covert campaign also invites retribution from Iran's own =ar-reaching underground. In the space of just days last month, alleged Ira=ian plots against Israeli targets in Thailand, Azerbaijan, Singapore and Georgia were announced as thwarted, and Indian o=ficials blamed Iran for a nearly fatal attack that went forward in New Del=i. The wife of an Israeli diplomat was injured by a magnetic bomb attached=to her car by a passing motorcyclist, the precise method Israeli agents are alleged to have used repeatedly on t=e crowded streets of Tehran. But scaling back covert operations against Iran also carries co=ts, especially as Iran hurries to disperse its centrifuges, some into faci=ities deep underground. Quoting an intelligence finding, one Israeli official says Iran itself estimates that sabotage to =ate has set back its centrifuge program by two full years. The computer vi=us known as Stuxnet — a joint 2 EFTA_R1_01444845 EFTA02404868 effort by intelligence services in Israel =nd a European nation, Western intelligence officials say — is only the best known of a series of efforts to slow th= Iranian program, dating back years. That alleged effort involves a variet= of governments besides Israel, involving equipment made to purposely malf=nction after being tampered with before it physically entered Iran. The resulting setbacks prompted Iran to=announce it would manufacture all components of its nuclear program itself=— something outside experts are highly skeptical Tehran has the ability =o actually do. "Iran has said for some time that they're self-sufficient, =ut that's a bag of wind," says Fitzpatrick, now at London's Internat=onal Institute for Strategic Studies. For example, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in February announced that Iran had =erfected a far more efficient centrifuge — a "fourth-generation" mac=ine, three levels beyond its original centrifuges, made from designs purch=sed from Pakistan's A.Q. Khan. Fitzpatrick has his doubts. "They haven't been able to get the second generation t= work over the last ten years," he says. The alternative is importing equipment, which leaves the produc= vulnerable to continued tampering — especially in the shadowy markets o= front companies where Iran has been forced by U.S. and international sanctions to do much of its business. It can be =lmost impossible to know whom you're actually doing business with, a cir=umstance that favors Western intelligence agencies. "The easiest way to sabotage is to introduce faulty parts int= the inventory from abroad," says Fitzpatrick. Between assassination and silent sabotage lies another covert o=tion: Very loud sabotage. Recent years have brought a series of mysterious=explosions at complexes associated with Iran's nuclear program. TIME has reported <http://www.time.comitime/world/article/0,8599,2099376,00.html> Western sources saying=that Israel was responsible for the massive November blast at a Revolution=ry Guard missile base outside Tehran, which by dumb luck also claimed the =ife of the godfather of Iran's missile program. But other blasts remain genuine mysteries. Weeks after a huge e=plosion darkened the sky over a uranium enrichment site in Isfahan, in cen=ral Iran, Israeli officials appeared eager to see what had actually happened. "I'm not sure what," a reti=ed senor intelligence official said two weeks afterward, then offered an a=alysis based on open-source satellite photos <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports=detail/no-visible-evidence-of-explosion-at-esfahan-nuclear-site-adjacent- f=cility-h available to anyone wit= an internet connection. Article 2. NYT Obama Finds Oil in Markets Is Sufficient to Sideline Iran=ispan> Annie Lowrey <http://topic=.nytimes.comitopireferenceitimestopics/peopleNannie Jowrey/index.html?in=ine=nyt- per> March 30, 2012 — After careful analysis of oil <http://topics.nytimes.com/topinews/businessienergy-environment=oil- petroleum-and-gasoline/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> prices and months of negotiations, President Obama on Friday determined that ther= was sufficient oil in world markets to allow countries to significantly r=duce their Iranian imports, clearing the way for Washington to impose seve=e new sanctions intended to slash <=ont color="#000Off">Iran 3 EFTA_R1_01444846 EFTA02404869 chttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/co=ntriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> 's oil revenue and press Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The White House announcement comes after months of back-channel=talks to prepare the global energy market to cut Iran out — but without =aising the price of oil, which would benefit Iran and harm the economies of the United States and Europe. Since the sanctions became law in December, administration offi=ials have encouraged oil exporters with spare capacity, particularly Saudi=Arabia, to increase their production. They have discussed with Britain and France releasing their oil reserves i= the event of a supply disruption. And they have conducted a high-level campaign of shuttle diplom=cy to try to persuade other countries, like China, Japan and South Korea, =o buy less oil and demand discounts from Iran, in compliance with the sanctions. The goal is to sap the Iranian government of oil revenue that m=ght go to finance the country's nuclear program <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news=international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html?inli=e=n yt-classifier> . Already, the pending sanctions have led to a decrease =n oil exports and a sharp decline <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/worl4middleeast/iran-eases-its-currency-exchange-policy.html> in the value of the country's currency, the rial, against the dollar <http://topics.nytimes.com=top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/currency/dollar/index.html?inline=n=t-classifier> and euro. Administration officials described the Saudis as willing and ea=er, at least since talks started last fall, to undercut the Iranians. One senior official who had met with the Saudi leadership, said= 'There was no resistance. They are more worried about a nuclear Iran th=n the Israelis are." Still officials said, the administration wanted to be sure that=the Saudis were not talking a bigger game than they could deliver. The Sau=is received a parade of visitors, including some from the Energy Department, to make the case that they had the techni=al capacity to pump out significantly more oil. But some American officials remain skeptical. That is one reaso= Mr. Obama left open the option of reviewing this decision every few month=. "We won't know what the Saudis can do until we test it, and we're about to," the official said. Worldwide demand for oil was another critical element of the eq=ation that led to the White House decision on sanctions. Now, projections =or demand are lower than expected because of the combination of rising oil prices, theEurope=n financial crisis chttp://topics.nytimes.com/to=/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovereign_debt_crisis/index.htm=?inline= nyt-classifier> and a modest slowdown in growth in China.=/span> As one official said, "No one wants to wish for slowdown, but=demand may be the most important factor." Nonetheless, the sanctions pose a serious challenge for the Uni=ed States. Already, concerns over a confrontation with Iran and the loss o= its oil — Iran was the third-biggest exporter of crude in 2010 — have driven oil prices up about 20 percent t=is year. A gallon of gas currently costs $3.92, on average, up from abou= $3.20 a gallon in December. The rising prices have weighed on economic co=fidence and cut into household budgets, a concern for an Obama administration seeking re- election. 4 EFTA_R1_01444847 EFTA02404870 On Friday afternoon, oil prices on commodity markets closed at =103.02 a barrel, up 24 cents for the day. Moreover, the new sanctions — which effectively force countri=s to choose between doing business with the United States and buying oil f=om Iran — threaten to fray diplomatic relationships with close allies that buy some of their crude from Tehran, like South Kor=a. But in a conference call with reporters, senior administration =fficials said they were confident that they could put the sanctions in eff=ct without damaging the global economy. Iran currently exports about 2.2 million barrels of crude oil a=day, according to the economic analysis company IHS Global Insight, and ot=er oil producers will look to make up much of that capacity, as countries buy less and less oil from Iran. A num=er of countries are producing more petroleum, including the United States =tself, which should help to make up the gap. Most notably, Saudi Arabia, the world's single biggest produc=r, has promised to pump more oil to bring prices down. "There is no rational reason why oil prices are continuing to=remain at these high levels," the Saudi oil minister, Ali Naimi, wrote i= an <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/=e1ccb48-781c-11el-b237-00144feab49a.html> Article 3. The National Interest The Increasingly Transparent U.S.-Israeli Conflict of Int=rest Paul R. Pillar <http://nationalinterest.org/profile/paul-r-pillar> March 29, 2012 -- We have a comparative lull at the moment in w=at has been saturation attention to Iran and its nuclear program. The lull=comes after the concentrated warmongering rhetoric associated with the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjam=n Netanyahu and the AIPAC conference in Washington, and before the opening=in mid-April of the only channel offering a way out of the impasse associa=ed with the Iranian nuclear issue: direct negotiations between Iran and the powers known as the P5+1. It =s a good time to reflect on how much the handling of this issue underscore= the gulf between Israeli policies and U.S. interests. The gulf exists for=two reasons. One is that the Netanyahu government's policies reflect only a Rightist slice of the Israeli politic=l spectrum, with which many Israelis disagree and which is contrary to bro=der and longer-term interests of Israel itself. The other reason is that e=en broadly defined Israeli interests will never be congruent with U.S. interests. This should hardly be surpris=ng. There is no reason to expect the interests of the world superpower to =Iign with those of any of the parties to a regional dispute involving old =thnically or religiously based claims to land. An article this week by Ethan Bronner <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/middleeast/netanyahu-and=barak- bond-over-israels-iran-crisis.html?scp=1&sq=Bronner%20Netany=hu%20Barak%20&st=cse> [3] i= the New York Times addresses one of the drivers behind the Israeli policy= a historically based obsession of Mr. Netanyahu, for whom an Iranian nucl=ar weapon would be, as Brunner puts it, "the 21st-century equivalent of the Nazi war machine and the Spanish=Inquisition." The extent to which the issue is a personal compulsion of =etanyahu is reflected in estimates that even within his own cabinet (and e=en with the support of Defense Minister Ehud Barak), a vote in favor of war with Iran might be as close as eight t= six. A former Likud activist who has become a critic of Netanyahu explain=, "Bibi is a messianist. He believes with all his soul and every last mo=ecule of his being that he—I don't quite know how to express it—is King David." It is not in a superpower=s interest to get sucked into projects of someone with a King David comple=. 5 EFTA_R1_01444848 EFTA02404871 Given—as several Israelis who have been senior figures in the-country's security establishment have noted—that an Iranian nuclear weap=n would not pose an existential threat to Israel, one has to look to other reasons for the Israeli agitation about t=e Iranian nuclear program. Besides Netanyahu's personal obsession, there a=e the broader Israeli fears and emotions, the desire to maintain a regiona= nuclear-weapons monopoly and the distraction that the Iran issue provides from outside attention to the Pal=stinians' lack of popular sovereignty. Columnist Richard Cohen, in a piece last week <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/strike-on-iran-could-buy-=srael-needed-time-in- mideast/2012/03/19/gIQAim44NS_story.html> [4) that is clearly sy=pathetic to Israel, mentions one more reason: a desire to stem a brain dra=n to the United States of Israelis who would rather live in a more secure =lace. Clearly there is no congruence with U.S. interests here. In fact, taking in the talent that is found amon= the Israeli émigrés is a net plus for the United States and the =S. economy. The Iranian nuclear issue only reconfirms the noncongruence of =S. and Israeli interests that should have been apparent from other issues= Most of those issues revolve around the continued Israeli occupation and colonization of disputed land inhabit=d by Palestinians. The United States has no positive interest in Israel cl=nging to that land—only the negative interest involving the opprobrium a=d anger directed at it for being so closely associated with Israeli policies and actions. Another reminder =f the lonely position in which the United States finds itself almost every=time it automatically condones Israeli behavior came last week, when the United Nations Human Rights Council voted chttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/world/middleeast/israeli-offic=als-denounce-move-by-united-nations-human- rights-council-to-investigate-se=tlements-affect-on-palestinian- rights.html?scp=3&sq=United%20Natio=s%20Human%20Rights&st=cse> [5) for an inquiry into how Israeli settlements in the occupied terri=ories affect the rights of Palestinians. Initiation of the inquiry was app=oved with thirty-six votes in favor, ten abstentions and a single no vote by the United States. If the United States escapes a war with Iran by achieving succe=s in negotiations (which Netanyahu and his government have in effect denou=ced and have helped to subvert by waging a covert war against Iran), Americans ought to reflect on how close they c=me to disaster by following the man who thinks he is King David. If it doe= not escape a war, it will be hard to find any silver lining in the conseq=ences. But perhaps one would be that Americans would then be more likely to understand how contrary to the=r own interests it has been to follow the preferences of the Israeli gover=ment. Perhaps that could be a first step toward a more normal—and more b=neficial for the United States—U.S. relationship with Israel. Paul R. Pillar served for twenty-eight years in the U.S. int=lligence community, including as deputy chief of the Counterterrorist Cent=r at the Central Intelligence Agency. He retired in 2005. Article 4. Foreign Policy <=>Hezbollah=s subtle shift on Syria <http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/post=/2012/03/30/hezbollahs_subtle_shift_on_syria> =span style=""> Nicholas Noe </=> March 30, 2012 -- After one year of doubling d=wn on their support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Lebanon's Hezbol=ah has finally shifted its public position on the regime, albeit with great subtlety and in an extremely measured 6 EFTA_R1_01444849 EFTA02404872 fas=ion. The pivot point came during a lengthy, televised speech delivered on =arch 15 by the party's longstanding secretary-general, Sayyid Hassan Nasra=lah. Speaking to hundreds of students mainly on the subject of illiteracy and the dire need for greater access t= education in the Arab world, Nasrallah eventually turned to the anti-gove=nment protests in Syria that began in March 2011. Almost from the outset, he was especially fran= in equating the opposition and the Assad regime, urging -- even pleading =or -- a negotiated political solution where both sides first "simultaneously" lay down their weapons (a call=subsequently made by the U.N. Security Council). "These matters canno= be dealt with by fighting, confrontations, wars, or by inviting foreign m=litary intervention," Nasrallah stressed, an intimation that, while some in the opposition should be blamed for calling for extern.' intervention, the regime also bore at least some responsibility, since i=s actions had (quite obtusely) moved the possibility of intervention to th= forefront of the international discourse. But he had more specific demands of the regime, too. "All forms of massacres and the targeting=of civilians and innocent people are to be condemned," he said. "=Now the opposition is accusing the regime and the regime is accusing the opposition. One of the regime's responsibilities today is =o present the facts to the people. Those who have the facts should present=them. Leveling accusations left and right is an easy thing to do but the m=in thing is that the massacres deserve to be condemned...All forms of killing must stop (emphasis added].=quot; What explains his heightened sense of urgency =n these matters -- ever a function of the many constituencies that he must=constantly juggle? Nasrallah argued that a great unravelling in the Middle East accompanied by extreme violence is =ast coming into focus."We are apprehensive," he said, "that=Syria, and hence the region, might be divided. We are afraid of a civil wa=, anarchy, and the weakening of Syria and its position as a pan-Arab force in the Arab-Israeli struggle and a genuine ba=ker for the resistance movements in the region [emphasis added]." Of =ourse, Nasrallah has long acknowledged these concerns, and said, during hi= speech, that he was merely reiterating this specific point of concern. What was different, however, was that alongsid= an unmistakable sense of alarm was an acknowledgement that, after months =f predicting the regime would get the upper hand, the situation has instead stalled just at the edge of chaos. The cri=ical question that now follows is how will Hezbollah approach a further de=erioration in Syria -- a still likely outcome -- in the coming phase? Unfortunately for proponents of militarizing t=e situation, and also those hopeful of violently "declawing" Hez=ollah, Nasrallah's new rhetoric does not aid the oft-repeated assertion that, in the event of a bloody Syrian regime collap=e, Hezbollah would just absorb the major strategic and ideological blow wi=h a minimal (or symbolic) response. (The corollary myth, it should be poin=ed out, has been that Iran would similarly limit its response in a militarized event and that Assad diehard=, for their part, would also not want or be able to do much harm in their =aning moments). Indeed, he suggested that Hezbollah, together =ith "the part of the Syrian people" who steadfastly reject what =he party believes is essentially a pro-Zionist push for supremacy over the Levant, will necessarily be forced to use counterfo=ce at some point -- the logic of resistance -- to defend mutual interests =o clearly threatened by a direct attack on the regime. "We tell our S=rian bothers," Nasrallah clarified, "people, regime, state, army, parties, and political forces -- your b=ood is our blood, your future is our future, your life is our life, and ou= security and fate are one." Ironically then, Nasrallah actually ends up wh=re so many regime opponents who believe in a direct confrontation are now:=in the absence of a viable political track, the only way to stave off total chaos, massive violence, and a collapse of=one's vital interests will be to introduce decisive counter-violence to th= picture. What is perhaps new here -- and more frighteni=g -- is that Nasrallah now also seems publicly concerned that the Assad re=ime, and not just the opposition and its external allies, are pushing everyone along a path to war, including Hezbo=lah. The brutal truth then for Nasrallah is that after having so tightly w=d his party to Assad, Hezbollah's own agency in these vital matters -- exi=tential matters as he repeatedly declares -- has been severely undercut. This means that even if Hezbollah =ould prefer to keep relatively quiet in the event of a violent regime coll=pse, Nasrallah feels he 7 EFTA_R1_01444850 EFTA02404873 might now have no choice in the matter if things c=ntinue as they have. After all, if we only take his suggestion that Assad's forces are killing women and c=ildren in cold blood, then the party understands perfectly well that this =egime will also have little regard for sucking its ally into a regional co=flict whose timing, scope, and terrain the party would realistically prefer to avoid for now. As if this was not enough, Hezbollah also know= that there are a multitude of ways by which Assad and his minions could g= about accomplishing this task with relative ease -- not least by pulling Israel and Hezbollah into yet another conflic= which both parties ideologically crave and which both will be enormously =ard pressed to limit, given the underlying mechanics of the relationship. Even so, all may not be lost or given over onl= to even more violence. Assad's regime has been significantly weakened=over the past few months, evidently less as a result of any fighting and e=ternal intervention than as a result of its own wanton and strategically stupid actions. It may have the upper han=, at least for the moment, on the field of battle, but it has done enormou= damage to its moral, ideological, economic, political, and diplomatic sta=ding. Further, Hamas has abandoned Assad. Russia and=China have at least some limits to their support, even if these are only s=owly coming into focus. And Nasrallah, still one of the most popular leaders in the Middle East, is apparently tr=ing to grab back some leverage over the pace of events by publically rebuk=ng the regime to stop fanning the violence before it's logic overwhelms ev=ryone and Hezbollah is forced, willingly or not, to "resist." Crucially, too, the United States=has privately and publically rejected the path of increased militarization=of the Syrian conflict and even signaled a willingness to step back from t=e demand Assad himself must go as a precondition for any political process. When you add up all of these factors, now migh= be exactly the time to get the severely wounded regime caught up in a con=erted international process that begins protecting Syrians while slowly and steadily draining Assad's ability and =esire to exercise violence. This may not be an ideal situation since the r=gime's brutality will likely continue and the democratic aspirations of Sy=ians will only be met gradually. But the alternative of full-blown civil war, and quite possibly a regional=war, would be far worse. Hezbollah, for one, now seems ready to succumb=to this logic -- and encourage the regime to bend -- if such a process rej=cts the use and encouragement of more direct violence. Without this key proviso, however, Nasrallah will likely find hi=self in the distasteful position of going to battle on the side of an ally=that has done so much to undermine the party's claim to represent the weak=and the oppressed. <1=> <=pan style="font-size: 18pt;">Nicholas Noe is the editor of "Voice o= Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah". Article 5. Los Angeles Times4=pan> <http://www.latimes.com/> 8 EFTA_R1_01444851 EFTA02404874 <=>Will The Lady Rule Burma?=/span> Timothy Garton Ash </=> March 29, 2012 -- If Aung San Suu Kyi is elect=d to Burma's parliament on Sunday, the world will inevitably ask: Has Asia=s Nelson Mandela finally met her President F.W. de Klerk? Or, if you prefer a European comparison, has Asia's Vaclav =avel met her Mikhail Gorbachev? Cue episode three in the world's prisoner-=o-president sagas? I do believe that day will come, but let us ha=e no illusions: There are still major obstacles ahead. Wisdom and strength= both inside and outside Burma, will be needed to surmount them. Whatever happens, Suu Kyi has long since earne= the Havel and Mandela comparisons. Like Mandela, she has endured decades =f imprisonment, emerging with an extraordinary lack of rancor. Like Havel, she has not only been her country's leading di=sident but also analyzed its political and social condition in a universal=frame. Listen to the first of the two BBC Reith lectures she delivered las= year. Read her free-speech manifesto in the magazine Index on Censorship. These are classics of modern dissiden= political writing, with a new dimension because she speaks always as a de=out Buddhist. Intellectually and morally, there is no compar=son between her and Burma's (a.k.a. Myanmar's) military leader in a civili=n suit, President Thein Sein. Politically, however, the opening he has creat=d is remarkable. Hundreds of political prisoners have been released, inclu=ing some from the important 88 Generation student movement and monks who were active in the so-called saffron revolu=ion of 2O07. The military junta has retreated behind a cloak of civilian p=litics. Freedom of expression and assembly has exploded, though the legal =asis for it is still insecure. Activists have been catapulted from the darkness of a prison cell to the b=inding flash of paparazzi bulbs. Remarkably, Thein Sein has risked the wrath of=China, Burma's would-be big brother, by suspending construction of the Chi=ese-funded Myitsone hydroelectric dam. (The energy would have gone mainly to China, the environmental cost to Bur-a.) He has sought cease-fires with insurgent minority groups, though some =rmed conflict continues. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy has been =Bowed to register as a party. It has put up candidates in Sunday's elections for 47 of the 48 available =eats in the lower house of parliament. Large crowds hail one of those cand=dates as a savior wherever she goes. If you had suggested any of this four years ag=, as the saffron revolution was brutally crushed, no one would have believ=d you. Every velvet revolution, every negotiated transition, requires figures in both the regime and the opposition who are=ready to take the risk of engagement. At last, Burma seems to have its two=to tango. Now for the warning notes. Both leaders are in=eed taking a big risk. The regime's chief astrologer —Burmese rulers fav=r astrologers over economists — has reportedly predicted that Thein Sein will fall ill this summer. That illness may be political, if the grossly =elf-enriched military feels its vital interests are threatened. Just a few=days ago, the head of the army warned that the military's special position, enshrined in the 2008 constitution, must =e respected. For Suu Kyi , the risks are also great. The NL= leader recently had to suspend her campaign, apparently worn out by the h=at, crowds and exertion. If some on the regime side add electoral fraud to media manipulation, what will she say? =ven if the NLD wins all the seats it is contesting, it will have just over=10% of a lower house dominated by the military- 9 EFTA_R1_01444852 EFTA02404875 created Union Solidarity an= Development Party, with 110 seats (one in four) reserved for military appointees. The next general election =s not till 2015. Popular hopes of her miracle-working powers ar= exceeded only by the scale of the country's problems. Central to those pr=blems, as in Egypt, are the economic privileges of the military. "I don't want to ask what you need before the electi=n," she told voters at an orphanage, "but I will afterward; I pr=mise to come back soon." But what if she can't, being stuck in parlia=entary committees in the remote, artificial government city of Naypyidaw? What if she knows the people's needs but cannot supply =hem? Sympathetic observers say she risks exchanging=one kind of powerlessness for another. Then there is the complex relationship with th= ethnic minorities that make up about one-third of the country's populatio=. And there is China, which is hardly going to welcome the emergence of a shining, Western-oriented democracy on its d=orstep. Against this, however, there are grounds for o=timism. The NLD may not have the kind of organization the African National=Congress had in South Africa, but, as Havel showed in Czechoslovakia, mass organizations can emerge with remarkable sp=ed in velvet revolutionary times. There is the social and moral force of t=e country's Buddhist monks. (I challenge any Burmese general to sneer, &qu=t;How many divisions has the Buddha?") The regime is clearly keen to get European and American sanctions lifted, =o there is some leverage there. Then there is the country's other mighty neigh=or, India, which might at long last choose to encourage next door what it =ractices at home: democracy. There is the popular momentum that such processes acquire, once begun. And there is The=Lady herself, a treasure without price. Astrologers do, after all, make mistakes. Even=political scientists have been known to err in their predictions. On what =e know today, it looks as if her road from prison to presidency has difficult turns and harsh gradients ahead; 2015 m=y be a more realistic target date than 2013. And that end will itself, as Havel and Mandela=discovered, only be a beginning. <1=> <=pan style="font-size: 18pt;">Timothy Garton Ash, a contributing writer t= Opinion, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of Eu=opean studies at Oxford University. <1=> <1=> Article 6. Council on Foreign Relations <=>Does the BRICS Group Matter?<=b> 10 EFTA_R1_01444853 EFTA02404876 Interview with Martin Wolf March 30, 2012 -- The group of fast-growing emerging markets known as the BRICS--Brazil, R=ssia, India, China, and South Africa--held their fourth annual summit this=past week in New Delhi. The leaders of the five nations agreed on new meas=res to facilitate greater trade within the bloc, including a deal to extend credit facilities in the local=currencies of other BRICS countries. They also discussed a potential plan =o set up a joint BRICS development bank, which would serve as a counterwei=ht to the Western-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, the BRICS have not set out = comprehensive long-term agenda because they are hobbled by internal diffe=ences and have "nothing in common," argues the Financial Times' =artin Wolf. What are the prospects for a BRI=S development bank? It's not completely obvious to me what i= could achieve, given that we have the World Bank and a whole network of b=g regional development banks. There are big questions about the governance of those institutions, and in particular, t=e continued domination of the developed countries. The BRICS collectively =ould be able to shake that if they really try to do so. What's not clear t= me is whether this is a bank that would operate everywhere using BRICS money in some way, or whether it woul= be a BRIC bank. We have enough official banks, and it would make far more=sense to improve the governance of what we have than to start creating com=letely new institutions. What is the significance of the =act that the BRICS did not put forward a candidate for the World Bank pres=dency, and is it clear where they stand vis-à-vis the U.S. nominee? The BRICS are not a group. The BRICS wer= invented by Jim O'Neil [of Goldman Sachs, in 2001j. They added South Afri=a to the BRICS [last year), which wasn't originally there, to give some representation of Africa. These countries h=ve basically nothing in common whatsoever, except that they are called BRI=S and they are quite important. But in all other respects, their interests=and values, political systems, and objectives are substantially diverse. So there's no reason whatsoever =o expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world, except that t=e existing dominating powers should cede some of their influence and power= That's the one thing they have in common. Secondly, the grouping has very specific=jealousies within it, particularly the two most powerful members--in terms=of their potential, anyway--China and India. There's a lot of mistrust between the two, and [it would be) very difficul= for them to agree on a candidate. Third, at this stage, I don't think the= are particularly interested in quixotic battles. They know the U.S. is li=ely to get European support. They probably don't regard this--none of the countries individually or collecti=ely--as a first-class issue to use their capital on in a big way. In time,=voting shares are going to be adjusted, so sooner or later, the big countr=es are going to get the power that they need. It's a matter of continuous pressure over time, so why fight th=s battle now when they don't really care what happens in the World Bank? B=cause these countries are not very dependent on the World Bank. There's no=reason to expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world, excep= that the existing dominating powers should cede some of their influence a=d power. What are some objectives that th= BRICS agree upon, besides getting the West to cede power? Quite a number of them tend to complain =bout Western protectionism. They obviously are interested in developing tr=de amongst themselves; that's a potential area of cooperation. But I don't regard the BRICS as a grouping of natural=fellows. They are very, very different politically, in terms of their deve=opment potential, in terms of the economic fundamentals they have--and the= have quite a few conflicts among them. 11 EFTA_R1_01444854 EFTA02404877 There's also been criticism by t=e BRICS that Western monetary policy has been too loose, and has hurt deve=oping countries. What do you make of that? I should have added that as one of the c=mplaints. The answer to that is: "Who the hell cares?" Western p=licy is made in light of what the Western countries see as their interests. And these countries make their monetary policy in =ight of their interests. There is no global monetary system at all, of any=kind, that disciplines this. So the reality is [that) we live in monetary =olicy anarchy, from a global point of view, in which each country pursues its own interest. So I regard these=as completely fruitless complaints, unless we start thinking about a total=reordering of the global monetary system, which these countries don't want=any more than the developed countries want because they would all lose sovereignty. I think the developed countries' monetar= policies are reasonable, given their circumstances. At least implicitly, =here's actually some concern about the monetary policies of some BRICS among other BRICS. For example, it's pretty clear B=azil is concerned about Chinese currency intervention. Finally, part of th=s is scapegoating--unpleasant things happen to you, your exchange rate app=eciates too much, there's some inflation in the world, you have to find someone to blame--it's very conve=ient to blame the monetary policy of the developed world. 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