EFTA02708692

From: Office of Teqe Rod-Larsen Sent: Saturday, June 14, 2014 4:01 PM Subject: June 14 update 14 June, 2014 Islamist Mili=ants Aim to Redraw Map of the Middle East Bill Spindle and Ge=ald F. Seib Article 5. The Council on Fore=gn Relations Syria: Humani=arian Disaster—and Security Threat Elliott Abrams <http://www.cfr.org/experts/middle-east-is=ael-human-rights/elliott-abrams/b1567> <=span> Arti=le 6. The Washington Post=/span> Iran is commi=ted to a peaceful nuclear program Mohammad Javad Zari= Arti=le 7. Foreign Policy in F=cus Genesis: Harr= Truman and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Adam Cohen</=> &n=sp; Arti=le 1. NYT Obama Finds H= Can't Put Iraq War Behind Him Peter Baker <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/t=mestopics/people/b/peter_baker/index.html> EFTA_R1_02111339 EFTA02708692 June 13, 2014 -- In=a high-profile speech <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/obama-foreign-poli=y- west-point-speech.html> to Army =adets last month, President Obama tried to move beyond America's tumultuous adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan w=th a new doctrine all but forswearing the use of military power except in =he most dire of circumstances. Barely two weeks la=er, Mr. Obama has already found himself in those circumstances and seems o= the verge of ordering the American military to intervene once more in Ira=. While ruling out ground troops to save the beleaguered Baghdad government from insurgents, Mr. Obama is cons=dering a range of options, including airstrikes by drones and piloted airc=aft. The possible return=to Iraq, even in limited form, underscores just how much that forlorn land=has shaped Mr. Obama's presidency. It defined his first campaign for the=White House, when his opposition to the war powered his candidacy. It defined his foreign policy as he resolved to=pull out of Iraq and keep out of places like Syria. And it defined the leg=cy he hoped to leave as he imagined history books remembering him for endi=g America's overseas wars. Yet as much as he w=nted Iraq in the rearview mirror, the swift march toward Baghdad by Islami=t extremists calling themselves the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or IS=S, has forced him to reconsider his approach. As much as he wanted to leave the fate of Iraq to the Iraqis the=selves, he concluded that the United States still has a stake in avoiding =he collapse of a state it occupied for more than eight years at the cost o= nearly 4,500 American lives. "We have an inter=st in making sure that a group like 1.5.1.1., which is a vicious organizat=on and has been able to take advantage of the chaos in Syria, that they do='t get a broader foothold," Mr. Obama said on Friday, using an alternative name for the group, the Islamic State=in Iraq and the Levant. "There are dangers of fierce sectarian fighting =f, for example, the terrorist organizations try to overrun sacred Shia sit=s, which could trigger Shia-Sunni conflicts that could be very hard to stamp out." Stepping back, he c=ted the United States' own tortured history in Iraq and the desire not t= let American efforts there go to waste. "We have enormous interests the=e," he added, "and obviously our troops and the American people and the American taxpayers made huge investments a=d sacrifices in order to give the Iraqis the opportunity to chart a better=course, a better destiny." Still, he insisted =hat Iraq's leaders have to make the sorts of compromises that will bring=stability to their country, and stressed that he would not let their probl=ms consume the United States all over again. "We're not going to allow ourselves to be dragged back into a s=tuation in which, while we're there, we're keeping a lid on things,"=but Iraq's own political leaders are failing to address the underlying f=ssures dividing the society. Mr. Obama has long =een criticized by Republicans for pulling troops out of Iraq at the end of=2011 without leaving behind a small residual force. That was a timetable o=iginally agreed to by President George W. Bush, and Iraqi leaders at the time would not agree to immunity provisi=ns insisted on by the Pentagon, but critics argued that Mr. Obama should h=ve tried harder to extend the American presence. Moreover, they said=the president has not done enough to pressure Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al=Maliki to reconcile with the Sunni minority, and they said Mr. Obama's f=ilure to do more to help moderate rebels in next-door Syria has emboldened more radical Islamist forces who have sp=lled over into Iraq. Not only has the la=est eruption in Iraq revived those criticisms, but it has also exposed the=president's plan for withdrawing from Afghanistan to further questions. =r. Obama announced last month that he would end the combat mission there by the end of this year, leaving behind=9,800 troops, all of whom would leave by 2016. Republicans on Frid=y urged Mr. Obama to act decisively in Iraq, questioning why he wants to t=ke several days to decide. "We shouldn't have boots on the ground, but=we need to be hitting these columns of terrorists marching on 2 EFTA_R1_02111340 EFTA02708693 Baghdad with drones now," said Representative Ed =oyce of California, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.</=pan> Representative Howa=d (Buck) McKeon of California, the chairman of the House Armed Services Co=mittee, said the president needed a broader strategy for containing the th=eat in the region. "There are no quick-fix solutions to this crisis, and I will not support a one-shot strike that lo=ks good for the cameras but has no enduring effect," he said. He added t=at the president should consider firing his national security team.=/p> From the other side=of the spectrum, Democrats expressed nervousness about becoming entangled =n Iraq just two and a half years after leaving. Even former Secretary of S=ate Hillary Rodham Clinton, who voted for the 2003 invasion as a senator but is now positioning herself for anot=er run for president, said she opposed the use of American force to help s=ve the Iraqi government without assurances from Mr. Maliki. "Not at this time= no," she said to the BBC in an interview recorded on Thursday. Mrs. Clinon, who if she ran and won would inherit the Iraq situation, said the Whi=e House should continue to reject Mr. Maliki's request for airstrikes until he has demonstrated inclusiveness. "That is=not a role for the United States," she said of military force. Liberal activists w=re more vehement. "For the last 12 years, Iraq has been Bush and Cheney=92s war," said Becky Bond, the political director for an activist group =ailed Credo. "But if the president decides to double down on George W. Bush's disastrous decision to invade Iraq by=launching a new round of bombing strikes, Iraq will become Barack Obama'= war." That would be the l=st thing Mr. Obama would want. For him, Iraq has been the template of ever=thing foreign policy should not be. He opposed the invasion as a state sen=tor in Illinois, and many of his decisions as president have been measured against the lessons he took from Iraq. To =im, the war proved that military intervention more often than not made thi=gs worse, not better. When he agreed to s=nd more troops to Afghanistan, he insisted on a timetable for pulling them=out. When he decided to intervene in Libya, he used only air power and mad= sure that NATO allies took the lead. When the Syrian civil war broke out, he resisted calls to step in even wit= air power or, for a long time, arms for the rebels. The longer he has bee= in office, the more skeptical he seems to have grown about the utility of=force as a means of changing the world for the better. Even as he acknowle=ged on Friday the possibility of using force again in Iraq, he put the onu= on Mr. Maliki and other Iraqi leaders to set aside sectarian differences =nd stabilize their country. "The United States will do our part," he said, "but understand that ultimately it=92s up to the Iraqis, as a sovereign nation, to solve their problems."</=pan> Still, those who ha=e spent time around Mr. Obama heard deep frustration in his voice as he sp=ke about the prospect of re-engaging in Iraq. "I can only imagine what=92s going through the president's head," said Julianne Smith, a former national security aide to Vice President Jos=ph R. Biden Jr. "He was just gett=ng to the point where he felt he could free himself from this agenda and n=t define his foreign policy solely on the last guy's," she said. "He=92s been keen not to use Bush as a reference point and get away from that and be more forward-looking and have a strate=y. And he was just turning a corner when this hit." gspan> Arti=le 2. The Economist 3 EFTA_R1_02111341 EFTA02708694 Barack Obama =nd Iraq: Cool calculations Jun 13th 2014 -- Av=iding aggressive questions is a hallmark of the White House press corps. S= it should be no surprise that reporters watching President Barack Obama m=ke an emergency statement on Iraq on June 13th failed to pelt him with the queries that lurk at the centre=of the debate over America's role in the Middle East. Namely: Mr Preside=t, did you help to bring these horrors about when you rushed to pull Ameri=an combat troops out of Iraq as quickly as possible? And, Mr President, does any part of you regret ignoring pleas=to arm and train non-extreme opposition forces across the border in Syria =ver the past two years? Instead reporters a=lowed Mr Obama to explain why American involvement in Iraq would be limite=, would take "several days" to be sent, would not involve any return o= ground troops and was conditional on Iraq's central government coming up with a "sincere" political plan to resolv= sectarian divisions. "We can't do it for them," Mr Obama said sever=ly. "Nobody has an=interest in seeing terrorists gain a foothold inside of Iraq and nobody is=going to benefit from seeing Iraq descend into chaos. The United States wi=1 do our part," he added. "But understand that ultimately it's up to the Iraqis, as a sovereign nation, to solve the=r problems." Yet is that enough?=Does such cool rationality from the global policeman make the world more d=ngerous? The question of Mr Obama's caution and hyper-realism (some woul= say cynicism) underpins everything. Foes and friends listen to Mr Obama. Then they then watch violent men harn=ss ethnic, sectarian and nationalist hatreds to challenge the internationa= order, seemingly with impunity. Finally, enemies and allies alike wonder:=does the world feel this volatile because Mr Obama has signalled America is so reluctant to intervene? =/span> But nobody asked Mr=Obama whether what is happening in Iraq or Syria is his fault, in any way.=As the president stood in the summer sunshine, his Marine One helicopter v=sible behind him, waiting to carry him to a speech about education and poverty-reduction on a Sioux reservati=n in North Dakota, reporters instead asked him to analyse the situation.&n=sp; Which he did. The p=esident is an intelligent, rational and rigorous observer of global horror=. And he is often eloquent in his assessment of why it is folly to think s=ch problems can be easily or reliably solved by military means alone. Asked about the sight of Iraqi army =nits abandoning their posts in the face of smaller enemy forces, Mr Obama =ade a good point. If Iraqi troops were not "willing to stand and figh=" against the militant attackers, that points to a "problem in terms of morale" and commitment that reflects p=litical divisions in the country. He expressed fears of worsening violence=should Sunni insurgents overrun Shiite sacred sites in the country. His observations we=e sound. And here is the frustrating thing about reporting on this preside=t's worldview. In and of itself, his cool, cerebral analysis is often mo=e rational and less hypocritical than the criticism raining down on him from his political opponents. Republicans in Wash=ngton, knowing full well that voters have precisely no appetite for a retu=n to Iraq, content themselves with accusing the president of allowing the =orld to fall apart and emboldening wicked men and dangerous foes through a lack of attention and "weakness=94. By this they seem to mean that Mr Obama should stop saying that Americ=n force may not be capable of fixing the world. They do not mean that they=actually want Mr Obama to do anything with American force. Thus the most senio= elected Republican in Washington, the Speaker of the House of Representat=ves John Boehner, criticised the president on June 12thfor watching terror=sts seize growing swathes of Iraq, adding: "And what is the president doing? Taking a nap!" <=p> 4 EFTA_R1_02111342 EFTA02708695 Mr Boehner chided M= Obama for failing to reach an agreement that would have allowed large num=ers of American troops to stay in Iraq after 2011. He urged the president =o "get engaged" in Iraq before it was too late. What American force= would be doing in Iraq, were Republicans in control, is anybody's guess= Mr Boehner murmured on June 12th about providing kit and technical assist=nce to the Iraqi government. He declined to say whether America should launch air strikes. Even the hawk's hawk, =enator John McCain of Arizona says that he does not want ground troops sen= back to Iraq, though he would like Mr Obama's national security team fi=ed. Senator Rand Paul o= Kentucky, a putative White House contender in 2016, spoke for the Republi=an party's non- interventionist wing, declaring the situation a "really=confusing mess" and musing aloud: "You could even go back ten years and say, you know what, it might have been a =ittle more stable when we had that awful guy [Saddam) Hussein, who hated t=e Iranians." Democrats, such as =enator Dianne Feinstein of California, content themselves with denouncing =epublicans for failing to acknowledge that they once cheered George W Bush=into war with Iraq. Republican "cheerleaders for the disastrous war in Iraq are now joining the blame-America-first cro=d rather than working with our Commander-in-Chief to confront this crisis,=94 she says. In short, the woefu= level of Washington debate allows Mr Obama to explain why the world is co=plicated, and why this is mostly for others to fix. It permits his opponen=s to talk vaguely about "weakness" and the need for leadership, without spelling out what that might mean—I=t alone what they might support by way of air strikes, arms transfers and =o on. Should America chan=e course? Are there dangers to Mr Obama's hyper-realist foreign policies= What if others seem incapable of fixing problems that threaten American i=terests? Those would be better topics for debate, but would involve challenging the overwhelming (and understand=ble) desire of Americans to avoid fresh entanglements. Thus, within the Wa=hington bubble, they are not voiced. =/span> Arti=le 3. Newsweek Does This Mea= Osama Bin Laden Has Won? Kurt Eichenwal= <http://www.newsweek.com/authors/kurt-eich=nwald-0> 13 June 2014 -- In =he end, Osama bin Laden may achieve the goal that inspired the 9/11 attack= after all. And, strangely, one of the best ways to thwart that dream is f=r the United States to anger some of its friends and cooperate with its enemies—in particular, the Islamic Re=ublic of Iran. The successful marc= toward Baghdad by the Sunni fundamentalist group in Iraq—Islamic State =f Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—has been as inevitable as it is threatening=to any prospects of peace in the Middle East. Now, the centuries-old tribal warfare between the two most prominent=sects of Islam—Sunni and the Shiite—has been inflamed once again, with=the fundamentalist group exposing the weakness and incompetence of what it= followers see as just another impure government established by the West. 5 EFTA_R1_02111343 EFTA02708696 What so many Americ=ns, including their leaders in government, have long failed to understand =s that this was what bin Laden and AI-Qaeda wanted all along. The intent o= the bloody attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was to lure the U.S. and its allies into attacking=the Middle East. Bin Laden was quite open about that. Such a war, he beli=ved, would unify Muslims and then lead to an enormous victory that would d=ive the West to withdraw from all of the Middle East. From there, bin Lade= wanted to set off a Sunni revolution that would topple secular, Western-supported governments in the Arab world=and confront Shiites, whom he deeply opposed. In fact, ISIL has proclaimed=that the current confrontation isn't a war between Iraq's government a=d Islamists, but Sunnis vs. Shiites. For those who didn=92t understand prior to the American invasion of Iraq about this boiling c=uldron of tribal hate that played so important a role in Middle Eastern se=urity, the evidence grew stronger throughout the war. AI-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have killed untold thou=ands of Shiites in the past 11 years—in particular, in Iraq. In fact, in=2007, groups in Kuwait that pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda issued a fatwa=97a legal pronouncement by a religious scholar—against the Shiite government in Iran. From the beginning,=this has been the irreparable flaw in the American strategy to topple the =raqi government of Saddam Hussein. Saddam was a brutal and murderous dicta=or, but as a secular Sunni who ruled with an iron, bloody fist, he was able to crush the fundamentalist threat.=But once the Sunni government was driven from power and the Iraqi military=disbanded by the Americans, its members joined forces with the more threat=ning Islamists among its tribal brethren. The American plan w=s for Iraq to be ruled by a cooperative government between the majority se=t, the Shiites, and the minority Sunnis. But this idea of cooperative lead=rship between the Hatfields and the McCoys was always destined to collapse—hundreds of years of war were not=going to be set aside just because the West demanded it. The Sunnis who atte=pted to join the new political order were soon marginalized. Their almost =oken representation intensified bubbling Sunni anger about perceived discr=mination and inequality. Making it all the worse has been the leadership of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Mal=ki, who has made every effort to destroy any credible leadership among the=Sunnis attempting to join the government. According to a repo=t by the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental group that works on=conflict resolution, Maliki has cast out prominent Sunni leaders on the ba=is of their connections to Saddam's Bath Party and has disproportionately deployed government security forces =n the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad and Sunni governorates. The primary politic=l movement of the Sunnis—Al-Iraqiya—fell apart as Maliki strove to con=olidate his and the Shiites' power. A major sign of Sunni impotence in l=aq came in late 2012 with the arrest of the bodyguards a prominent member of Al-lraqiya. Sunnis launched an extraordin=ry, peaceful protest movement, only to see a response of further repressio=. The result? Intensi=ying support among Sunnis for the only remaining option—insurgency. The =igns of a growing possibility of civil war became more evident in the summ=r of last year as the number of car bombings swelled across the country. Of course, the Iraq= security forces were supposed to have been able to protect the country by=now. Instead, they have melted away in the face of the oncoming march of 1=11. In part, that is also Maliki's fault. He ended the on-the-ground training of his forces by U.S. military =dvisers too soon—and over American objections. And this poorly trained, =ndisciplined group were fully aware that the far stronger, far better Syri=n military struggled and experienced significant losses in the early confrontations against ISIL and other jiha=ists in their country. 6 EFTA_R1_02111344 EFTA02708697 But the issues that=are driving the explosion of violence in Iraq also contains the seeds of a=solution—or the prospect of an even more intense conflagration. The fund=mentalist Shiite regime of Iran would, from the opening days of an Iraq governed by NI., be confronted by a coun=ry on its border led by Sunnis bent on the destruction of the Tehran gover=ment. An all-out religious war—this time between nations—might well be=considered inevitable by the Shiites in Iran. In other words, Ira= has the biggest stake of any nation in the outcome of the struggle in Ira=. Maliki—as a fellow Shiite—has a strong alliance with Tehran. So do t=e two most prominent Kurdish militias in the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq. And the Iranian milita=y is nothing like the slapdash Iraqi security forces—the Iranian Revolut=onary Guards are so well trained and armed they could easily crush ISIL.</=pan> And Iran is already=on the march. American officials say that two battalions of the Revolution=ry Guards' most elite special operations group—the Quds Force—have alr=ady crossed the border and are fighting alongside Iraqi soldiers. Militarily, ISIL could not survive such an onsla=ght. But here is where t=e Americans could play a role. If politicians once again fail to understan= the dynamics taking place and fall back on the traditional opposition of =ran, they will be simultaneously opposing the Shiites and the Sunnis. While the cable news talking heads might not g=t that, the Iraqis certainly will. Here is the danger:=The Iranians will certainly rout ISIL, but such a victory by a Shiite forc=—particularly if it results in the killing of innocent Sunnis—would li=ely drive more Sunnis to support ISIL and the other fundamentalists. This is, after all, a direct conflict between t=e Sunnis and Shiites, which has been joined by a powerful Shiite nation. I=aqi Sunnis already believe that the Maliki government is too close to Iran= That issue will only intensify. The answer? The 11.5= must engage in complex diplomacy, recognizing that it shares a strategic =nterest with Iran's Shiites while also confronting Iraq's Shiites over=their marginalization of the Sunnis in government. If Sunnis have no influence in governance—and if Iran is all=wed to have a long-term presence in Iraq—the perception that this is pur=ly a conflict between the two tribes will undoubtedly take hold. Maliki must go and =n his place a leader more committed to the nation, rather than to his fact=on, must take over. The Shiites in Iraq must be persuaded that power-shari=g is about their own survival, and the Americans are the only ones in a position to help make that happen. Cr=sis can be averted. But it will not be easy. Kurt Eichenwald,=is a contributing editor with Vanity Fair and a New York Times author of f=ur books, one of which, The Informant, was made into The Informant!, a mot=on picture. =1span> Arti=le 4. WSJ Islamist Mili=ants Aim to Redraw Map of the Middle East Bill Spindle and Ge=ald F. Seib EFTA_R1_02111345 EFTA02708698 June 12, 2014 -- IS:=5 militants are shown after allegedly seizing control of an Iraqi army che=kpoint in northern Iraq, in an image posted on a jihadist website. Agence =rance-Presse/Getty Images At an annual securi=y conference in Israel this week, the head of the military showed pictures=of two long-dead diplomats. Mark Sykes, an Engl=shman, and Francois Georges-Picot, a Frenchman, secured their place in h=story by cutting a deal that drew the borders of the modern Middle East.</=pan> The point of recall=ng the men: It suddenly appears those century-old borders, and the Middle =astern states they defined, are being stretched and possibly erased. "This entire s=stem is disintegrating like a house of cards that starts to collapse,"= Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz said. The Obama administr=tion signaled it is preparing to re-engage militarily in Iraq, a remarkabl= U-turn for a president who campaigned in 2008 on ending the war there and=has cited the removal of U.S. troops as one of his top successes. Photo: AP A militant Islamist=group that has carved out control of a swath of Syria has moved into Iraq,=conquering cities and threatening the Iraqi government the U.S. helped cre=te and support with billions of dollars in aid and thousands of American lives. The group—known a= the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham—isn't a threat only to Iraq and S=ria. It seeks to impose its vision of a single radical Islamist state stre=ching from the Mediterranean coast of Syria through modern Iraq, the region of the Islamic Caliphates established in t=e seventh and eighth centuries. The threat of Sunni=extremists eclipsing the power of its Shiite-dominated Arab ally presents =ran with the biggest security and strategic challenge it has faced since t=e U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Photo: Youtube/Brown Moses Governments and bor=ers are under siege elsewhere, as well. For more than a year, Shiite milit=as from Lebanon have moved into Syria and operated as a virtual arm of the=Syrian government. Meanwhile, so many Syrian refugees have gone in the opposite direction—fleeing into Lebanon=97that Lebanon now houses more school-age Syrian children than Lebanese ch=ldren. And in Iraq, the Ku=dish population has carved out a homeland in the north of the country that=97with the help of Turkey and against the wishes of the Iraqi government=97exports its own oil, runs its own customs and immigration operations and fields its own military, known as the Peshm=rga. The picture is diff=cult for the U.S., which is deeply invested in keeping the region stable, =nd the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq is setting off alarm bells =nside the Obama <http://topics.wsj.com/person/O/Obama/4328> administration. The U.S. is weighing more direct military assis=ance to the government of Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, the White House said Thursday, and officials hinted that =id might include airstrikes on militants who have edged to within a half-h=ur's drive of Baghdad. "There will be=some short-term immediate things that need to be done militarily," Pr=sident Barack Obama said. "Our national security team is looking at a=l the options." Mr. Obama also urged Iraq's Shiite-dominated government to seek 8 EFTA_R1_02111346 EFTA02708699 political paths for moderate Shiites and Sunnis to work=together against jihadists. "This should be also a wake-up call for t=e Iraqi government," he said. Why are the borders=of today's Middle Eastern states suddenly so porous and ineffectual? Just months after t=e United States military moved out of Iraq, Islamic extremists have captur=d several vulnerable cities on its borders. Jerry Seib discusses with Fore=gn Policy Editor Bob Ourlian about the developing situation. Photo: Associated Press The militants known=as ISIS wreaking havoc in Iraq are an 'Islamist' group. The terms 'Islamis=1 and 'Islam' are often used interchangeably, but there are very distinct =ifferences between them. In short, the confl=cts unleashed in Iraq and Syria have merged to become the epicenter of a s=ruggle between the region's historic ethnic and religious empires: Persian=Shiite Iran, Arab-Sunni Saudi Arabia and Turkic-Sunni Muslim Turkey. Those three, each of whom has dominated th= whole of the Middle East at one time or another in past millenniums, are =ow involved in the battle for influence from the Mediterranean to the Pers=an Gulf. Saudi Arabia, for e=ample, refuses to recognize the Shiite government of Iraq, backs an array =f almost exclusively Sunni Muslim rebel groups in Syria and bitterly oppos=s the Shiite Hezbollah. Iran conversely, is=the biggest backer of the Shiite-linked Syrian regime, has forged deep tie= to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government and assures that Hezbollah, whic= Iran's Revolutionary Guards nurtured from its birth in the early 1980s, remains impressively armed and trained.=/span> The U.S. also has p=ayed a role. In the wake of 9/11, it toppled Saddam Hussein, who had no co=nection to the attacks, and launched an effort to remake Iraq as a first s=ep to transform the region. The Arab uprisings =hree years ago ousted more iron-fisted rulers, whose authoritarian regimes=had kept ethnic and religious tensions in check. Syria's uprising reached =o resolution, and instead morphed into a festering civil war. Both sides have turned to religious and ethnic prop=ganda and brutality to maintain their advantage. The U.S. straddles =ome of the divisions. It supports the Shiite government it helped create i= Iraq, for example, while denouncing the Shiite-linked Syrian regime. Its =oppling of an Iraqi leader and encouragement of sectarian rule has helped fan tensions along religious and ethnic lines= The U.S. further undermined indigenous authority with its long, troubled =ccupation of Iraq as it sought to rebuild the country. Broader changes in =he global power structure also have helped unleash change. For decades, th= Middle East was locked in place by the Cold War and petro politics. The U=S. supported countries opposed to the Soviet Union and rich in oil—Persian Gulf monarchies, Jordan and Egypt s=arting in the mid-1970s—while the Soviets supported their friends— Syri=, Iraq, Libya at times and South Yemen. The U.S. backed a lot of anti-demo=ratic and despotic regimes, but the result was relative stability. Now, though, the Co=d War framework has been shattered, and the growth of new energy sources e=sewhere has reduced the premium placed on stability. The trouble for the=U.S. and regional powers is that the conflict may have outrun their contro=, fueled by the rise of the most pernicious groups in chaotic conditions.<=span> ISIS is a threat fo= both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but its easy conquests over the past week=97including Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city—were made possible by gove=nments hobbled by years of insurgency and opposition aided by those two countries and like-minded Arab Gulf resident=. 9 EFTA_R1_02111347 EFTA02708700 Iran, for its part,-has encouraged Shiite Muslim militia groups so extreme and violent, and of=en intent on targeting Sunni Muslims, that many Sunnis are willing to endu=e ISIS if it provides the protection their own government won't. The mess puts Mr. 0=ama in a box. A few weeks ago he laid out in a policy speech his rationale=for staying out of the mire of such sectarian conflicts, since they seem f=r removed from concrete U.S. interests. Yet, he now seems to acknowledge the U.S. must do something. The danger for the =resident is the U.S. are being drawn back into the fray, but with very few=options, never mind good ones. gspan> Arti=le 5. The Council on Fore=gn Relations Syria: Humani=arian Disaster—and Security Threat Elliott Abrams <http://www.cfr.org/experts/middle-east-is=ael-human-rights/elliott-abrams/b1567> June 13, 2014 -- Th= facts about the humani=arian situation in Syria ar= well-known: A minimum of 160,000 people have been killed=/span>. About 6.5 million Syrians =ave been forced to leave their homes and are displaced inside Syria, and 2=7 million are refugees in neighboring countries—altogether, nearly half of Syria's population of 22 million. T=e refugee burden on neighbors is immense: There are a million Syrian refug=es in Lebanon, whose population is only a bit over 4 million, and 600,000 =egistered in Jordan, with a population of just over 6 million. These official refugee figures may be far lower th=n the real numbers (there are probably over a million refugees in Jordan),=and do not begin to express the misery in which so many Syrians now live.<=span> The refugee flows a=d the jihadi presence, which are both growing, constitute a threat to Syri=, its neighbors, and the interests of the United States. Today, foreign fi=hters from around the globe are said to number anywhere from 8,000— t=e estimate given by Gen. Lloyd Austin, U.S. Central Commander—to 12,000,=and several of the groups are linked to al- Qaeda. The Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, said in April 2014 that &=uot;Syria has become a matt=r of homeland security,&quo=; and the Director of National Intelligence, James Clappe=, said in January 2014 that=one of the al-Qaeda-aligned Syrian jihadi groups "does have aspiratio=s for attacks on the homeland."Among the foreign jihadis now fighting in Syria there are believed to be seventy Americans=/span>. The U.S. Reaction <=span> The U.S. government=s reaction has been almost entirely humanitarian, through aid to neighbori=g countries and to various UN and private agencies. Soon the total will re=ch 52 billion. President Obama has=been extremely reluctant to lift U.S. involvement from the humanitarian an= diplomatic to the military. His 2012 d=cision against military aid=to the Syrian rebels was made against the advice of his top national secur=ty officials at that time, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Director David Petraeus, Joint Chi=fs Chairman Martin Dempsey, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. His las=-minute decision in August 2013 not to strike Syria after its use of chemi=al weapons was popular in the Pentagon and with the public, but clearly went against advice from Secretary of Sta=e John Kerry. 10 EFTA_R1_02111348 EFTA02708701 In June 2013 the ad=inistration announ=ed the provision of some ai= to the rebels, but from all evidence little or no material help actually =allowed. Finally in late May 2014, the president himself announced in his speech at West Point a decision to give=additional aid to the rebels: "I will work with Congress to ramp up s=pport for those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to=terrorists and brutal dictators." The Price of Inacti=n U.S. policy since t=e start of the rebellion in Syria in 2011 has failed. Regime brutality aga=nst the majority-Sunni population of Syria and intervention by foreign Shi= forces (Iranian and Hezbollah) have attracted a far larger and more dangerous group of jihadis than ever exist=d in Afghanistan, one whose threat to U.S. allies and interests keeps grow=ng. That the Iranian and Hezbollah intervention has elicited no serious U.=. response has not only favored the regime's survival, but shaken faith in American reliability among all =.S. allies in the region and beyond. That Iran has appea=ed far more determined to win in Syria, defined as keeping Assad in power,=than the United States has appeared in achieving its stated goal (that Ass=d must go) similarly shakes confidence in U.S. power and willpower. The huge and growing refugee burdens threaten=stability in Jordan, long a key U.S. ally, and in Lebanon. And the fact th=t Assad is an Alawite trying to rule a 74 percent Sunni country suggests t=at with him in power there will never be stability, only more war. Less tangibly but o= equal importance, U.S. willingness to enforce the norms of international =onduct has been undermined, as has American moral leadership. The associat=on of the United States with the cause of human rights and democracy, going back at least to Woodrow Wilson, has =een weakened by its unwillingness to act in the Syrian case. America's sof= power is linked to its reputation for idealism and the defense of human v=lues. The refusal to use hard power in the Syrian case has contributed to a diminution of soft power as well.aspan> Needed: A New Polic= The early goal of a=quick departure for Assad and transition to democracy in Syria is now impo=sible to attain. More disorder and suffering are certain. But Syria need n=t be an endless source of refugees, a center of inhuman suffering at the hands of a vicious minority regime, a=d a worldwide gathering place for jihadi extremists. First, the United S=ates must establish a serious program to train and equip the rebels. Diplo=acy has failed: the efforts made by the United States in Geneva to reach a=political accord cannot now succeed, because diplomacy will always reflect the power relationships on the groun=. Those must be changed by strengthening the anti-Assad, anti-jihadi force= composed of nationalist Syrian rebels.Their weakness is largely linked to=their possession of very limited amounts of guns and other equipment, and limited amounts of money with whi=h to pay fighters, while jihadi groups appear to have far more of both. The balance of forc=s will change when anti-jihadi groups can arm and train all the men they c=n attract, including attracting them from other forces to which they have =one because those forces were able to feed and clothe them and supply modern weapons. Without such a fighting=force, there is no hope that the power of the regime or the jihadis can be=countered. Second, the United =tates should punish Assad for the continuing use of chemical warfare. This=means an air strike robust enough to damage CW targets, including units th=t have used CW and any air assets ever used to deliver them. Any strike should at this point be broad enough to g=eatly restrict Assad's ability to use air power as an instrument of terror= More broadly, punitive air operations should be considered to force the r=gime to allow humanitarian aid to quickly reach those who need it. And even more broadly, air strikes can=both change the military balance on the ground and affect the political an= psychological dimensions of the conflict by demonstrating a new American =olicy and new determination. 11 EFTA_R1_02111349 EFTA02708702 As Anne-Marie Slaug=ter, director of policy planning in the State Department in Obama's first =erm, wrote in April 2014, "A U.S. strike=against the Syrian government now would change the entire dynamic. It would either force the regime ba=k to the negotiating table with a genuine intention of reaching a settlement, or at least make it clear that Assad w=ll not have a free hand in reestablishing his rule." Is such use of Amer=can air power feasible? Yes; outside of the Damascus area air defenses are=quite limite= and so would be the risk t= the United States. This conclusion is supported by Israel's series of suc=essful air attacks on Syria without losing one aircraft. Third, the United S=ates and other donors are still not delivering sufficient aid to Jordan an= other neighbors of Syria to enable them to cope with the refugee crisis w=thout severe political and economic strains—for example, on schools and hospitals. The United States and its=Gulf allies, some of who are actively funding rebel groups in Syria, shoul= undertake a serious joint review of Jordan's needs, and then act together=to meet them. At West Point, the president pledged to do so. Fourth, the United =tates should make it clear to allies in the region such as Israel and the =ulf Arab states that any nuclear deal with Iran will stop it from developi=g a nuclear weapon but will not stop Washington from confronting Iranian subversion and aggression—such as it= sending hundre=s of Revolutionary Guard an= Quds Force combatants and advisers to Syria. There are many susp=cions in the region that a "grand bargain" between the United St=tes and Iran is still in the cards, and that if a nuclear deal can be reac=ed, U.S. resistance to other aspects of Iranian conduct would be softened just when sanctions relief would be giving Iran =ore economic resources. These fears should loudly be laid to rest. The Oba=a administration should clarify that it seeks a nuclear deal with Iran, bur has no illusions about or intentions to negotiate a broad rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, and will hel= those nations that are resisting Iranian misconduct. Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreig= Relations and was a deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bus= administration. =/span> Arti=le 6. The Washington Post=/span> Iran is commi=ted to a peaceful nuclear program Mohammad Javad Zari= June 13 -- The <=pan style="font-size:18.0pt">nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 powers <http://www.voanews.com/content/us-iran-push-to-meet-deadline-=n-nuclear-deal/1926482.html> have reached a critical stage. I am reasonably confident that by nex= month's deadline, we can reach a comprehensive agreement that will assu=e the world that Iran's nuclear program will remain exclusively peaceful. All that is required is a sober apprecia=ion of the realities faced and a serious calculation of alternatives. Illu=ions have in the past led to missed opportunities and should not be allowe= to ruin the real prospect of the historic deal before us. 12 EFTA_R1_02111350 EFTA02708703 When current Presid=nt Hassan Rouhani and I were leading the Iranian nuclear negotiating team =lmost 10 years ago, just before the election of former president Mahmoud A=madinejad, I presented a proposal to our Western counterparts that contained an array of measures designed by i=dependent, non-Iranian scientists to provide assurances that our nuclear p=ogram would remain forever peaceful. Prodded by the Bush=administration, however, our counterparts demanded that we abstain from en=ichment until at least 2015, effectively killing the chances of a deal. Th=ir mistaking our constructive engagement for weakness, and opting for pressure and sanctions to gain concessions, l=d to a change in Iran's position, both by the ballot box in the 2005 pre=idential election and the subsequent expansion of Iran's peaceful nuclea= activities. As we approach 2015= the outcome of past maximalism and obsession with sanctions is clearly ev=dent. In the past 10 years, Iran has gone from 200 to 20,000 centrifuges, =ur enrichment capacity has risen from 3.5 to 20 percent and the Arak heavy-water research rea=tor <http://www.theguardian.com/wor=d/2014/apr/19/iran-arak-nuclear-plant> is less than a year from being commissioned. Nobody can rewind t=e clock. Sacrifices have been made. Capabilities are vastly different. Knorledge and expertise have been attained. None of this can be wished or nego=iated away. Today, President Ro=hani and I are back at the negotiating table, and our commitment to constr=ctive engagement has not changed. We are willing to provide assurances of =he exclusively peaceful nature of our nuclear program. Our proposed measures are serious and would make a real d=fference. But we will not abandon or make a mockery of our technological a=vances or our scientists, nor would it be prudent or serve the interest of=nuclear nonproliferation to expect us to do so. And we have already=delivered. Within 100 days of my being appointed as Iran's nuclear negot=ator, the first nuclear agreement in a decade was concluded with the P5-I=;1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has verified that we have kept up our end of the bargain. Furthermore, the=cooperation we now extend to the IAEA has been recognized as the best in y=ars. We are prepared to maintain this trajectory. It would be tragica=ly shortsighted if illusions were to again derail progress toward a histor=c achievement. There will be no better time to put an end to the unnecessa=y nuclear crisis than now, when all sides have much to gain and before the window of cooperation and pragmatic=reason closes. Excuses for once ag=in torpedoing a deal, which can change the shape of our region, can certai=ly be found. Prominent among them is the myth of "breakout." For years= small but powerful constituencies have irrationally advanced the idea that Iran can produce enough fissile materi=l for a bomb in months. While reaching a re=listic deal is the best available option for the West to prevent such a re=ote possibility, it may be instructive to take that phobia at face value. =et's put it to a logical test. If Iran ever wanted to break out, all IAEA inspectors would have to be expelled fr=m the country. Iran's program would then have to be reconfigured to make=weapons-grade fissile material, which would have to be converted to metal,=be molded into the shape required for a bomb and undergo countless other complex weaponization processes. No=e of these capabilities exist in Iran and would have to be developed from =cratch. This would take several years — not a few months. Even when Iran had =he time for this, it did not opt for a bomb. Between 2005 and 2013, when i=s relations with the West and the IAEA were at rock bottom, Iran had time,=little international constraints, relatively relaxed monitoring and enough centrifuges to press ahead toward a bomb. Fu=thermore, Iran had already paid the price of massive, unjust sanctions tha= far exceeded those imposed on countries that have developed a bomb. Despite all this, w= did not take a single step toward a nuclear weapon. The 16 security organ= behind two consecutive U.S. National Intelligence Estimates, in 2007 <http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and=20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf> and 2012 13 EFTA_R1_02111351 EFTA02708704 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/us-age=cies-see-no-move-by-iran-to-build-a- bomb.html?_r=0> , agreed. It is ironic that s=me in the West ignore all of this in favor of projecting the dangerous dou=le myth that Iran needs the bomb to protect itself and is only months away=from getting one. It will be even more ironic if this hype torpedoes a deal that is the surest and safest way to =reclude proliferation. Today, we have a un=que opportunity in our negotiations with the P5+1 to put in place long=term confidence-building measures, as well as extensive monitoring and ver=fication arrangements, to provide the greatest assurance that Iran's nuclear program will forever remain exclusively pe=ceful. To overcome the obstacles to realizing this historic achievement, w= must look ahead, but we also cannot ignore the lessons provided by the pa=t. Comprehension of how the cycle of lost chances has been propelled by illusions is important. Taking actio= to exit this cycle is crucial. As we enter the cro=sroads of turning the interim nuclear deal into a comprehensive solution, = urge my counterparts to reciprocate our willingness to address concerns a=out our capabilities with appreciation of our demand for our rights, dignity and respect. Most of all, I urge the= to refrain from allowing illusions to derail the march toward ending an u=necessary crisis and opening new horizons. Mohammad Javad Z=rif is Iran's foreign minister. =/span> Arti=le 7. Foreign Policy in F=cus Genesis: Harr= Truman and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Adam Cohen</=> Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the =rab/Israeli Conflict by John B. Judis <http://www.amazon.com/John-B.- Judis/e/B00GDWW6OM/ref=3Ddp_byline_cont_book_1> </=> June 13, 2014 -- Ju=is is an activist journalist cum historian who writes frequently at The Ne= Republic. Instead of moralizing about the cast of characters involved in =his complicated history, as others have already done, Judis looks at the enduring themes from the "Genesis=94 that influence today's Middle East. Since the end of Ot=oman rule at the conclusion of World War I, Judis details, Palestine's f=te has remained linked to Western influence. The British mandate in Palest=ne acted as a formal colony for London in its final imperial decades. In the mandate's waning days, the mantle =f Western leadership passed to its new leader, the United States, and its =ewest international institution, the United Nations. Both the United State= and the UN failed to develop ideas to promote a sustainable solution to the Palestinian crisis before it brok= into open warfare. 14 EFTA_R1_02111352 EFTA02708705 As the United State= and the UN dithered, the situation on the ground evolved. The British man=ate expired while President Harry Truman vacillated between the counsel of=Zionist activists, political advisers, and State Department Cold Warriors over one unworkable plan after another=97the critical, and sometimes exhausting, political and interpersonal dyna=ics that make up the lion's share of Genesis. The Jews and Arabs of Pale=tine, along with the armies of Palestine's Arab neighbors, then descended into a war that none could bring to a halt.=/span> This story of Weste=n ineptitude is incomplete without mentioning the second enduring theme fr=m this period: the impact of lobbying in the West on Middle East policy. T=e most effective lobbyists were those who advocated for the Zionist cause, who believed, as Judis notes, that Pa=estine's Jews "were still engaged in a war for survival" in a war-to=n world that turned them away. Pro-Israel activist= learned to harness the power of the Jewish vote in states such as Ohio an= New York to influence the actions of President Truman, who was at once a =oralist and an unrivaled political animal. Transforming a Jewish community increasingly convinced of the need=for a Jewish state into single-issue voters, leading American Zionists lik= Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver effectively pushed U.S. policy towards what they=believed to be in the best interests of the Jewish people. But each plan the T=uman administration considered, as Judis acknowledges, was fatally flawed.=There might have been missed opportunities to implement a workable governa=ce structure for Palestine during British rule. But during the Truman administration, the impact of Zionist activist=, both within the formal lobbying organizations and within the White House=itself, often pushed President Truman to reject plans for federation and p=rtition as unworkable. Finally, the book m=kes clear that the ongoing Palestinian Arab exile and refugee crisis remai= the most pressing problems. Throughout Judis' account, ordinary Palesti=ians faced marginalization at nearly every turn throughout the 1948 war and beyond, turning the Palestinian Nak=a into a reality. As Palestine's Jews finally achieved their goal of cre=ting a political home of their own, its Arabs saw their own hopes for the =ame dashed. For the Palestinian Arabs, the great tragedy of exile began along with the decades-long hardships of =ife in refugee camps. Thus began the vicious cycle of outside meddling, vi=lence, and indifference, as well as inner political turmoil, that plague t=e Palestinian people to this day. In each of these th=mes lie potent parallels and truths for the present. Western failures, suc= as the recently defeated Kerry Peace =nitiative chttp://fpitorg/israel-palestine-kerrys-peace-talks-hit-s=paration-wallk , make a greater statement about the compromised U.S. role in the region tha= anything else. The influence of American Jewish groups, many of which coa=esce around the policies of the Israeli government, remains a strong, thou=h neither absolute nor monolithic, force affecting U.S. congressional activity and Obama administration polic=. Though the UN and e=en the United States provide tangible support for the cause of Palestinian=statehood, the Palestinian cause remains an aspiration. This is due in par= to the enduring fact of internal political ruptures within the Palestinian camp that, despite current efforts at rapp=ochement, go to the religious and national core of Palestinian identity. 1= is also due, as Judis forcefully asserts, to the flawed U.S.-Israeli rela=ionship that allows "Israelis to overlook what they did and are continuing to do to Palestine's Arabs."=If peace is to come to the Middle East, surely all of these problems will =eed to be addressed. But above all of th=s noise, the great tragedy of Palestinian exile remains unanswered. The Pa=estinians will be hard- pressed to accept a peace deal with Israel that doe= not satisfactorily remedy the plight of Palestine's refugees. Although it's likely not feasible for Palesti=ian exiles to return to communities that Israelis have lived in for genera=ions now, it is easy to understand why this leaves so many Palestinians un=atisfied. This nut, at the ce=ter of Genesis, is the hardest one for the Israelis and Palestinians to cr=ck if they are to make peace. Judis writes: 15 EFTA_R1_02111353 EFTA02708706 [T]he main lesson o= this narrative is that whatever wrongs were done to the Jews of Europe an= later to those of the Arab Middle East and North Africa — and there wer= great wrongs inflicted — the Zionists who came to Palestine to establish a state trampled on the rights of the A=abs who already lived there. That wrong has never been adequately addresse=, or redressed, and for there to be peace of any kind between the Israelis=and Arabs, it must be. Adam Cohen is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus. 16 EFTA_R1_02111354 EFTA02708707