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NEWS & VIEWS
EVOLUTION
Selection for positive illusions
Everybody knows that overconfidence can be foolhardy. But a study reveals that having an overly positive self-image might
confer an evolutionary advantage if the rewards outweigh the risks. SEE LETTER P.317
MATTHIJS VAN VEELEN & MARTIN A. NOWAK
A
sk anyone with a driver's licence to
rate their own abilities behind the
wheel, and most people will report
that they are above average'. The same is true
for self-assessments of performance in cogni-
tive tasks', of attractiveness' (by men, not by
women) and of the healthiness of our behav-
iour': people typically place themselves higher
on the ladder than they really are. In a survey
of 1 million high-school students', a solid 70%
rated themselves as above-average leaders
(versus 2% who thought of themselves as
below average), and a spectacular 94% of col-
lege professors possess teaching abilities that
are above average — according to themselves°.
Obviously they cannot all be right, but
that does not make them dysfunctional or
mentally unhealthy. In fact, one way to get self-
assessments to obey some minimal aggregate
consistency is to restrict surveys to sufficiently
depressed people' (although this finding has
been questioned"). Mentally healthy people
blissfully suffer front what are called positive
illusions: they overestimate their abilities, as well
as their control over events, and they under-
estimate their vulnerability to risk1'. Of course,
one can overrate oneself too much, as do suf-
ferers from narcissistic personality disorder or
megalomania, but healthy people's estimates of
their own abilities seem to start just a little above
where they really are. Reporting on page 317
of this issue, Johnson and Fowler" describe a
model that might explain why this is so.
An obvious question is how overconfidence
survives the process of natural selection. The
prevalence of rose-tinted self-assessments
suggests that it might even be adaptive to be
overconfident — in contrast to schizophrenia,
for instance, which is maladaptive but none-
theless exists in moderate proportions in
humans. But how can it be adaptive to mis-
judge how you compare with others? You
would think that an incorrect assessment
of one's own capabilities can induce only
misguided decisions.
One suggested explanation is that there is
a benefit in having others think that you're
great. And as there is no better way of being a
strong persuader than firmly believing in your-
self, this would lead to an upward bias in how
Figure I I Float like a butterfly, sting lilce a bee. Muhammad Ali saw himself as"the king of the world".
His supreme confidence helped him to win many fights. Johnson and Fowler" report that overconfidence
can confer an evolutionary advantage.
people perceive themselves compared with
others". That may lead to a mistake here and
there, but the benefits of the esteem of others
could outweigh that (Fig. 1).
Johnson and Fowler" suggest a remark-
able alternative explanation. According to
their model, a biased self-belief can actu-
ally lead people to make the right decision,
whereas an unbiased self-image would lead to
a suboptimal decision. That sounds counter-
intuitive, but the key lies in the authors' depar-
tu re from what could be called the 'naive
economist's idea of how humans arrive at deci-
sions ('naive because many economists are not
that naive at all).
The authors model envisages a valuable
resource that two individuals can decide to
claim or not. If both claim it, then they will
fight over it — which is costly for both. The
stronger individual will win the fight and gain
access to the resource. If only one of them
claims the resource, it goes to that person. If
neither claims it, no one gets it.
Now if both contenders could simply assess
the fighting strength of the other with perfect
accuracy, the optimal strategy would be a
no-brainer: fight if you are stronger, concede
if you are weaker. But it gets interesting if the
contestants have imperfect information about
each other's strength. In this situation, contest-
ants might back off because they think their
opponent is stronger than he or she really is.
A weaker contestant could then win a reward
if she claims it while the opponent backs off.
This situation can be dealt with within the
realm of what economists call perfect ration-
ality, which assumes that both parties under-
stand all aspects of their situation, and that
they correctly anticipate the odds that the
other player will claim the resource. But John-
son and Fowler suggest that there is a short cut
to the right decision. The short cut combines
a simple heuristic — fight if you think you're
stronger — with a bias. If the resource is valu-
able relative to the cost of fighting, then the risk
of an extra battle here and there is outweighed
by the gains made when otherwise unclaimed
resources are won, which makes overestimat-
ing ones own fighting abilities worthwhile. If
the cost of fighting is large relative to the value
of the resource, then it is better to under-
estimate ones own strength. The behaviours
282 I NATURE I VOL 477 I 1S SEPTEMBER 2011
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NEWS & VIEWS RESEARCH
described by the authors model are actually
more complex than described above, because
the model also predicts that populations can,
for instance, evolve to a stable mixture of both
over- and under-confident people.
Another evolutionary explanation is the
following: overconfidence could reduce aver-
age pay-off, but top performers will still come
from the group of overconfident individuals.
For example, overconfidence about roulette-
playing 'abilities will lead to overall losses from
this game, but the best performers will have
played often. Strong selection — as in 'winner
takes all'— should favour overconfidence.
Johnson and Fowler's study" prompts a
variety of interesting questions. The 'winning
strategy' (for low fighting costs) can be wired
into the brain in two ways. The first involves
a simple heuristic plus overconfidence: only
fight when you think you are stronger, but
overestimate your strength. The second way
involves perfect rationality without overcon-
fidence: given some uncertainty, the winning
strategy can be to fight opponents even if they
seem slightly stronger than you. Future empiri-
cal and theoretical studies might help to decide
which of these two describes us best.
It would also be interesting to establish a link
between the authors' findings and overconfi-
dence in trading behaviour", the willingness to
buy overly complex financial products (which
are thought to have led to the current crisis in
the banking system), political decisions that
lead to war", and the evolution of fighting
behaviour in animals". Given that 94% of col-
lege professors rate themselves as above aver-
age, there should be enough overconfidence
around to tackle all the natural follow-up
questions. ■
Matthijs van Veelen is at the Center
for Research in Experimental Economics
and Political Decision Making, University
of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11,
1018 WE Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Martin A. Nowak is at the Program for
Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of
Mathematics and Department of Organismic
and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University.
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.
e-mails: cm.vanyeeleneuvairk
martin_nowakeharvard.edu
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