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From: US GIG
To: Undisclosed recipients:;
Subject: JPM Eye on the Market, July 17, 2012
Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 15:14:57 +0000
Attachments: 07-17-2012 - EOTM _ - The Big Screen.pdf
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Eye on the Market, July 17, 2012 (attached PDF file is much easier to read this week, particularly the last 2 charts)
Topics: US equity markets holding in despite poor economic data; which fiscal cliff is worse; European Credit
Divorce; will China respond to economic CPR; After 50
The Big Screen. Given all the monetary and fiscal stimulus thrown around, recent data has been weak in the US (low
readings on retail sales, payrolls, small business surveys and GDP), China (declining manufacturing surveys and imports) and
Europe (recessionary conditions in all places between the Po River, the Aegean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar). Nevertheless,
equity markets have held up better than they otherwise might have. US equities are up 7%, Asia ex-Japan is up 5% and
Europe is flat (heroic given the circumstances). It's difficult to know for sure, but in addition to low valuations, this might
reflect the fact that institutional and individual investors, now well-versed in the macroeconomic train wrecks of the day, have
reduced equity positions to those they are comfortable holding from here. It's like staying in the theater watching a bad
movie since there's nothing better playing anywhere else. In that context, here's what we're watching this summer to see
if we should shift portfolio risk more towards elation or despair; right now, we are in the middle.
The Lion in if
(1968) and the sluggish response of the US economy to monetary and fiscal stimulus
Despite all the stimulus, this is the weakest US post-war recovery on record. A couple of years ago, some argued that the
deeper the recession, the more the economy would roar back. Not this time: the US economy is a lion in winter, struggling to
maintain a 2% growth rate. Saving grace: profits have outpaced GDP, a function of demand from faster-growing emerging
economies, and a shift in compensation from labor to capital (see next section). To be more optimistic, we need to see
growth > 2.5%.
US real GDP growth following post-war recessions
Index, quarter of GDP trough = 100
130
15x
143x
125
120
115
110
105
100
95
0
1
2
3
4
6 6
7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 16 -10x
Quarters since GDP trough
1952
Earnings still outperforming the economy
Ratio of 2-year earnings growth to 2-year nominalGOPgrowth
10x
Average peak: 2.1x
Current
recovery
5.4x
Average
sk: 4.2x
1950
1966
1973
1980
1987
1994
2001
2038
fagags.pf Wrath (MO. low labor compensation ac the pthllary driver behind fat priamargins
The last time I showed these charts, they were picked up by a journalist at the Washington Post who is the vice-chair of the
National Political Committee of the Democratic Socialists of America. In other words, they mean different things to different
people. While the implications are debatable, the picture is clear: extremely weak labor compensation has been a large driver
of the profits boom this time. High profit margins are likely to be sustained for a while longer, but the consequences of what
drives them (weak consumer spending, large government transfers to households and political acrimony) may keep P/E
multiples low. I can only imagine what Steinbeck would have said about this. Any signs of a pickup in labor compensation
would be good news, but we haven't seen much yet. The employment cost index and average hourly earnings are growing at
2% y/y (nominal).
EFTA01179060
Corporate profit cycle - past 5 US recoveries
Change since profit trough - billions of 2005 dollars
51,100
1958.1974.1982.1990. 2001
5900
$700
$500
$300
$100
Sales
Labor
compensation
Profits
-$100
Quarterssince profit trough
0
1
2
3
4
5 6
7
8
9
10 II 12 13
Soiree: Bureau of Econonic Anabei% J.P. Morgan Asset Management.
Corporate profit cycle - current US recovery
Change since profit trough -billions of 2005 dollars
5500
5700
5500
$300
5100
-5100
Labor
Ore plofitg
compensation
Profits
4300
0
I
2
3CW/in ?
9"
rough 10 11 12 13
Sales
One other point: the chart (below, left) shows how labor costs in most US manufacturing sectors dwarf energy costs. With
high unemployment, this means little pressure on margins from labor. But it also means that you might want to temper
enthusiasm regarding the benefit of cheap natural gas, since energy makes up less than 5% of total expenses. There are some
multiplier benefits not accounted for here, but I think it's worth waiting to see what they really are.
Labor and energy intensity In US manufacturing
snareof total expenses. percent
35%
30%
25%
20%
or Labor Costs sEnergy Costs
O
I -1 1
z
i
E
k I
05 c 0
6
8
05
S&P 500 operating earnings per share estimates
USD
$30 50
$29.00
S27 50
526.00
524.50
No
Apr-12
O
Aug-10
Jan-11
Jun-11
Yet ated:lb
042012: +16.3%
022012: +0.9%
O2 2012
The Man Who Fell to Earth (1.27_6): realism sets in on US cornimat nistillsALIrgat for O2 2012
With the onset of Q2 earnings season, US equities should hold up over the next few weeks if the pattern since January 2010 is
any guide. Since that time, the S&P 500 is up a cumulative 28%: 13% during profits reporting seasons, 13.5% immediately
after quantitative easing announcements by the Fed and ECB, and 1.5% during the rest of the time. Furthermore, Q2 profits
do not have to do much to hit expectations. As shown above (right), Q2 earnings estimates have come crashing to earth since
their highs last summer. Analysts now expect 0% y/y profits growth in Q2 2012, which as hurdles go, is a low one. A higher
hurdle is the 16% y/y earnings growth analysts expect in Q4 2012 (Great Erpeetations, 1946).
Thelma and Louise (1991): which fiscal cliff is worse?
A lot of people hope that the US does not, like Susan Sarandon and Geena Davis, drive off the 2013 (fiscal) cliff to a grisly
end. While I understand the reasoning, take a look at the 2 charts below. The first shows the 2013 fiscal cliff (the austerity
impact if all legislated tax increases were to take place). The second looks at the other cliff, which is the increase in US
federal debt over the next decade, shown on an inverted scale to capture its cliff-ness. Just as scary, right? These dueling
cliffs are essentially a generational battle. By completely avoiding the first cliff, the US would be passing the buck to the
next generation, violating Washington's farewell address which warned against "ungenerously throwing upon posterity the
burden which we ourselves ought to bear". So far, the US has not paid much of a price for its escalating debt burden, other
than the shock of last year's S&P downgrade. Will its luck continue? A lot may depend on the game plan for bringing the
debt down over time. Given current gridlock, almost any signs of progress would be taken positively by financial markets.
EFTA01179061
Fiscal cliff #1: 2013
Change in cyclically-adjusted federal deficit %of potential GDP
5 Final stimulus
3
1
0
1
-2
3
Ascal drag
2013 estimate
assuming
current taw
Fiscal cliff #2: 2013 and beyond
Net debt b GOP. percent. inverted
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1908 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
2004
J.P. Henan Asse4Minagenint. As dJuk 2011.
060 Baseline
• • • • •
•
•
• •
$ •
•
Post-BCA case
•
e • •
C80 Alternative Case
•
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Sometimes a Great Notion (1971): how did the US dig itself out of wartime debt levels after WWII?
I find that there is a lot of misreporting about how US debt levels were halved during the 1950's. As shown in the table
below, government spending was not cut sharply; there was no radical increase in tax collections, either from businesses or
from households; and the Fed did not engineer negative long-term real interest rates to jumpstart growth. In addition to the
competitive advantage the US had over recovering Axis Powers, the US of the 1950's benefited from pro-business policies
that resulted in over 4% annualized GDP growth throughout the decade. This approach is not in play now, raising questions
about how the US will deal with 80% net debt to GDP for only the second time in its 200+ year history.
1951
sum
W12
MEE
SEM
Net debt
Mot GDP
80%
67%
62%
59%
60%
57%
52%
49%
49%
48%
46%
Comp. anal gr:
Sane: c*t. SEA. %ten Shier data set. &rem et Leta Statnta.
Net debt
(bn)
$219
$273
$273
16%
14%
1.3%
$214
$320
$302
14%
16%
-5.3%
$215
$349
5322
19%
19%
0.5%
$218
$373
$341
21%
19%
2.0%
$224
5377
5343
19%
19%
2.1%
$227
$396
5354
17%
17%
3.1%
$222
$427
$368
17%
18%
1.7%
$219
5451
5377
17%
18%
0.3%
$226
5460
5377
18%
17%
0.6%
$235
$490
$398
19%
16%
3.3%
$237
$519
$415
18%
18%
2.7%
0.8%
6.6%
4.3%
Nominal
GDP (bn
Real GDP (bn
1950 USD)
Outlays ('
of GDP)
Receipts (%
of GDP)
Average real
10 year rate
1950's time capsule: taxes were
regarded as a greater cause for small
business failures than tight money.
Eisenhower championed legislation
which eased tax burdens on small
business and which culminated in a
bill eliminating double-taxation
(Subchapter S); he also eliminated
wage and price controls. In the
1950's, the private sector accounted
fora post-war peak of 86% of all
employment, a level not seen since.
A brief detour: The 1971 film chosen above is about rugged individualism, the power of small business and the lack of
reliance on government or organized labor to solve problems. It's actually hard to find a pro-business or pro-capitalist film.
According to Larry Ribstein at the University of Illinois College of Law (see page 6 for details), US filmmakers have a long
history of disliking profit-maximization, and have generated a huge volume of work depicting evil, soulless corporations and
heartless capitalists. He quotes Joseph Schumpeter and theorizes that filmmakers are an intelligentsia over-produced by the
bounties of capitalism which directs its resentment at a society that refuses to value what they do. Ouch!
Scenes from a Marriagt(1973): the European Credit Divorce keep&getting more worse
A decade of European monetary integration continues to unravel. As shown below, Eurozone banks are cutting their cross-
border credit exposure as fast as they can. Unsurprisingly, the rest of the world is not any more anxious to lend to the
European Periphery, and is cutting its exposures as well. The ECB is providing the stop-gap to finance all of this capital
flight, which helps prevent an outright Depression. But to be more optimistic on Europe, we need to see some improved
economic conditions in the Periphery, and evidence that structural reforms are paying off. As things stand now, there are still
serious questions about how the ECB and the EU will come up with the money to finance all the maturing Peripheral
sovereign and bank debt that investors no longer want to hold. Total Periphery sovereign and bank debt: almost 7 trillion
Euros.
EFTA01179062
Flight of the Bumblebee
Tuitions. USD
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
25
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source.. BIS. Dataas o104 2011.
2008
2009
2010
2011
Non-Euro zone
lending to the
Periphery
Peripheral sovereign and financial debt
Euros
7
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Death in Venice (1971): will the Italian economy ever grow again?
Spain is the fulcrum of the crisis now, given the dreadful condition of its economy and banks. But Italy is a lingering
concern, given its low growth and massive debt burden, the third largest in the world. Italy runs a very tight primary (pre-
interest) budget surplus, among the best in Europe. But the size of its debt burden (120% gross, 99% net) means that there is
little room for error. The second chart is as stark an example as you will ever see on how a seemingly benign political idea
can negatively affect economic reality. In terms of its private sector economy, Italy is even less like Germany than Spain
(third chart), raising questions about whether southern European economies can be Germanified. Keeping the Euro together
at any cost probably means the cost will be very high. It's unlikely that markets will get a sustained respite from this
melodrama in 2012 or 2013.
20-year growth rates, 1881-2011
Death in Venice
Percent
Industrial Production Mex. 1998 = 100. sa
140
7%
2% hill]
5%
4%
3%
nary
0%
ap
l1 W
6t;'14 '7% “
1" g li/ Eli'lri
t -•
°
6%
How different are Eurozone countries from Germany?
Sum of country specific tactx differentials
14
12
£ 10
8
6
4
2
0
130
120
110
100
90
80
2
1
a
al Conpettveness Repod
70
1982
1906
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
I
Euro exchange rate fixed'
I
I
Germany
Can stimulus turn the tide in China
Percent change. YoY
35%
25%
15%
2010
Bectricity production
4_
25%
20%
5%
Money supply
15%
-15%
10%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
lag the Bullets F(LTh
2010)- will China's economy
pond to stimulus?
In the last chart above, we show everyone's new favorite China indicator: electricity production, which presumably cannot be
easily fudged or massaged. The sharp drop confirms what we are seeing elsewhere, which is a slowdown in China to around
EFTA01179063
Men
Women
a 6%-7% growth rate. The government is responding with an impressive array of bullets:
** Reduction in bank lending and deposit rates; reduction in bank reserve requirements; PBOC injection of liquidity through
reverse repo
** Increasing bond issuance limit for the Ministry of Railways, and infrastructure projects pulled forward
** Incentives to acquire energy-efficient appliances and automobiles
** First-time homebuyer restrictions eased, tax relief for small and medium sized companies
** Easing rules for domestic and foreign investment in Chinese equities
As shown in the chart, there has been a recent pickup in the money supply, which is a good start. We are watching intently to
see if this momentum builds, which would be critical for a growth rebound in the second half of 2012. We are guardedly
optimistic on the chances for success here; we will know more by the fall.
No Counoyfor Old Men (2007 : what happens after you turn 50?
Having crossed this threshold recently, I have been asked what it feels like. I don't sense anything concrete just yet, other
than more and more young people not understanding references to HR Haldeman or Ursula Andress. However, based on
some research I have seen, I intend to (a) keep working, and (b) acknowledge that my spouse is right if we disagree on
remembering something. Why? A 2010 study on cognitive abilities and aging shows some pretty striking results. As shown
in the top set of charts, mental faculties fade rapidly with age once you hit 50, with women maintaining a steady lead
over men in all categories except numeracy. And in the second set of charts, all things being equal, cognitive abilities
remain in much better shape the longer you work and do not retire. That, and zero interest rates, makes working the
better option.
Ade-profiles of avenge test scores by gender
064162361011
Imm•cft•
Delayed
Fluency
Numeracy
moat
recall
00
00
i0 4
do le lb
to
de
40 4
to
Sacco Wens cagotweataesandletretnenr Fabnao Iftmonta
A90 Fro= Penedo IlanchCento lot theEcenoncsolAg rs. January
10.20t2
Agpopre414 of minor test scores by employment SOWS
Onsotatoo
•
Immediate
Delayed
Fluency
Numeracy
recall
t
retie
Retired
-
Employed
X
15
00
05
'0 ,)
66
03
65
70
SO
06
Of
65
'0
50
56
00
Of
'0
50
54
Of
OS
70
A90
Sotrce kw .* ccgneve>tdieos aximfrorncer. Febrile° Alton na FraemPeracde IlbreichCrece for the Econarricsof Ages Jawy
10,2113
Michael Cembalest
J.P. Morgan Asset Management
Sources
"Wall Street and Vine: Holbnvood:s New of Business", March 2009, Larry Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law.
Examples of anti-business sentiment examined in the paper: Erin Brockovich, Silkwood, The Insider, The Constant Gardener,
Michael Clayton, Mission Impossible II, The Hudsucker Proxy, Executive Suite, Network, Wall-E, The Graduate and Star
Trek: First Contact, in which Captain Picard tells a citizen of the 21st century that "the economics of the 24th century are
EFTA01179064
different — people are no longer motivated by money, but rather by the good of mankind." I'd like to see how that economy
would work.
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EFTA01179065
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