EFTA Document EFTA01762898

From: ehud barak . I Sent: Monday, May 20, 2013 4:18 AM To: Epshtein Jeffrey Subject: Op-Ed draft Last Version Jeff Sorry to disturb you. This is the right draft. It has certain slight but imp=rtant modifications. Please delete the previous one to avoid confusion. Thx= Best EB >>> The unfolding tragedy in Syria which already cost the lives of 75 thousa=ds had culminated these days with evidence of the use of nerve agents by th= Assad regime against his own citizens and the videotaped executions as wel= as canibalism in the name of God on behalf of the rebels. Have we said: "=ough neighbourhood " ? lives lost, red lines crossed but no coordinated pla=, in sight, to end it had yet emerged. >>> Beyond the human suffering three main risks are embedded in this situati=n: first, the very continuation of the blood spill in a place where blood r=venge is a cultural norm and the conflict already became a magnet for extre=ist groups complicates the ending of the bloodshed and increase the odds of=post Assad Syria ending up as a failing state, a new Lebanon at best or so=alia at worst. >>> Secondly, the possibility of much wider use of chemical weapons >>> grows wi=h every round of actual use, as the psychological thresholds and impact of e=ternal deterrence are waning out. And with it the prospect of chemical weap=ns in terrorists hands and the internal civil war deteriorating into much w=der regional conflict. A, deterioration can easily develop as a result of a=Syrian attempts to transfer advanced weapon systems to Hezbollah in Lebanon= as Israel is committed to block it. physically if necessary Thirdly,and probably more important, the intensive ,risky and resource d=manding dealing with the Syrian crisis might detract leaders from tackling t=e Iranian military nuclear program which in the long term is much more dang=rous. >>> Assad's armed forces are weak, and heavily attrited by the infighting . m=re than one player on the world stage or even in the region can destroy his=airforce and air defence within a relatively short timeframe. but thats won=t necessarily end the fighting or secure the CW arsenal. when one considers=the alternatives which had been raised:no fly zone to be imposed by US, Nat= orTurkish force separately or combined," cordon sanitaire'" for refugees a=ong the Turkish and Jordanian borders,US or Israeli attacks on the CW capab=lities i feel that at this stage all options should remain on the table but=worth a try at being avoided and the key to the shortest and life cost redu=ing path is not in any neighbour's hands ,but in Moscow. it could be argued=that under different set of early decisions and actions we would already ha= won the case over Assad. but that doesn't matter. answers should be given n=w,immediately, based on PRESENT situation. >>> >>> The Kremlin has at its disposal the leverages that can convince Assad to=leave and at least to stop fighting immediately as a first step towards it.=The Russian leaders are as clever as we are and fully understand that Assad=is doomed and lost legitimacy.lt is not too hard to asses why they are relu=tant to say it loudly at this stage.lf we want to see an end of fighting an= do not want to see Jabhat al Nosra or the likes running Syria added probab=y by years of bloody massacre of Alawites and others in a no man's land Syr=a we need Russia to be asked to lead the international effort to end it,wit= all other players supporting it. in a way a mirror image of what happened i= Libya, where Russia was asked to support an effort lead by the Europeans a=d backed by the US.. >>> The Kremlin ,for more than forty years,invested a lot of political capit=l,financial resources and prestige in the Assads dynasty.They still do. the=r readiness to keep their commitment to give him SA300 AD and improved rada=s for the Yakhont shore to sea missiles systems is worrying . in the past t=ey trained and equipped the Syrians.provided intelligence gathering capabil=ties, they know the CW units generals on first name basis . they perceived t=e naval outpost in Tartous and Latakia as strategically important for them.=and they are making an effort that we don't like, to protect those assets.w= should be realistic. the challenge is not to educate Russia. and even if w=uld try it it would end up impractical. its true in the other direction as w=ll/. they can't educate us/ the real challenge for both is to put an end EFTA_R1_00068535 EFTA01762898 to=the massacre without loosing the capability of following cease fire to rem=ve Assad from power. This can not be achieved in a simple way now without=the Russians at a leading role. i don't think that a mutually agreed speci=l role for Russia in post Assad Syria,including naval base rights in the ab=ve mentioned ports is a bad deal for all of us ,bearing in mind the alterna=ives. we can always turn back to the tougher choices if this one fails. >>> The Russians are short of perfect as all of us sometimes are. but they a=e an important world power with special relevance to Eastern Europe, the Mi=dle East and the Caucasus.They have their own interests and perspectives th=t have to be taken into account parallel to those of all other players. so,=there will be a price for their readiness to lead. this price is what has t= be pre negotiated. Russia might push to the table other issues from MD, to=other points of difference with the US or its allies. >>> but Putin behaved in a very responsible manner when it came to supply of= advanced air defence systems to Iran. and as of now Syria is still several=months from potentially having SA300 operational.not to mention that howeve= modern and effective those systems are they are not invincible or undestro=able. >>> it is my judgment that giving Russia the opportunity to lead and hopeful=y succeed in such an effort can help shaping not just Syria but Russian a=titude towards cooperation on world stage regarding other sour issues. >>> news are that secretary Kerry's trip to Russia had not yet yielded this r=sult. it was however an important visit that proves the sincerity of the Se=retary and the administration in trying exhausting all alternatives before t=rning to tougher choices. I'm confident of the need to try again. thats not=a zero-sum game. we have to retry,open minded, self confident, not out of w=akness but out of sobriety regarding the huge toll of paralysis. no one can=assure success. but it worth trying once again. even harder. <?xml version=.0" encoding=TF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version=.0"> <dict> <key>date-last-viewed</key> <integer>0</integer> <key>date-received</key> <integer>1369023393</integer> <key>flags</key> <integer>8623750161</integer> <key>gmail-label-ids</key> <array> <integer>22</integer> <integer>2</integer> </array> <key>remote-id</key> <string>302881</string> </dict> </plist> 2 EFTA_R1_00068536 EFTA01762899