EFTA Document EFTA01764344

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Friday, November 9, 2012 10:26 PM Subject: November 8 update Articl= 2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b> The Newsweek/Daily Beast Why Obama Won't Take Revenge on Bi=i Peter Beinart <http://www.thedailybeast.com/=ontributors/peter-beinart.html> Aaron David Miller Articl= 5. <https://mail.google.com/mail/q0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#e> Stratfor The Next U-S. Foreign Policy Team<=span> Robert D. Kaplan Articl= 6. <https://mailsgoogle.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#f> Asia Times The politics of money in Palestine=br> Ramzy Baroud Ar=icle 1. NYT Netanyahu Rus=es to Repair Damage With Obama EFTA_R1_00071562 EFTA01764344 Jodi Rudoren<A> <http://t=pics.nytimes.com/topireferenceitimestopics/people/r/jodi_rudoren/index.htm=> November 7, 2012 =97 Over the past several years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chttp://topics.nytimes.com/topireference/timestopics/people/n/ben=amin_netanyahu/index.html?inline=nyt-per> has on several occasions confronted or even undercut= President Obama chttp://topics.nytimes.comitopireference/timestopics/people/o/ba=ack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , taking his message directly to the Israel chttp://t=pics.nytimes.comitopinews/international/countriesandterritories/israeffind=x.html?inline=nyt-geo> -friendly United States Congress, challenging Mr. Obama's appea= to the Arab world, and seeming this fall to support his opponent, Mitt Romney <http://topics.nytimes.comitopics/referenceitimestopics/people/r/=itt_romney/background/index.html?inline=nyt- per> . Mr. Netanyahu woke =p Wednesday to find not only that his Republican friend had lost, but also=that many Israelis were questioning whether he had risked their collective=relationship with Washington. "This has not bee= a very good morning for Netanyahu," a deputy prime minister, Eli Yishai=of the religious Shas Party, told journalists in Eilat. The prime minister,=facing his own re-election fight on Jan. 22, did not directly acknowledge =ny missteps, but he rushed to repair the relationship. He called the Ameri=an ambassador to his office for a ceremonial hug. He issued a damage-control statement declaring the bond between the t=o nations "rock solid." He put out word to leaders of his Likud Party =hose congratulatory messages had included criticism of Mr. Obama that they=should stop. Mr. Netanyahu still=maintains strong ties to members of Congress, particularly Republicans, an= to other influential Americans. But his strained relationship with Mr. Ob=ma may prove more than a temporary political headache. Israeli leaders and analysts are concerned that the pr=me minister has hampered his ability to influence Washington on vital poli=y matters, particularly the Iranian nuclear threat and the Israeli-Palesti=ian conflict. In practical terms, Jerusalem is worried that Washington will agree to direct talks with Tehra=, and go easier on the Palestinian Authority's quest this month for upgr=ded status in the United Nations. "Netanyahu backed=the wrong horse," Mitchell Barak, a pollster and strategist, said at a m=rning gathering of Americans watching the election results here. "Whoeve= is elected prime minister is going to have to handle the U.S.- Israel relationship, and we all know Netanyahu is not t=e right guy." Mr. Obama's re-el=ction seemed to embolden Ehud Olmert chttp://topics.nytimes.com/topireferenceitimestopics/people/o/ehu=_olmert/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , the former prime minister who has spent the past few years=battling corruption charges, making it more likely that he will forge a co=eback that he hopes can unite and expand Israel's center-left bloc. "Given what Netan=ahu had done these recent months, the question is: Does our prime minister=still have a friend in the White House?" Mr. Olmert asked at a meeting w=th Jewish leaders in New York. "I am not certain of this, and this might be very significant to us at critical poin=s." Few believe that Mr= Obama will act to punish Mr. Netanyahu, but their notoriously tense relat=onship, made worse in recent months not only by the Romney question but al=o by Mr. Netanyahu's hard-line position on Iran, could hurt efforts to coordinate priorities. And freed from elect=ral concerns, the second-term president may prove likelier to pursue his o=n path without worry about backlash from Washington's powerful and wealt=y pro-Israel lobby. 2 EFTA_R1_00071563 EFTA01764345 "I would be surpr=sed if he were more rather than less forthcoming in dealing with Israel,=94 Bob Zelnick, a former Middle East correspondent for ABC News who now te=ches at Boston University, said of Mr. Obama. "My sense is that he both dislikes and distrusts Israeli Prime Minister =etanyahu, and that he is more likely to use his new momentum to settling s=ores than to settling issues." On Iran, the immedi=te concern here is that a White House pursuit of bilateral talks would str=tch out the timetable for diplomacy even as Mr. Netanyahu's famous "re= line" for halting Iran's capability to develop a nuclear weapon closes in. On Wednesday, one member of the inner =ircle of Iran's ruling system said such talks — the subject of an Octo=er article in The New York Times — are "not a taboo," though another=said it was a "big mistake" for Washington to think it could "blackmail" Iran into relations. Several analysts sa=d Mr. Obama was loath to take on a new Middle East military operation; ind=ed, one of the biggest applause lines in his victory speech was his declar=tion that "a decade of war is ending." Regarding the Palestinians, Israeli officials had been counting on the Obama administ=ation to forcefully oppose the United Nations bid — as it did last year =97 and to chastise those countries that support it. But Palestinian leader= seemed unworried on Wednesday, making the bid for nonmember state status in the General Assembly a central focus=of their congratulations. "We will not retr=ct," said Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator. "We hope Pres=dent Obama will even support this move." Regardless of how h= handles the United Nations effort, Mr. Obama is unlikely to pursue the pe=ce process more broadly in the early part of his second term, given the tu=moil across the Middle East and internal divisions among the Palestinians. "I think he recog=izes the importance of this issue — he would be a fool not to," said D=ana Buttu, a political analyst and former Palestinian Authority official b=sed in Ramallah, in the West Bank. "But when it comes to the priority list of issues he will have to deal with, I'm j=st not certain that this is going to be No. 1 or even No. 10 on that list.=94 Ehud Barak, the def=nse minister who shared a close partnership with Mr. Netanyahu for much of=the last four years but has tried to distinguish himself on Iran and other=issues as elections approach, since he leads the separate Independence Party, congratulated Mr. Obama nearly a= hour ahead of Mr. Netanyahu, and followed up by e-mailing reporters photo=raphs and video of himself with the newly re-elected president. "Even if there we=e certain kinds of bumps on the road in recent years, we should be able to=move beyond it," Mr. Barak said in an interview. "There is nothing bet=er to mend any scar or grudge from the past than making better achievements in the present and the future." <=p> Articl= 2. The Newsweek/Daily =east Why Obama Won=t Take Revenge on Bibi 3 EFTA_R1_00071564 EFTA01764346 Pet=r Beinart <http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors=peter-beinart.html> November 7, 2012 -- Within minutes of the President's reelection, my twitter feed was =live with conservatives fretting that Obama will take revenge upon Benjami= Netanyahu for doing everything he could to boost Mitt Romney and almost n=thing to boost Israeli-Palestinian peace. Unfortunately, they're probably wrong. The argument that in a second term Obama will intervene aggressivel= in the peace process rests on the mistaken belief that because he himself=doesn't have to run for reelection, he's freed from worrying about the domestic political costs of friction with Is=ael. That's untrue. Even if Obama is no longer worried=about reelection, virtually every Democrat in Congress still is, and it'= Congress where groups like AIPAC have long focused the bulk of their energy and wielded the bulk of their influence. =f Obama launches a diplomatic initiative that leads him into conflict with=Netanyahu, it will be the Democrats in Congress, especially the ones who r=n the Democratic Congressional and Senatorial Campaign Committees, and thus spend their time raising mone= for the 2014 midterms, who will make their displeasure felt. And given ho= much of Obama's second term fate depends on Democrats controlling the S=nate (and not falling further behind in the House), he won't easily be able to ignore them. What's more, if=Joseph Biden and/or Hillary Clinton have any desire to make their own runs=in 2016, they'll be nervous about an American-Israeli clash, and the Pre=ident will not want to undermine their chances. And while the chances of a politically costly confrontation are hig= if Obama makes a renewed push for peace, the chances of success are low. =etanyahu, a heavy favorite to win reelection, vocally opposes the only parameters—the 1967 lines plus swaps—that cou=d conceivably lead to a peace deal. Mahmoud Abbas publicly favors them, bu= in the four years since he negotiated seriously with Ehud Olmert, he's =rown weaker and less legitimate in the eyes of his people. That means his room to make wrenching concessions (esp=cially on refugees), and get Palestinians to accept them over the likely o=position of Hamas, has shrunk. What's more, Obama's Middle East agenda is crowded with other i=sues. In Bill Clinton's second term, when the region was more placid, he=had the time to invest heavily in Israeli-Palestinian (and Israeli-Syrian) peace. But Obama must grapple with the Iranian nuclea= issue, the bloodbath in Syria and all manner of potential crises in unpre=ictable ex- client states like Egypt. All this will suck up the time that a= intensive peace push would require. Finally, anyone who has spent any time around Democratic foreign po=icy types in recent years knows that many of them are desperate to "pivo=" to Asia. Democrats feel that, for the most part, they've spent Obama's first term cleaning up George W. Bush=92s mess in the greater Middle East. While they know America must remain e=gaged there, they see the region largely as a place where America exerts e=ormous energy trying to keep bad things from getting worse. In Asia, by contrast, a Democratic secretary of state =an imagine himself (or herself) the new Dean Acheson, "present at the cr=ation." Since the greater Middle East has so dominated US foreign policy=in the post-9/11 decade, no president has laid out the kind of strategic vision for America's relationship wit= China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia etc that Acheson, George Kenn=n and Harry Truman famously did vis a vis Europe in the late 1940s. Ws=likely that Asia will receive more foreign policy attention in a second term because it is in Asia that Obama=and his top aides believe they can etch their names in the history books, = consideration that always looms larger in a president's second term. All this could be wrong. I hope it is. But it's worth noting that=while Obama mentioned the peace process often during the 2008 campaign, he=barely ever mentioned it this year. He didn't bring it up in his convention speech, the debates or his acceptan=e speech. The 2008 Democratic platform promised a "personal" president=al "commitment" to Israeli- Palestinian peace. In 2012, that was taken =ut. The Jewish left and the Jewish right both have an interest in promo=ing the idea that Obama will intervene aggressively on the Palestinian iss=e in his second term. For the left, the prospect breeds hope, which fuels Jewish groups fighting for a two state s=lution. For the right, it breeds fear, which fuels Jewish groups skeptical=of a two state solution. But in a 4 EFTA_R1_00071565 EFTA01764347 second term, I suspect, both hopeful dov=s and fearful hawks will encounter presidential indifference, and the looming realization that on the Israel-=alestinian issue, we are entering the post-American age. Articl= 3. Foreign Policy How the Middle East Could Make Or Break Obama's Legacy Aaron David Miller =/span> November 7, 2012 --=Congratulations, Barack Obama. You now join a small club of 16 two-term pr=sidents. (Of those, only 13 actually served out their second four-year ter= -- William McKinley, Abraham Lincoln and Richard Nixon weren't so lucky.) An eight-year run d=es count for something. There are no great one-termers. All consequential =residents require a bond with the public that the validation of a second t=rm provides. Consider it a necessary but not sufficient condition for presidential greatness. Governing this repu=lic effectively is hard and sometimes, I think, borders on the impossible.=To a certain extent, the founders willfully contributed to the problem by =esigning a system that the late constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin brilliantly described as an open invitation to strugg=e. They did so to make the accretion of too much power by an individual or=branch of government very hard. But they still rese=ved for the presidency the capacity -- depending on the president and his =ircumstances -- to lead energetically, in a way 535 elected legislators or=9 Supreme Court jurists cannot. The presidency is the only national office all Americans can vote for -- it st=nds for something special, and remains to this day, regardless of its flaw= and tendency to disappoint, the repository of our hopes and aspirations. John F. Kennedy onc= said that nobody should judge presidents -- not even poor James Buchanan =- because it's impossible to know what it's really like to be in the White=House. Fair enough. At the=same time, we elected you -- myself included. And, not to put too fine a p=int on it, you work for us. And so, having work=d for several of your predecessors on Middle East policy -- and having wat=hed Republican and Democratic administrations succeed and fail in foreign =olicy -- I don't have the slightest reservation in offering up a number of suggestions for your second term. <=span> 1. Don't look fo= transformation this time around. I get the fact that=in your first term you saw yourself as a transformative figure -- a leader=with a mandate to save the nation through bold policies at home and abroad= And maybe you thoug=t the country wanted a savior. I know that Abraham Lincoln was very much o= your mind. With the possible exception of George W. Bush, you owe your pr=sidency to him more than any other man. 5 EFTA_R1_00071566 EFTA01764348 We got the point. Y=u recreated part of Lincoln's train journey to Washington, were sworn in o= his Bible, and all but reenacted his post-inaugural lunch -- right down t= the sour cherry chutney served on Mary Todd Lincoln's china. With all due respec=, Mr. President, try to be a tad more humble and less narcissistic in your=second term. I knew Abe Lincoln, and you're no Abe Lincoln. I know you already think <http://www.politico.cominews/stories/1211/70841.html> you're entitled to be in the presidential hal= of fame, but forget transforming the country at home. Americans don't wan= a polarizing transformer; they want a president who can fix what's broken -- this time with the support of Rep=blicans so that change can be legitimate, authoritative, and successful. Abroad, you also th=ught you would transform the world. You seemed to believe that, somehow, y=ur own persona and the imperfections of your predecessor could combine to =olve historic conflicts and convert adversaries into friends. But the world wasn't and isn't going to be trans=ormed by you or anyone else. Look around at the 192 other nations represented in the United Nations. Do you see any transformative figures there, or =nternational conflicts just waiting to be solved? If the world is ame=able to anything these days, it's transaction. Sports analogies are usuall= horrible, but in this case I think one works: Forget home runs; try small=ball. Moderate progress, after all, can buy time to deal with the bigger issues like Iran and the Israeli-Pale=tinian conflict (more on that later). 2. Legacy cuts b=th ways: the hero or the goat Having been elected=to a second term, the only thing you're running against now is the reputat=ons and accomplishments of your predecessors. Health care -- it's too soon=to know for sure -- may be your domestic legacy. But the temptation to secure a foreign-policy spectacular will be =reat, too. I saw the draw of l=gacy play out in a negative way during the final year of the Clinton admin=stration. As Clinton saw his last days in the White House tick away, he gr=sped on to the idea of hosting an ill-timed, ill-prepared, and poorly thought-through summit with Israeli Prime Ministe= Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat at Camp David in July 2000=The rush to the summit led to a collapse of the peace process from which I=raeli-Palestinian negotiations have yet to recover. Arafat received much of the blame for Camp David's fa=lure, much of it well-deserved but counter- productive nonetheless, leading=to another spasm of violence. As the sand passes =hrough the hourglass of your second term, that's something to keep in mind= Yes, a dramatic success on a tough issue can add to the luster of your pr=sidency. But failure also carries consequences that go well beyond your presidency and can have serious implications for =our successor. 3. Empower your =ecretary of state I would have though=, given the huge domestic crisis you faced in 2008, that you would have be=n only too happy to delegate significant responsibility to your diplomat-i=-chief. And why not? Hillary Clinton is talented and knowledgeable. And while certainly not a great secretary o= state in the mold of Henry Kissinger or James Baker, she has done an imme=se amount to improve America's image by pursuing an agenda of global human=sm -- emphasizing the role of women, the environment, technology, and social media. But when it came to=the big issues such as Iran, Afghanistan, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian=conflict, you withheld far more than you gave. All power on these issues f=owed to and from the White House. Clinton owned not a one of them. No matter whom you =hoose as your next secretary of state, you ought to be more generous in de=egating authority over some of these big issues. 6 EFTA_R1_00071567 EFTA01764349 Yes, this may confl=ct with your desire to forge your own legacy. But presidents can't be ever=where and do everything. Smart and empowered secretaries of state can set =p all kinds of opportunities through the tireless and tedious diplomacy that you may not have the time to join.=Baker worked for nine months to set up the Madrid peace conference for Bus= 41. Madeleine Albright labored for a year and a half to set up the Wye Ri=er Summit and prevented a great deal of Israeli-Palestinian violence in the process. Give your secretary o= state a few big issues -- he or she can actually make you look good, and =erve American national interests too. 4. Come clean on=Benghazi You have a real cre=ibility problem on this one from almost every conceivable angle. You've pr=ded yourself on competence in foreign policy, and yet the fatal attack on =he diplomatic mission in eastern Libya raises serious questions about your administration's judgment and performa=ce. Over the past two m=nths, the questions have piled up higher and higher: Why weren't adequate =reparations taken months before the attack to deal with what was clearly a=higher threat level to Western and U.S. interests in Libya? What was the CIA's role in responding to the cris=s, and the Pentagon's too? And what about the confused and misleading mess=ges that came from your administration as you responded to the crisis? Neither a congressi=nal nor a State Department investigation will be credible enough to answer=these questions. Some independent panel should be created -- one with the =andate to go after the White House, too -- to determine what transpired. In a turbulent Middle East, the threa=s to America's diplomats will continue. We need to figure out a better way=to minimize the risks. 5. The Middle Ea=t is a choice between root canals or migraines. Pick your poison. No region of the wo=ld is going to be more dangerous for the United States than the Middle Eas=. Challenges abound -- but at the moment there don't appear to be a great =any opportunities. Disengagement, sadly, is not an option. Again, think transa=tion, not transformation. On Iran, explore the hell out of diplomacy befor= you seriously consider military action -- let alone war. Getting out of t=ese conflicts is always more difficult than it seems, and the risk-to- reward ratio on Iran is inherently skewed t=ward the risk end. Once a nation acquires the knowledge and capacity to co=struct a nuclear weapon, it can't just be bombed out of its collective con=ciousness. Military actions will at best delay, not prevent, Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. <1=> Unless you can chan=e the mullahcracy in Tehran, your best bet would be an outcome that would =eep Iran years away from actually making a nuclear weapon. Given the depth=of animosity and mistrust between the United States and Iran over the last half-century, the odds of a grand bar=ain are pretty low. But here's how to g=ve it your best shot: Start with an interim arrangement that deals with th= issue of enrichment, and forestalls Iran from acquiring enough highly enr=ched uranium to construct a nuke. To get such a deal, by the way, you can't just come to the party with sticks.=Carrots will be required too -- not only some sanctions relief on the enri=hment question, but developing Iran's enrichment capacity on the civilian =ide. None of this may work -- but a good-faith, sustained effort is critical to your credibility and to any =allow-on military attack. On Israeli-Palestin=an peace, think interim agreements and managing the conflict. Barring some=profound change in the politics of Israel or Palestine, no conflict-ending=solution that addresses borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security is likely. Also, prepare to de=l with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for some time to come. If you're =ooking to get even with him for stiffing you on settlements, sit quietly u=til the urge passes. Israeli elections in January will likely return Bibi 7 EFTA_R1_00071568 EFTA01764350 to power, and if his coalition expands =t will be for the purpose of stability and maybe war with Iran -- not for =old moves toward the Palestinians. Let's face it: You =on't have much credibility with Netanyahu. If you want any progress, you'r= going to have to figure out a way to create a relationship with him. In a=y event, think small for now. Do what you can to keep the Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty afloat. Push internation=l donors to keep the Palestinian Authority in the black. Press hard on kee=ing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation up and running. Push the Isra=lis to end restrictions on movement and economy opportunities for Palestinians. And, if there's a way to encou=age quiet discussion on the least contentious final-status issues like ter=itory and security, try that too. If you truly can't =elp yourself and need to lay out a U.S. plan on all of the big issues, go =head. Chances are they'll still be out there when your successor takes the=inaugural oath. But don't delude yourself with visions of being the man to solve this thing once and for all. On Syria, don't be =ulled into believing that some notional post-election flexibility is going=to expand your options there. As long as the rebels are so inchoate, the r=gime so militarily powerful, and the Russians so supportive of President Bashar al-Assad, the chances for drama=ic change are pretty low. That doesn't mean y=u should be idle on the Syrian front. Do what you can to ease the humanita=ian and refugee crisis. Support Jordan, continue to work with the Turks, a=d support efforts to encourage a credible Syrian opposition. But be wary of a more proactive policy on the military =ide, particularly when it comes to providing sophisticated weaponry to a d=vided rebel movement whose interests may not necessarily be yours and whic= is acquiring its own record of war crimes. 6. Fix America's=house even as you persist in trying to fix others. Here's the bad news= Your credibility will begin to diminish the first day after your inaugura=ion, and your status as a lame duck will grow ever closer as 2016 nears. It's not that you c=n't chew gum and walk at the same time. The United States has to be involv=d in the rest of the world even while its domestic house is in a state of =isarray. The major priority, though, must be on fixing our broken house and addressing the Five Deadly D's that=sap American strength: debt, deficit, dysfunctional politics, decaying inf=astructure, and dependence on hydrocarbons. If you bet on risky adventures=abroad and lose, your credibility and political stock will fall when, in fact, it's badly needed to deal wit= pressing domestic matters, particularly the economy. Governing is about =hoosing. The best thing you can do both for America and its position in th= world is to address the sources of domestic weakness. If you succeed on t=at front, you will be strengthening the foundation on which our foreign policy rests. And in the process, who =nows? You might actually become what you aspire to be -- a truly consequen=ial American president. Aaron David Mill=r is a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center fo= Scholars. His forthcoming book is titled Can America Have Another Great P=esident? Articl= 4. 8 EFTA_R1_00071569 EFTA01764351 Agence Global Why the Middl= East is in Torment Patrick Seale 6 Nov 2012 -- The Middle East is plagued by death, destruction =nd population displacements. A dozen different conflicts are raging. The w=ole region has rarely been in such torment. In Syria, a bitter fratricidal war, largely fuelled by outsiders, threatens=to reduce the country to a smouldering ruin, while consigning tens of thou=ands to the grave. Its neighbours are suffering from the spill-over. Turke= is struggling with a flood of Syrian refugees and a revival of Kurdish militancy. Lebanon and Jordan hav= been dangerously destabilised, and fear the worst. Iraq, once a powerful =rab state, was destroyed and dismembered by America's invasion and bruta= ten-year occupation. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed or wounded and millions displaced. Materia= damage was enormous. The once united country was transformed into a far w=aker federal state by the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the=north. Although Iraq's oil industry is now recovering, its society and its politics remain highly unstable. Ju=t as America's invasion in 2003 was launched on the fraudulent claim tha= Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, so the United States and=its allies are now waging an undeclared war against Iran -- a war of crippling sanctions, cyber-subversion and ass=ssinations. The alleged aim is to force Iran to give up its development of=nuclear weapons -- although there is no credible evidence that Iran is doi=g any such thing. The real aim would seem to be 'regime change' in Tehran. A military attack on Iran =n the New Year cannot be excluded. After eleven years of war in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies =ave failed to stabilise the country, let alone devise a credible exit stra=egy. Their planned departure in 2014 seems likely to turn into a humiliati=g scuttle, while plunging the country into an even more murderous civil war. Meanwhile, Egypt and Tunisia strugg=e to tame their Salafists, while armed gangs in Libya vie for supremacy. In Mali, a war is in preparation to expel militant Islamic groups which hav= captured the northern part of the country and threaten the stability of t=e whole Sahel. In Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and soon possibly in Mali as w=ll, U.S. 'targeted killings' of alleged Islamic terrorists by means of pilotless drones also kill civilian= and terrorise peaceful communities, driving relations between the United =tates and the Muslim world to new depths of misunderstanding and hostility= Meanwhile, unchecked by either the Arab states or the Western powers, Israel continues its relentless seizure of Palestinian territory, finally burying any hope of a two-state solu=ion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and condemning itself to generati=ns of future conflict with the Arab and Muslim world. How has all this come about? What false moves and foolhardy decisions have =rought the region to this lamentable state? In my personal opinion, the fo=lowing are some of the main reasons. • As everyone knows, America's invasion of Iraq triggered a civil war b=tween the Sunni minority and the Shia majority, inflaming antagonisms betw=en these two Muslim communities right across the region. The war transform=d Iraq's regional role. Instead of acting as a counterweight to Iran -- which had long been Iraq's traditio=al role -- Iraq under Shia leadership has become Iran's ally. This has overturned the balance of power in the Gulf region to the alarm of=Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Fear that Ira= has ambitions to dominate the Gulf region has shaped the thinking and the=regional policy of Saudi Arabia and some of its GCC partners. The fear may not be wholly justified, but it=is real nevertheless. • By removing Egypt, the most powerful Arab country, from the Arab milita=y line-up, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 eliminated any possibilit= of a balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It gave Isr=el the freedom to attack its neighbours with impunity and fuelled its ambition for regional dominance. One need on=y recall Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in1981 and =ts invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Many more aggressions were to follow. In I=rael itself, the rise of right-wing and ultra-religious forces hardened the country's determination to expan= its land area and prevent any expression of Palestinian statehood, while =aintaining Israel's military supremacy over the entire Greater Middle Ea=t. • Israel's belligerent and expansionist policy has largely been made po=sible by the considerable influence of American Jews on American politics.=The U.S. Congress seems to have succumbed to AIPAC, the main Jewish lobby.=At the same 9 EFTA_R1_00071570 EFTA01764352 time, AIPAC's sister organisation, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, managed to place its member= in key posts in successive American administrations and generally shape A=erican policy towards the region. Pro-Israeli neo- conservatives pushed the=United States into war against Iraq -- because Saddam Hussein was seen as a potential threat to Israel --=and are now echoing the call of Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanya=u for war against Iran. Against this background, it is not altogether surp=ising that the United States has been unable to halt Israel's land-grab of Palestinian territory, let alo=e persuade it to make peace with the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab=world. • Yet another factor which helps explain the present disastrous situation=is the collapse of Arab nationalism and its replacement by the rise of mil=tant Islam. Arab leaders failed to coordinate their efforts in support of =oint policies. Equally, they failed in their dealings with Western powers to use their considerable financial =nd oil and gas resources in support of Arab causes. The Arab League, a vic=im of inter-Arab quarrels, remains something of a broken reed. What needs to be done? What are the key challenges facing the leading Arab =tates as well as the new American Administration? A great deal will hang o= the way the United States adapts to its changing position in the world. O=ce the world's dominant power, it must now come to terms with a new multi-polar international system. Ame=ica's relative decline (largely brought about by its catastrophic wars a=d the misbehaviour of its deregulated financial institutions) has been mat=hed by the rapid rise of China and a resurgent Russia. The challenges are daunting. First, an urgent effort needs to be made to re=olve the Arab-Israel conflict and bring to birth a Palestinian state. Noth=ng could better stabilise the region. Secondly, Arab leaders should work f=r a Sunni-Shia reconciliation, which must also require an entente with Iran. Iran should be the Arabs' =artner, not its enemy. The United States, in turn, should seek to negotiat= a 'win-win' deal with Tehran -- a perfectly feasible outcome which wo=ld at a stroke remove a major source of dangerous tension. Finally, the United States, the Arab states and the =est of the world should unite in finding a solution to the rise of Islamic=violence. This must surely be done by negotiation and re- education -- and =y a change of state policies -- rather than by force. Is there even the slightest hope that any of this will be accomplished? Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest=book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of=the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press). Articl= 5. Stratfor The Next U.S.=Foreign Policy Team Robert D. Kaplan With the U.S. presi=ential election over, speculation now commences about the makeup of the de=ense and foreign policy team that will assume power following the presiden=ial inauguration Jan. 20. It is not only a matter of who will be the next secretary of defense, secretary of s=ate and national security adviser but also who will fill the critical depu=y positions one, two and three steps below, at the level where the real da=-to-day decisions are made. For what is often just one line in a newspaper -- the United States and Pakist=n resume cooperation on this or that, or the United States and Australia decide to upgrade their military relationship<=a> -- entails many hours of negotiations =ith several American officials present at all times overseas. <http://us4.account- manage.com/transaction/track/click.php=u=74786417f9554984d314d06bd&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfor.com%2F an=lysis%2Famericas-pacific-logic-robert-d-kaplan&url_id=499018aags=3D5,33> 10 EFTA_R1_00071571 EFTA01764353 Foreign policy is m=stly hidden: 90 percent of the effort never warrants a sentence in the med=a, even as it is essential to American interests. There are nearly 200 cou=tries in the world, but the media only seriously follows about one-tenth of them, even as the State Department mu=t conduct daily bilateral relations with almost all of them. And just beca=se a country is not in the news does not mean that America's relations wit= it are not complex and fractious. Media speculation a=out who will get the first- and second-tier jobs in government is often in=ne because the media chttp://us4.account- manage.com/transaction/track/click.php=u=74786417f9554984d314d06bd&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfor.com%2F we=kly%2F20081222_death_deep_throat_and_crisis_journalism&url_id=202341=amp;tags=5,33> confuse who is interesti=g and engaging in print and in conversation with who is actually qualified= Here is a list of the real qualifications of a top-tier foreign policy pr=fessional: He or she has real =dministrative experience. He can manage people and systems -- and get deci=ions implemented fast. This kind of experience comes from the world of cor=orations, government and law firms, much less than from the world of universities and the media. Academic supe=stars like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski are famous exceptions t= this rule. Think tanks also produce top-tier foreign policy officials, pr=vided such institutions are of a basically centrist inclination and are not pushing an ideological agenda= Someone who can thi=k functionally in terms of what works, at minimum risk to the public. This=practical, almost mathematical bent is in line with a corporate or a hard-=ore, think-tank background. Ronald Reagan was a great president in part because he had such men in key positi=ns: Caspar Weinberger as secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci as national =ecurity adviser and George Shultz as secretary of state. These were the te=peramentally bipartisan realists who were able to practically implement Reagan's conservative agenda. Someone who has goo= judgment rather than detailed knowledge of an area. You will have experts=on staff who can brief you, but all the expertise in the world won't help =ou in government if your instincts are bad. It is all about the genius of temperament rather than the genius =f intellect. Donald Rumsfeld had a first-rate intellect but a third-rate t=mperament, at least in his second go-around as secretary of defense under =eorge W. Bush. Someone who is able=to make hard decisions <http://us4.account- manage.comitransaction/track/click.ph=?u=74786417f9554984d314d06bd&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfor.com%2F w=ekly%2Fpurpose-presidential-debates&url_id=202345&tags=5,33> daily whil= still being able to sleep at night. Unlike journalists and intellectuals,=who constantly revise their opinions to suit evolving circumstances, a top=tier government official will be dogged for life for decisions made without the benefit of hindsight. He ca= never walk away from them or revise them. This is especially true in matt=rs of war and peace, in which he will see his name taken in vain in future=libraries full of histories of the period. Someone who can mak= decisions based on very partial evidence, because as Kissinger once famou=ly quipped, by the time all or most of the facts are in, it is too late to=affect the outcome. The world of government is not the world of academia, in which you can hold off publishing a monog=aph for months to add a few more vital footnotes. Someone who can mak= decisions based on the greater strategic good rather than based on how he=or she will look on the newspaper opinion pages the next day. The worst so=ts of officials are those who crave good publicity. Of course, an official has to know how to manage the media= but he must also avoid being captured by it. It is not a require=ent, but it certainly helps to be wealthy. Government jobs pay abysmally. =nd because of electronic communications, the 24-hour news cycle and so on,=officials work longer hours and are under more stress than ever before. Wealth reduces stress, even as it gran=s an official a measure of independence -- from which brave decisions migh= sometimes flow. Wealth means an official can quit his government job over=principle anytime he wants. Someone without wealth, who needs to perform well in government to make wealth lat=r on, is likely to take fewer risks and stand less often on his principles= 11 EFTA_R1_00071572 EFTA01764354 Someone who knows h=w to brief and be briefed. Both things require terseness. Those who feel t=e tendency to give speeches at small, time-constrained meetings and who al=ays have the psychological need to get in the last word are apt to be less successful in government, which, a=ter all, is about social skills at meetings. Successful officials get to t=e point quickly and efficiently extract knowledge from others by asking pe=etrating questions. Someone who knows h=w to be a realist while talking like an idealist <http://us4.account- manage.comitransaction/track=click.php?u=74786417f9554984d314406bd&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfo=.com%2 Fweekly%2Fegypt-and-idealist-realist-debate-us-foreign-policy&ur=_id=202349&tags=5,33> . Idealism provides a state with an identity, even as a state requi=es realism to survive. Someone who does no= need -- for monetary or psychological reasons -- to publish often. Great =ublic servants like former Secretary of State James Baker and former Secre=ary of Defense Robert Gates were never known for brilliant pieces in the newspapers and journals of opinion. Thei= genius was the process of decision-making itself. And that is the essence=of government. In short, the real =oreign policy professionals are people who are all about discipline: disci=line in what they say, in how they think, in how they administer and in th= discipline of maintaining a thick hide against public criticism. Obviously, discipline is not all that is re=uired -- just look at Rumsfeld, an intensely disciplined man -- but, never=heless, discipline is the basis for good judgment and a good management st=le. Remember, America is a vast country that requires a massive security and diplomatic bureaucracy. Turni=g that bureaucracy in the direction you want it to go, and making it all w=rk toward repeated, successful outcomes is more an art than a science. But that art is mor= likely to come from some professional fields more than others. Baker was = high-powered lawyer, Gates spent a life in the intelligence bureaucracy a=d Shultz ran a large engineering firm. While Kissinger and Brzezinski were academics, they also came from World W=r II European immigrant backgrounds, which gave them an emotional and inte=lectual depth relatively rare on today's university campuses. Ideas matter: An ad=inistration without ideas will drift from one tactical fix to another with=no overall direction. But ideas need not always be articulated in print. G=orge H. W. Bush's administration, in which Baker served, was about the sensibility of managing the Cold War to = peaceful conclusion advantageous to the United States, even as none of th= top-tier men had ever published much of note. Keep that in mind when judg=ng the next administration's foreign policy officials. Unfortunately, it i= sometimes hard for the public to scrutinize appointees to top- and upper-=iddle level positions. The media are not always aware of their personal tr=its, for the traits that really matter are often known to a relative small number of people. Meanwhile, congressi=nal hearings on appointees are often a game of gotcha, in which mistakes o=er a long career are exposed for the sake of mere embarrassment or to disq=alify someone who runs ideologically afoul of some members of the committee. The best advice I c=n offer the public in this regard is to try to find out what the colleague= of the appointees themselves have to say about them. In addition, as I sa=d at the beginning, look for people who have a resume of actually running things. 12 EFTA_R1_00071573 EFTA01764355 Articl= 6. Asia Times</=> The politics of money in Palestine Ramzy Baroud Nov 8, '12 -- In Malaysia, a small group of community activists are busy at=work developing projects that benefit most vulnerable members of Palestini=n society in Gaza. Working under the umbrella of Viva Palestina Malaysia (VPM), the group show= solidarity through empowerment projects: interest free loans for small pr=jects, providing employment for women, supplying thousands of solar lamps =imed at ending the persistent darkness for many families, and more. The overall value of the combined efforts of VPM is important because it is=long-lasting. Equally important, the channeled funds are not part of a pol=tical scheme nor are aimed to exact concession. This can hardly be said of=much of the relationship between Palestinian leadership and society, and outside funds, which began pouring=it, with a clear political manual that has been dutifully followed by thos= who provide the funds and those who receive them. That relationship=was once more a subject of scurrility and discussion following the recent visit by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-T=ani, emir of Qatar to Gaza, which has been under an Israeli siege soon fol=owing Hamas' victory in the general elections in 2006. The siege became co=plete in 2007, when llamas clashed with its rival Fatah, perceived by Israel and the US as "moderate&quo=;. Al-Jazeera said the emir's arrival to Gaza was to "to inaugurate a Qat=ri investment project worth hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild the=impoverished and overcrowded coastal enclave". Gaza Prime Minister Is=ail Haniyeh interpreted the visit at a grander scale: "The visit of the emir announces officially the breaching of t=e political and economical siege imposed on Gaza for more than five years.=quot; Analysts, depending on their political leanings, however, spoke of entirely=different mechanism that compelled Qatar's generosity. Those sympathetic t= Fatah warned that empowering Hamas in the Gaza enclave to act as a state =ill further deepen the national divide. Others spoke more candidly of a Qatari reward to Hamas for leaving=Syria at the height of the regional power play ignited by the so-called Ar=b Spring. Judging by the largely measured or reserved response from Israel, the US an= other countries that would have made it impossible for the emir to visit =aza in the first place, Syria might have been the keyword behind the seemi=gly selfless effort. But in any case, there are hardly any inconsistencies between this episode =nd a history rife of the political manipulation of funds. It is an intrins=c relationship that goes even earlier than the signing of the Oslo Accords=in September 1993. Oslo, however, officiated and cemented that relationship in many respects. Merely two wee=s after the signing of the Declaration of Principles issues of internation=l aid became a core subject involving mostly Western donor countries, Arab=countries and others. Although the political dominion of Oslo is all but dead, international aid =ontinues to flow. The rise and decline in funds are often affiliated with =he Palestinian Authority (PA) report card, as in its ability to sustain a =olitical charade and serve as Israel's "partner" despite the fact that Israel has completely altered th= physical reality upon which Oslo was predicated. Despite appearances, Mahmoud Abbas' PA is much less immune to political arm=twisting as a result of its nearly two- decade entanglement of the internat=onal aid cartel, than Hamas. The latter is barely learning the ropes. They=too will eventually learn that there is no such thing as free money, especially when those offering their=services are very much at the heart of the political struggle for the futu=e of the Middle East. 13 EFTA_R1_00071574 EFTA01764356 The link between political statements and action and money is obvious for a=l to see. What may appear as political concessions can oftentimes be attri=uted to some funds being frozen or waiting to be delivered. It is transact=on-based politics at its best. While the PA's budget deficit stands at US$1.3 billion, old friends are bar=ly in a hurry to offset the financial crisis. The US is yet to free $200 m=llion it pledged for the year 2012. The decision has everything to do with=the PA's attempt last year to obtain UN membership for Palestine. Israel on the other hand agreed to an early transfer of $78 million of tax =evenues it collects on behalf of the PA fearing that a collapse of PA inst=tutions could prove too costly for Israel as well. With the conspicuous re=reat of international donors, and the measured Israeli moves, Israel is now earning a greater stake in the P= political investment in the West Bank. Israel is notorious for manipulati=g the weaknesses of the PA whenever the opportunity arises, as it surely w=II. The financial entanglement of the Palestinians to obtain political goals is=not confined to such obvious examples. In fact that political/financial ba=ter is a major component that defines the relationship between Palestinian=leaderships and factions and their supporters. It is the same paradigm that turned thousands of NGOs in Palestine into dis=onnected entities, less concerned with uniting behind a national liberatio= program, and more concerned with maintaining attractive portfolios that m=ke their services more marketable among potential donors, mostly affiliated with the donors' countries that =ave long leased the Palestinian political will in the first place. It is difficult to say what it will take to free the Palestinian leadership=and society from these impossible entanglements. But it goes without sayin= that those who rent their sovereignty to the highest bidder have no busin=ss speaking of national liberation, popular resistance and all the right sounding, but empty slogans. Ramzy Baroud (ramzy=aroud.net <http://ramzybaroud.net> ) is an internationally syndicated columnist and the editor PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighte=: Gaza's Untold Story. 14 EFTA_R1_00071575 EFTA01764357