Redundant Federal‑State Criminal Prosecution as a Check on State Under‑enforcement

Redundant Federal‑State Criminal Prosecution as a Check on State Under‑enforcement The passage outlines a structural feature of U.S. criminal justice federalism—overlapping federal and state jurisdiction that allows federal prosecutors to step in when states decline to charge. While it does not name specific actors, cases, or financial flows, it suggests a systematic mechanism that could be investigated for patterns of selective federal intervention, especially in politically sensitive cases. The lack of concrete leads keeps the score moderate, but the systemic nature and potential for abuse raise investigative usefulness. Key insights: Federal prosecutors can review and override state declinations, creating a de‑facto oversight layer.; U.S. federalism features unusually high redundancy compared with other federations (Canada, Germany, Australia).; The text cites scholarly sources but provides no specific instances of misuse or targeted prosecutions.