Skip to main content
Skip to content

Duplicate Document

This document appears to be a copy. The original version is:

Allegations of Edward Snowden’s CIA employment and internal disciplinary actions
Case File
kaggle-ho-020205House Oversight

Allegations of Edward Snowden’s CIA employment and internal disciplinary actions

Allegations of Edward Snowden’s CIA employment and internal disciplinary actions The passage offers unverified claims that Snowden was a CIA officer stationed in Geneva and faced a derogatory mark for alleged unauthorized computer access. It names specific reporters and agencies, providing some detail (dates, locations) that could be pursued, but the assertions lack corroborating evidence and largely repeat known public narratives, limiting novelty and impact. Key insights: Claims Snowden was on the CIA roster at the US Mission to the UN and worked out of Geneva.; Alleged December 2008 derogatory note placed by a CIA superior for suspected unauthorized computer access.; Reference to New York Times reporter Eric Schmitt’s sources and a former CIA officer’s commentary on ‘necessary containment.’

Date
Unknown
Source
House Oversight
Reference
kaggle-ho-020205
Pages
1
Persons
1
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

Allegations of Edward Snowden’s CIA employment and internal disciplinary actions The passage offers unverified claims that Snowden was a CIA officer stationed in Geneva and faced a derogatory mark for alleged unauthorized computer access. It names specific reporters and agencies, providing some detail (dates, locations) that could be pursued, but the assertions lack corroborating evidence and largely repeat known public narratives, limiting novelty and impact. Key insights: Claims Snowden was on the CIA roster at the US Mission to the UN and worked out of Geneva.; Alleged December 2008 derogatory note placed by a CIA superior for suspected unauthorized computer access.; Reference to New York Times reporter Eric Schmitt’s sources and a former CIA officer’s commentary on ‘necessary containment.’

Persons Referenced (1)

Tags

kagglehouse-oversightmedium-importanceedward-snowdenciaintelligence-oversightinternal-disciplinemedia-criticism

Ask AI About This Document

0Share
PostReddit
Review This Document

Extracted Text (OCR)

EFTA Disclosure
Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
53 to an adversary intelligence services on the prowl for a source. If any party was looking for a disgruntled US employees, Snowden’s Internet chatter about bad choices in gambling could arouse its interest. That Snowden used his TheTrueHooHa alias for these Internet posting would not prevent a sophisticated espionage organization, such as the Russian Intelligence service, from quickly uncovering that his true identity was Edward Snowden. Nor would it be difficult to place him at the CIA since, it will be recalled, he was listed by his true name on the roster of the US Mission to the UN. By consulting personnel records it would further emerge that he did not actually work for the State Department. Since it was no secret, at least to the Russian Intelligence services, that the US mission in Geneva housed the CIA station for all of Switzerland, it was probable that this brittle gambler who played the options market worked for the CIA. Even though it cannot be precluded that Snowden was spotted in Geneva by another intelligence service, there is no evidence, at least that I know of, to suggest that he was approached by one. Nor is there reason to believe that if he had been contacted by a foreign service in 2008, he would have responded positively. Despite his indiscreet posting about his outside activities, he apparently still respected the boundaries of secrecy that had been clearly defined in the oath he had taken in the CIA. For example, after the New York Times published an article revealing secret American intelligence activities in Iran on January 11, 2009, Snowden railed against the newspaper on the Internet under his True HOOHA alias, He wrote “This shit is classified for a reason... It’s because this shit won’t work if Iran knows what we are doing.” He clearly recognized that revealing intelligence sources was extremely damaging. As for the New York Times, he said “Hopefully they’ll finally go bankrupt this year.” When another Internet user asked him if it was unethical to release national security secrets, he answered,” YEEEEEEEEEES.” Nevertheless, he had his career-ending problem at the CIA. As with every CIA officer, he had to undergo a two year evaluation and take a routine polygraph test. It was then, in December 2008, that his superior at the CIA placed the “derog” in his file. The reason remains somewhat murky. According to a New York Times story by veteran intelligence reporter Eric Schmitt, Snowden’s superior had suspected that Snowden “was trying to break into classified computer files to which he was not authorized to have access.” Schmitt evidently had well-placed sources in the CIA. He said that he interviewed two senior American officials who were familiar with the case. According to what they told Schmitt, the CIA superior had decided to “send Snowden home.” Officially, however, according to a CIA reply to the New York Times report, Snowden had not been fired or accused of attempting to “break into classified computer files to which he did not have authorized access.” The discrepancy was explained to me by a former CIA officer who had also been at the US Mission in Geneva. He said that the spin the CIA put on the story was “necessary containment.” After the Snowden breach occurred in June 2013, the CIA had a problem which could, as he put it, “blow up in its face.” If Snowden had been fired but allowed to keep his secrecy clearance in 2009, the CIA’s incompetency could be partly blamed for the NSA’s subsequent employment of him. If he had broken into a computer he was not authorized, he should have been fired, if not arrested. What this spin glossed over, according to this former CIA officer, is the part of Snowden’s behavior that concerned his superior. Technically,

Related Documents (5)

House OversightUnknown

General discussion of surveillance history and Snowden revelations

General discussion of surveillance history and Snowden revelations The passage provides a broad overview of surveillance practices and historical context but does not contain specific, actionable leads, new allegations, or concrete details linking powerful actors to misconduct. Key insights: Mentions Snowden's disclosures about government collection of phone and internet data.; References historical surveillance by J. Edgar Hoover's FBI on civil rights leaders.; States that surveillance programs were authorized by the President, Congress, and federal judges.

1p
House OversightOtherNov 11, 2025

Sparse references to Snowden interviews and Cold‑War defectors

The excerpt consists mainly of citation fragments and generic statements about past defections and interviews. It provides no concrete names, dates, transactions, or actionable leads linking current p Mentions Anatoly Kucherena’s interview about Snowden’s communications. References a Russian researcher (Vassili Sonkine) and author Edward Jay Epstein. Lists a series of Cold‑War American defectors a

1p
House OversightUnknown

Putin allegedly authorized safe‑passage for Edward Snowden, raising questions about Russian facilitation of the NSA leak

Putin allegedly authorized safe‑passage for Edward Snowden, raising questions about Russian facilitation of the NSA leak The passage suggests that President Vladimir Putin personally approved Snowden’s entry and transport in Russia, potentially explaining Aeroflot’s visa waiver and rapid extraction. If true, it links a head of state to the protection of a U.S. intelligence whistleblower, opening avenues to investigate diplomatic communications, flight‑manifest records, and any quid‑pro‑quo with Russian officials. The claim is not widely reported, offers concrete follow‑up steps (e.g., request airline logs, interview Russian consular staff, examine NSA‑Russia liaison logs), and implicates a high‑ranking leader, but lacks hard evidence, keeping it in the moderate‑to‑strong lead range. Key insights: Putin purportedly told an unnamed “agent” that Snowden would be welcome if he stopped damaging Russian‑U.S. relations.; Aeroflot allegedly waived passport/visa checks for Snowden’s flight, possibly on Putin’s orders.; Russian officials reportedly whisked Snowden from Moscow airport to a waiting car within hours of arrival.

1p
House OversightUnknown

NSA’s Global Surveillance Partnerships with Five Eyes and Other Allies

NSA’s Global Surveillance Partnerships with Five Eyes and Other Allies The passage outlines known intelligence-sharing arrangements between the NSA and allied nations, describing capabilities and legal frameworks. It does not provide new, actionable leads, specific transactions, dates, or allegations of misconduct beyond what is already public knowledge. Key insights: NSA collaborates with the Five Eyes alliance (UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) for extensive phone and internet monitoring.; Additional liaisons exist with Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.; British Intelligence Services Act of 1994 allegedly permits GCHQ officers to conduct illegal acts abroad.

1p
House OversightUnknown

Snowden’s encrypted outreach to Laura Poitras via Freedom of the Press Foundation insiders

Snowden’s encrypted outreach to Laura Poitras via Freedom of the Press Foundation insiders The passage details a concrete chain of encrypted communications linking Edward Snowden, through Freedom of the Press Foundation CTO Lee, to journalist Laura Poitras. It identifies specific aliases, dates, and key individuals (Glenn Greenwald, William Binney, Thomas Drake, Julian Assange) and mentions the use of PGP/TOR. While the overall narrative is already public, the specific mention of Lee’s role as a gateway and the timeline (Jan 23 2013) provide actionable leads for verifying communication logs, key exchanges, and possible undisclosed contacts within the foundation. Key insights: Snowden used alias “Anon108” to contact Lee, CTO of Freedom of the Press Foundation.; Lee supplied Poitras’ public PGP key to Snowden after confirming the alias.; Snowden later used alias “Citizen Four” on Jan 23 2013, falsely claiming senior intelligence roles.

1p

Forum Discussions

This document was digitized, indexed, and cross-referenced with 1,500+ persons in the Epstein files. 100% free, ad-free, and independent.

Support This ProjectSupported by 1,550+ people worldwide
Annotations powered by Hypothesis. Select any text on this page to annotate or highlight it.