Speculative claims about Russian/Chinese intelligence recruitment of Edward Snowden and Putin’s motives

130 It is also possible in this Hong Kong scenario that Russian or Chinese intelligence did not become aware of Snowden until after he went public on June 9" 2013 by having the Guardian release his video. At that point, if the Russians or Chinese had any doubts how dissatisfied he was with the NSA, they would be dispelled by the video. Since dissatisfaction is one of the classic means of recruitment in the intelligence business, he certainly would become a prime target for recruitment after he went public. The CIA also considered the possibility that Snowden also may have been reeled in unwittingly. Its Deputy Director, Michael Morell suggested in his book that Snowden may not himself have fully realized “when and how he would be used.” What can be safely assumed is that the decision made by Putin’s intelligence service to allow Snowden to proceed to Russia proceeded from something other than soft-hearted sentiment about his welfare. In addition, this decision was not made on the spur of the moment. After Putin learned that there was an American in Hong Kong from the “special services” seeking to come to Russia, he also learned from Snowden’s own disclosure on the video that he had taken to Hong Kong a large number of NSA documents. After that self-outing by Snowden, Putin had at least 14 days to calculate the advantages and disadvantages of allowing him to come to Moscow. To be sure, we don’t know the precise date of Snowden’s first contact with Russian officials in Hong Kong. Putin reframed from specifying when Snowden first met them. But whenever it was, we know that he was deemed important enough by the Russian intelligence service for it to bring him to the personal attention of Putin. Putin could offer him not only his freedom from arrest but a platform to express his views. The exploitation of an intelligence defector, even after he yields his secrets documents, can also be part of an intelligence operation. General Alexander, who ran the NSA during this period, concluded that Putin was playing a deep game with Snowden by “looking to capitalize on the fact that his [Snowden’s] actions are enormously disruptive and damaging to US interests.” This game, if Alexander’s assessment in correct, might provide Putin with ample reason to have his representatives in Hong Kong offer Snowden an exfiltration deal. Snowden hardly was not in any position to refuse such a deal. After the release of the video release, there was no going back to America without his facing a determined criminal prosecution. If he had researched the issue, he would have known that in every prior case, intelligence workers who had released even a single classified document had gone to prison. As his Internet postings show, he had closely followed the ordeal of Bradley Manning, whose trial was coming to its conclusion while Snowden was in Hong Kong. So he likely knew that even though the documents Manning had sent to Wikileaks were far less damaging than those Snowden had taken. Manning had been kept in solitary confinement under horrific conditions for over a year while awaiting his trial and was facing a long prison sentence. (Manning was subsequently sentenced to 35 years in prison.) There was no reason for Snowden to expect a better outcome for himself if he returned to the US or was arrested in Hong Kong or any other place that had an extradition HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282