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Alleged NSA TOR-tracking capability and possible SVR infiltration via disgruntled contractor
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kaggle-ho-020331House Oversight

Alleged NSA TOR-tracking capability and possible SVR infiltration via disgruntled contractor

Alleged NSA TOR-tracking capability and possible SVR infiltration via disgruntled contractor The passage hints at NSA technical ability to de-anonymize TOR users and suggests a possible Russian SVR foothold through an insider contractor, offering a moderately actionable lead. However, it lacks concrete dates, transaction details, or verifiable evidence, limiting its immediate investigative utility. Key insights: NSA purportedly could tag and follow TOR communications and even borrow users' internet identities.; Former DOJ official claims NSA located Ross Ulbricht’s server by cracking TOR.; CIA Deputy Director Morell criticized NSA cyber security compared to financial institutions.

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House Oversight
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kaggle-ho-020331
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Summary

Alleged NSA TOR-tracking capability and possible SVR infiltration via disgruntled contractor The passage hints at NSA technical ability to de-anonymize TOR users and suggests a possible Russian SVR foothold through an insider contractor, offering a moderately actionable lead. However, it lacks concrete dates, transaction details, or verifiable evidence, limiting its immediate investigative utility. Key insights: NSA purportedly could tag and follow TOR communications and even borrow users' internet identities.; Former DOJ official claims NSA located Ross Ulbricht’s server by cracking TOR.; CIA Deputy Director Morell criticized NSA cyber security compared to financial institutions.

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kagglehouse-oversightmedium-importancensatorcybersecurityrussian-intelligencesvr

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179 messages which would allow it to trace the path of messages that passed through them. Through this technology, it could tag and follow TOR users as their communications travelled across the Internet. It could even borrow their Internet identities. To be sure, the NSA also had such a capability. The Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht discovered to his distress that his TOR software did not make his computer server in Iceland invisible. According to a former top official in the Justice Department, the NSA was able to locate it by cracking the TOR software, (Ulbricht is currently serving a life prison sentence for his Silk Road activities.). Unlike adversary services, however, the NSA needs a warrant to investigate US citizens who use TOR. Even the NSA is not immune from an attack of its own computers. CIA deputy director Morell, who served on the committee evaluating the NSA’s vulnerability in the Snowden affair after retiring from the CIA in 2013, wrote in his 2015 book “The Great War of our Times,” that many financial institutions have “better cyber security than the NSA.” If nothing else, the Internet helped make the activities of US intelligence workers visible to the SVR. Even if the SVR theoretically had opportunities, it still had to find at least one disgruntled civilian contractor inside in the NSA who had access to the sealed-off computer networks. Did it find its man? If so, was it before or after Snowden arrived in Hong Kong with the Level 3 NSA files?

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