Historical account of Saddam Hussein's threats and Israeli/US responses during the 1990 Gulf War

nearly a thousand miles away from us, he tried to divert attention from US-led international condemnation of his invasion by threatening Israel. He said “all issues of occupation” were on the table — the West Bank and Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon — and vowed to “let our fire eat half of Israel” in a future war. And we could not assume this was mere rhetoric. Iraq had an arsenal of Soviet-made ballistic missiles. Called Scuds, they were not always accurate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring of 1988. Even the prospect of American military action seemed not to faze him. Hours into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush’s administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom — the first step in what would become a huge American land, sea and air force to face down Saddam and force him out of Kuwait. Given the credible threat of Scud missile attacks on Israel, Dan immediately assigned me to coordinate our assessment and evaluation of what Saddam was likely to do in the event of a US-led attack, and what defense arrangements or Israeli military response would be necessary. We knew we’d be under strong pressure from the Americans to stay out of any war. Israeli involvement would be a political gift to Saddam, allowing him to convert a conflict over his aggression against an Arab neighbor into a “defense” against “Israeli occupation.” But we had a primary responsibility to protect our citizens. I was now working with a new Israeli government. After Shimon Peres tried and failed to topple the unity coalition in the spring of 1990, Shamir had formed a Likud-led government shorn of both Peres and Rabin. Misha Arens was again Minister of Defense. I began preparing regular, fortnightly reports for him, Dan and Prime Minister Shamir. Within days of the invasion, I produced my initial assessment. The bottom line was that we had to assume there would be a war. It was impossible to imagine the Americans would commit hundreds of thousands of troops and simply bring them home again, unless Saddam succumbed and retreated. I was equally certain Saddam would use his Scuds against us. He’d figure the benefits of trying to bring Israel into the conflict far outweighed the risk of retaliation. But I was “nearly 100 per-cent sure” he wouldn’t use chemical warheads, since that would almost guarantee an Israeli military 230 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028078